米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件　沖縄関係　米国議会審議（議会証言、議事録）

資料

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

送付公信

政 第2211号	昭和44年3月18日
外務大臣殿	在米下田大使
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送付資料

沖縄問題（マスキー議員の選挙民への書簡）

Mar. 1, 1969

"Letter to Maine" from Senator Muskie

付属添付 ☑　付属空便（行） ☐　付属空便（D. P.） ☐

本信写送付先：

（別添省略）

44.3.22

Letter to MAINE

from

Senator Edmund S. Muskie

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ASAKAI

March 1, 1969

Dear Friends:

During the mid-February Congressional recess, I spent a week in Japan participating in the Japanese-American Interparliamentary Conference sponsored by Columbia University. It was the third such conference to be held since autumn 1967, and the second I have attended.

The issue that was most in evidence during the six days of dawn-to-dusk meetings was Okinawa. Okinawa is not a large island, but it is important to the United States because of its effect on our position in Asia.

In Japan, the Okinawa issue is intensely emotional. If it is not resolved in a way supported by a majority of the Japanese people, it could threaten continuation of the American-Japanese Security Treaty and undermine Japan's pro-American foreign policy, as well as our relations generally.

A million Okinawans live under American military rule, and they consider themselves deprived of human rights and their rights as Japanese citizens. They and mainland Japanese want to have the issue settled generally.

The question of Okinawa involves first the reversion of civil administrative control of the island to the Japanese. We have conceded since World War II that Okinawa--at some time-- should be returned to Japan, but no date for reversion, even of administrative control, has yet been negotiated. I am convinced that the United States and Japan should agree this year on a date for beginning of the reversion process, which could begin as early as 1970 or 1971.

The most difficult problem involved is, of course, the status of American military bases, once administrative control is returned to the Japanese. The key question is whether the use of our military bases on Okinawa should be limited, and if so, how much. We must consider the Okinawa bases in light of their importance to our entire Asian foreign policy and the changing nature of our defense requirements.

In this regard, we would have to weigh the judgments of our military and foreign policy experts carefully. Our objective should be to move toward a reduction of our military presence in Japan. Specific recommendations toward that end should be seriously considered this year. In any event, I am strongly in favor of moving toward early restoration of civil administration of Okinawa to the government of Japan.

Sincerely,

Edmund S. Muskie

MACHIASPORT

PLUS CA CHANGE--

There is a French saying quite appropriate to the continued fight over the Machiasport Foreign Trade Zone proposal: "Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose." --The more things change, the more they are the same.

During the last days of the Johnson Administration, Senator Muskie and other New England congressional leaders, along with Governor Curtis and his colleagues, pressed Secretary of Commerce C. R. Smith to make a decision on the trade zone without getting it bogged down in the oil import license problem. The oil question, Senator Muskie said, should be resolved outside the decision on the trade zone. Secretary Smith declined to make that decision.

After the Nixon Administration took office, Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans indicated he wanted to make an early decision on the trade zone. The alternate members of the Foreign Trade Zone Board voted approval of the project. President Nixon took oil policy decisions out of Interior Secretary Hickel's hands. Secretary Stans announced that he would not act on the trade zone application until after an oil import decision had been reached.

--PLUS C'EST LA MEME CHOSE.

OIL POLLUTION IN CALAIS

The oil spill which has covered three miles of beaches and shoreline of the St. Croix River at Calais underscores the need for enactment of the Water Quality Improvement Act, which Senator Muskie introduced last month.

The St. Croix River incident is similar to other tragedies involving oil discharges from vessels, shore installations and off-shore oil rigs in other parts of the country. It represents a constant threat to our waterways and the adjoining shores.

Remedies under present law are limited, but Senator Muskie requested the International Joint Commission to investigate the Calais spill, its origins and possible steps to clean it up.

The Water Quality Improvement Act would have provided the mechanism in the St. Croix case for immediate action to control and clean up such a spill before it became a major environmental problem.

Senator Muskie is pressing for enactment of the bill this spring.

LEGISLATION

Regional Development Act of 1969. Senator Muskie introduced this bill to extend and expand the programs and opportunities of the five regional economic development commissions, including New England's.

They were authorized under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, which Senator Muskie introduced. Its objective is to provide Federal help for regions whose economies lag behind the national average.

In 1967, the Act was amended to authorize the commissions to make initial supplemental grants to on-going Federal grant-in-aid projects as a modest program to strengthen regional economies. In addition, the amendments directed the commissions to develop comprehensive long-range economic plans defining needs and priorities and proposing programs to meet the needs.

Senator Muskie's bill this year would enable the commissions to implement those long-range plans, by authorizing $50 million for each commission over the next two years. The bill also would extend Federal technical assistance to the commissions, and authorize them to continue their supplemental grant programs.

Senator Muskie said, "The long-range plans developed by the regional commissions represent agreement by both Federal and State governments on what needs to be done and the sharing of responsibilities for doing it. Now the commissions need the authorization to carry out their plans in accordance with the objectives of the Congress in 1965."

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

送付公信

政 第6646号	昭和44年8月12日
外務大臣 殿	在米下田大使
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送付資料

アメリカン・リージョンの沖縄、グアム島及び硫黄島に関する行動

最近発刊になった同リージョンの1968年大会の議事録から関係部分を御参考まで送付申上げる。

Proceedings of 50th National Convention of the American Legion, New Orleans, La.:September 6-12, 1968 (91st Congress, 1st Session.....House Document No. 83)

p. 247, Register No. 1338 (New Jersey Department Executive Committee) "To Retain Islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa for Permanent U.S. Possessions"

p. 254, Memorials on Guam

p. 274, Memorial on Guam to American dead of World War II Resolution 296-1967

(希望配付先：)

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要処理 / 首席事務官 / 南方 / 渉外 調査 / 漁業 / 航空 / 科学協力 / 連絡調整 / 調査 / カナダ / 局庶務

文書課受領 44.8.15

p. 247, Report of the National Adjutant
Foreign relations commission
Action on Referred Resolutions

Resolutions received from national adjutant

REGISTER NO. 1338 (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE)—"TO RETAIN ISLANDS OF IWO JIMA AND OKINAWA FOR PERMANENT U.S. POSSESSIONS"

This resolution was initially received during the executive subcommittee meeting of April 29–30, 1968. It was referred to the staff for study and report to the full commission's preconvention meeting in New Orleans. (This action was contained in the chairman's report to the May 1–2, 1968, NEC meeting.)

↑ (National Executive Committee)

p. 254, Report of the National Adjutant
Foreign relations commission
Conclusion

Memorials on Guam.—The House Foreign Affairs Committee failed to hold hearings on our bill, House Resolution 475, which would declare it to be the sense of the House of Representatives that it opposes "the proposal of the South Pacific Memorial Association or any other group or organization to construct on Guam a monument dedicated to Japanese servicemen who died while fighting American forces." This was based on a 1966 convention resolution, No. 166, expressing the Legion's opposition to such a memorial on Guam. Also, we failed in our efforts to get the Congress to add $200,000 to the fiscal year 1969 appropriations of the American Battle Monuments Commission, for the purpose of its constructing on Guam an already planned and designed memorial to the American servicemen who lost their lives there in World War II. This effort was pursuant to resolution No. 296 of the 1967 convention. On the other hand, the Department of State—during the report period—expressed to Congress what seemed to be a reversal of its earlier position regarding a Japanese memorial on Guam. Initially, the State Department had indicated that it "approved" such a memorial project on the grounds that it "would be consistent with our encouragement of the promotion and maintenance of close and friendly relations with our ally, Japan." (Our resolution, No. 296, had pointed out, however, that the State Department opposed an American war-dead memorial on Okinawa—for precisely opposite reasons.)

In a letter dated February 1, 1968, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations advised the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Department had taken steps to correct "any misinterpretation" by advising the South Pacific Memorial Association's representatives that the Department did not have authority to give official authorization to their project, and that the proposal had "provoked a great deal of controversy, which had cast a cloud over the original intent of promoting friendly relations." The Department's spokesman also stated that the promoters of the Japanese memorial had been advised that they "may well wish to reconsider" the project. This letter to the chairman was prompted by the Legion's bill, House Resolution 475, which Congressman Selden of Alabama, introduced at our request. It, therefore, had a good effect, even though it was not given formal consideration.

p. 274, Report of the National Adjutant
Legislative commission
Foreign relations

Memorial on Guam to American dead of World War II
Resolution 296—1967 (Res. 116—1966)

For previous action on Resolution 116, 1966, see 1967 report.

H.R. 17522, May 24, 1968, Representative Rooney (New York), to make appropriations for the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and related agencies for fiscal year 1969; House Report 1468.

H.R. 17522 passed the House on May 28, 1968.

On June 17, 1968, Director Stringer wrote to Senator McClellan, chairman, Subcommittee on Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and to each member of the subcommittee, requesting that $200,000 be added to the above appropriation bill for the erection of a memorial on Guam to American dead of World War II.

H.R. 17522 passed the Senate July 29, 1968, and went to conference.

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

送　付　公　信

政　第 7578 号	昭和44年　9月 16日
外　務　大　臣　　殿	在　米　下　田　大　使

引用 (来)(往)公信・電信番号

送　付　資　料

沖縄問題に関する記事

記：9月12日付コングレッショナル・クォーターリー
"U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN ASIA: THE OKINAWA QUESTION"

（希望配付先：　　　　　　　　　　）

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(郵)

本信写送付先：　　　　　　（別添省略）

要処理
首席事務官
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漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務

44.9.19

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Fact Sheet **OKINAWA**

U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN ASIA: THE OKINAWA QUESTION

"The future status of Okinawa is the number one issue in Japanese politics," a Japanese Embassy official commented in mid-summer 1969. "It is also the biggest problem facing U.S.-Japanese relations."

U.S. officials agree that a satisfactory arrangement on Okinawa is a prerequisite for continued close ties with Japan. These ties are described by U.S. diplomats as of incalculable value to the United States.

The outcome of negotiations on the Okinawa question will affect U.S.-Japanese political relations in the years ahead. More immediately, the outcome will have an important bearing on the prospects for continuing the nine-year-old U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The treaty will be extended automatically and indefinitely on June 23, 1970, unless at any time thereafter either party wishes to negotiate a revision or gives one-year notice that it wishes to dissolve the pact.

Both governments are firmly committed to the treaty and the relationship it symbolizes, but they differ on its extension to Okinawa. The government of Premier Eisaku Sato has demanded reversion of Okinawa and the other islands of the Okinawa chain (or Ryukyus, as they are called by the United States) to Japanese administration by 1972. At that time, the Sato government contends, the U.S. bases on Okinawa—the use of which is currently unrestricted—should be governed by the limitations now applying to bases in mainland Japan, as spelled out in documents relating to the mutual security treaty and the Japanese constitution. In effect, this would ban nuclear weapons on Okinawa and would require prior consultation with Japan on the use of the bases for offensive combat missions not directly related to Japan's defense.

Demands for mainland status intensified after the July 24, 1969, disclosure that poison gas had been stored on Okinawa. Although the Defense Department quickly promised to remove the gas, such incidents create what one Japanese Embassy official has called a "credibility gap" in U.S.-Japanese relations, adding to the pressure for prior consultation on Okinawa military operations.

The U.S. Government has agreed that the issues of administrative reversion and the status of the bases are inseparable. But it views the question from the perspective of its far-reaching Asian defense commitments and its ability to honor them.

Whether U.S. security requirements necessarily entail continued totally free use of Okinawa is a major point of controversy between the United States and Japan as well as among American defense analysts. So, too, is the nature and extent of the Communist threat facing Asia, which, in turn, will affect the future U.S. military role in the Far East.

Negotiations on Okinawa began April 2, 1969, when a preliminary sounding was taken by Japan's influential elder statesman, former President Nobusuke Kishi, who came to Washington for the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kishi presented to Mr. Nixon his personal view that reversion should occur as soon as possible, combined with the removal of nuclear weapons from U.S. bases on Okinawa.

By the end of May, the Japanese government had settled on its proposals, which Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi conveyed to President Nixon and Administration officials during a five-day visit to Washington June 2-6.

Officials on both sides hoped that most of the major differences in the two governments' positions could be resolved when Aichi returned to Washington Sept. 11. Sato will come to the United States in late November. Both governments believe that substantial progress in working out a satisfactory arrangement must be made by then.

The Issues

For additional background, see E.R.R. Report of June 25, 1969: "Okinawa Question" 1969 Vol. I, p. 473.

Administration of the Ryukyus. Japan annexed Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands in 1879. But the United States has governed the territory since Japanese officials unconditionally surrendered it in 1945, following one of the costliest battles of the Pacific. Article 3 of the 1951 peace treaty with Japan formally sealed the U.S. position as the "sole administering authority," with the "right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands." (Okinawa has been governed by a U.S. military high commissioner, but increasing civilian control has been gradually turned over to Okinawans.)

By 1967, a poll showed that 100 percent of Okinawan respondents favored immediate reversion to Japanese control; by 1969, all of Japan's leading political parties were lobbying vigorously for an immediate return of the Ryukyus.

The reversion issue indicates a more general reassertion of Japanese pride and independence—also demonstrated by the early September visit of Aichi to Moscow, where he discussed the return of the Soviet-held Kurile islands.

Demands for administrative reversion have been magnified by widespread opposition to U.S. free use of the bases. Most Japanese—including the Liberal-Democratic ruling party—believe that political reversion is a means to obtain limitations on the use of these bases. The link between the two issues was emphasized in November 1968, when the United States allowed Okinawans to participate in the first popular election of a local chief executive. The victor—Chobyo Yara—ran on a platform of immediate reversion to Japanese control, removal of nuclear weapons and an end to B-52 Vietnam bombing missions originating on Okinawa.

Although all U.S. Presidents since 1951 have acknowledged Japan's ultimate sovereignty over the islands, no firm date for reversion has been fixed, because U.S. officials have felt that doing so would jeopardize military operations that have been regarded as essential for Asian defense.

When Sato visited Washington in 1967, he expected to reach an agreement on reversion. But the premier succeeded only in obtaining return of the Bonin island chain (which reverted to Japan June 26, 1968) and a pledge by President Johnson to keep the status of Okinawa under continuous review.

The premier has pledged to bring home a specific reversion timetable after his November talks with Mr. Nixon. U.S. and Japanese diplomats have said Sato's political future depends on the success of his mission.

The constraints of Japanese public opinion on Sato's negotiating position are fully understood by the Nixon Administration. Moreover, the Administration recognizes that an alternative to the Sato government would be one which—at least temporarily—would have to be less friendly to the United States. U.S. officials are therefore taking into account the fact that it may be impossible to maintain the status quo of U.S. administrative control, combined with completely free use of the bases. A semi-official Japanese advisory council cautioned March 10 that the strategic value of retaining control over the islands' administration "would be extremely small compared to the political loss that could be incurred...."

Faced with this possibility, the Nixon Administration now has modified previous U.S. policy and is willing to discuss reversion by 1972 or 1973, provided a satisfactory agreement on the bases is reached.

Relation to the Mutual Security Treaty. "The political opposition in Japan apparently views Okinawa reversion, in the context of rising Japanese self-confidence, as the issue best suited to obtain popular support for the challenge of the treaty and the entire U.S.-Japanese relationship," reported an eight-member House Foreign Affairs Committee far eastern study mission in March 1969. "Unless the Okinawa issue is resolved by the time the treaty becomes subject to renegotiation, Japanese domestic political pressure may force the Japanese government to engage in a renegotiation process. Negotiations under these circumstances would be very difficult, despite the present government's friendly attitude toward the United States."

The 1960 treaty superseded a 1951 arrangement under which the United States undertook primary responsibility for the defense of Japan. It restored full sovereignty to Japan in matters of defense and made the two nations partners in a defense alliance to maintain "international peace and security in the Far East." The signatories pledged to come to each other's defense if either was attacked in territories under Japanese administration, and it reaffirmed U.S. rights to land, air and naval bases on the mainland.

Declarations attached to the 1960 treaty placed restraints on U.S. use of the installations, however. The United States agreed that major changes in the equipment or use of facilities for combat operations "shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the government of Japan."

In fact, the United States has never held prior consultations with Japan because it has never attempted such major changes as introducing nuclear weapons into its mainland bases or inaugurating combat missions from

U.S. Military Presence in Japan

Okinawa. The United States maintains what American military officials proudly refer to as a $2-billion complex on Okinawa. About 110 square miles (or 25 percent of the total land surface) have been appropriated for 120 bases on an island 3/8 the area of Rhode Island. Added to a population of 900,000 Okinawans are 45,000 U.S. troops. Americans in 1968 spent $260 million in Okinawa—in addition to official U.S. Government aid of about $24 million.

Okinawa is the only Asian base in which the United States has a totally free hand. Its position is extremely strategic, since the island lies within 1,000 miles of Taiwan, most of Korea, large parts of Japan proper, the Philippines and Communist China.

Okinawa serves as a fueling and supply station for American activities in Asia, including combat operations in Vietnam. A counter-guerrilla warfare school, extensive warehouses and military hospitals and the computer center for Vietnam logistics are located on the island. The 5,620-acre Kadena Air Base is one of the largest Air Force installations in Asia and is able to handle an almost unlimited number of all types of U.S. planes. Special forces train for Vietnam in the Okinawan jungles; the Marines have a division headquarters; and the Navy operates several ports. Psychological warfare operations, radio monitoring, intelligence operations, Voice of America broadcast facilities to the Asian mainland—all are located on Okinawa. So, too, are two chemical companies—the 267th and 137th—under the 2nd Logistical Command, which has testing facilities for chemical warfare.

B-52 bombers have been stationed in Okinawa since 1966. Additional B-52s were sent there following the January 1968 seizure of the *Pueblo* by North Korea. They have been flying sorties to Vietnam regularly since then, although the United States has not officially acknowledged this.

The U.S. military has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on the island, but it is known that they are stockpiled on Okinawa.

Japan. The United States has reduced the number of its military installations in mainland Japan from more than 2,500 in 1952 to 149 in mid-1969. In 1968, the United States agreed to a further reduction of 50 minor installations. The United States maintains six major bases and two naval installations in Japan, employing 35,200 Americans in uniform. The U.S. presence is, according to a State Department official, "very visible," and is accentuated by the fact that the bases are in or near population centers.

The Japanese government's position on the U.S. bases in Okinawa and on the mainland is that they are necessary and should remain. Of the major opposition parties, the Democratic Socialists and Komeito will settle for mainland status for Okinawa as a first step toward the eventual removal of all U.S. troops from Japan. The Socialist and Communist Parties demand immediate removal of all U.S. bases.

them. It is generally acknowledged that Japan would veto these changes.

Although a majority of Japanese believe that the treaty is in Japan's best interests, substantial opposition to the pact has existed since 1960, when protests led to the resignation of Kishi and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Tokyo. The Socialist-Communist left continues to argue that instead of protecting Japan, the treaty is actually provocative, because it links Japan too closely with the wide-ranging commitments of the United States and permits U.S. bases in Japan. Leftists also have expressed a desire to abolish the Far East peace and security clause.

Under these circumstances, the Sato government wishes to avoid any changes in the pact which would require resubmission to the legislature, risking an attack on the entire U.S.-Japanese defense relationship.

The Nixon Administration also wishes to avoid renegotiating the treaty in the face of Japanese leftist opinion. In addition, Congressional criticism of U.S. commitments now is at a peak and could be directed at the Japanese relationship, particularly in view of Congressional pique at Japan's economic policies and refusal to shoulder more of the defense burden.

Impact on the Status of Okinawa Bases. If Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration, the laws governing Japan—including the mutual security treaty—would automatically extend to U.S. bases there, unless special arrangements were negotiated. Under the terms of the treaty and its related documents, the United States would have to consult with Japan on the use of these bases.

The Nuclear Question. The country's so-called "nuclear allergy" has dominated Japanese thinking on the Okinawa bases. Sato has firmly insisted on removal of nuclear weapons with political reversion.

There are conflicting opinions on the necessity of maintaining nuclear weapons on Okinawa. Prof. Albert Wohlstetter, a Pentagon consultant, has said that changes in the technology of weapons delivery—development of long-range and Polaris missiles—"have diminished and will continue to diminish the value of potential nuclear operations from close-in."

The Japanese government concurs with this analysis. While recognizing the necessity of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, most Japanese do not believe nuclear weapons on Okinawa add to the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.

Many U.S. officials challenge the Japanese assessment, pointing to the development of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese and the psychological effects of removing nuclear weapons as an invitation to Communist aggression. But they recognize that the nuclear issue is particularly sensitive and that the political repercussions of maintaining stockpiles on Okinawa after reversion could be a backlash of opinion that would be even more detrimental to the U.S. military position there.

"Free Use" Issue. The United States is particularly concerned to obtain guarantees of continued "free use" of the Okinawa bases—at least in circumstances it considers emergencies. Although the Sato government wants the bases to revert to mainland status, it has indicated that it could agree to "free use" in cases of "serious emergency." The premier has also suggested that "prior consultations" could mean Japanese approval, rather than a veto, of U.S. operations.

Spokesmen for the Administration have expressed doubts as to the acceptability of these terms. First, the spokesmen point to ambiguities in the concept of serious emergency. U.S. negotiators will want to have this spelled out in some detail in a written agreement that would be binding on subsequent governments. Japanese negotiators have replied that it would be politically impossible for their government to agree to these terms. They have argued that a broad oral pledge, based on good faith, would be sufficient.

Complicating the prospects for a "free use" agreement is the divergence in U.S. and Japanese definitions of a serious emergency. According to a government official, the Japanese regard the term as characterizing such cases as an invasion of South Korea or Nationalist China and would not agree that incidents such as the seizure by North Korea of the U.S. espionage ship *Pueblo* would warrant reversion to free use status. The United States wishes to remain flexible in responding in any manner it chooses to any act it regards as aggression. And the United States has objected to prior consultation on the grounds that it would impede a quick response to crises.

The question of B-52 flights will receive particular attention in this context. The Sato government is under pressure to obtain their termination. But the United States considers this impossible so long as the Vietnam war continues and other Communist nations follow policies deemed aggressive by Washington.

U.S. Military Role in Asia

The United States has an extensive network of commitments in Asia: the 11-nation Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. ANZUS Treaty and bilateral defense pacts with the Republic of China (1954), South Korea (1953) and the Philippines (1951).

To carry out these commitments, the United States has stationed some one million men in the Pacific. The Okinawa complex, however, is the only one in Asia for which the United States has completely free use. Two Asian nations—South Korea and Nationalist China—have argued vigorously that continued unrestricted use of the Okinawa bases is essential to their own security. Their attitude may place constraints on the U.S. position.

Paradoxically, the possibility also exists that if Japan were to obtain veto power in Okinawa, other nations might be given further encouragement to press for U.S. concessions in return for continued base rights in their territory. Dissatisfaction with U.S. bases runs particularly deep in the Philippines.

A More Cautious U.S. Military Role in Asia? U.S. commitments in Asia and the manner in which they will be honored in the future are under review by Congress and the Administration. The results of this review will have a bearing on the value of maintaining the current status of Okinawa against strong Japanese opposition.

Before leaving on a five-day tour of Asia, President Nixon cautiously proposed some new directions for U.S. Asian policy. Although he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to existing defense arrangements, he indicated (in Guam July 25) that his Administration would avoid additional pledges and would interpret existing commitments somewhat differently in the future. The United States, he said, would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella for

Asia and would be prepared to meet threats of aggression by a nuclear power, but it might be less willing to intervene militarily in cases of internal subversion or to jump in immediately in cases of aggression by a non-nuclear nation. At the same time, Mr. Nixon emphasized that the United States was a Pacific power and would retain its long-standing interest in the region.

A gradual evolution and redefinition of U.S. military policy in Asia is apparently supported by a majority on Capitol Hill, where there is increasing concern with avoiding the "escalation" of commitments and possible overreactions to over-emphasized threats.

Because U.S. military policy in Asia in the post-Vietnam period will probably be more restrained, the necessity to retain a free hand in Okinawa in order to respond quickly and alone to local threats (short of massive aggression) may diminish.

However, the Administration will also have to consider the impact on Asian security of Britain's projected "East of Suez" withdrawal by 1971. And as long as the United States continues to have wide-ranging defense pacts in Asia, many Government officials and Members of Congress believe that the military status of Okinawa should remain unchanged. If the United States retained "free use" after reversion, the bases would be the only ones in the world under a foreign government enjoying total free use status.

A Larger Japanese Defense Contribution? Along with an increasing disinclination to assume the sole responsibility for Asian defense, the Nixon Administration and many Members of Congress have urged the nations of Asia to assume a larger share of their own defense. The fact that the Japanese defense budget is abnormally low has frequently been criticized. In 1968, Japan's defense budget was $1.17 billion, or .83 percent of its gross national product (GNP), compared with 9½ percent in the United States.

Defense analysts have said that Japan must be prepared to increase its 275,000-man defense force in the years ahead and to devote at least 2 percent of its GNP to defense. A Japanese government official, however, has said that 1.2 percent is probably more realistic.

The Japanese government has said that it will assume responsibility for the security of the Ryukyus after reversion and is prepared to increase its defense forces.

But a larger military role for Japan is psychologically unacceptable to most Japanese. It is therefore unlikely that Japan would join any Asian military alliance in the foreseeable future. Article 9 of the constitution has been interpreted as prohibiting the stationing of Japanese troops abroad. Many of the Asian nations that have pressed for a regional defense alliance have expressed apprehension about possible Japanese rearmament.

Any increases in the Japanese defense contribution may be dependent on—and would therefore follow—U.S. concessions on Okinawa. If the United States were to agree to prior consultation, the lines of communication with Japan would have to be strengthened. The Japanese government has proposed a joint standing military committee for this purpose.

In a speech June 19, Sato called for an end to Japan's "negative pacifism" and said the country should demonstrate more "initiative and originality in foreign policy." But Japanese leadership will almost certainly be economic rather than military. Takeo Fukuda, Japan's influential finance minister, has predicted that the country's aid to Asia could double within the next five years (Japanese aid to Asia in 1967 amounted to about $343.3 million).

Japan's view of its future role in Asia rests partly on its assessment of the military threat facing the region. Most Japanese have been described as complacent toward the possibility of large-scale aggression by the Communist Chinese. This, in turn, has influenced Tokyo's position on the Okinawa bases.

Although the Nixon Administration has recently made some modest overtures toward normalizing U.S. relations with Communist China, officials have reiterated the view that Communist Chinese policy remains aggressive and poses the greatest military threat to Asian peace.

Outlook

While visiting Tokyo in February, Sen. Hugh Scott (R Pa.) predicted that the Nixon Administration would take a firm stand in the negotiations, insisting that there would be no U.S. concessions without comparable compromises from Japan.

Economic Issues. Complicating the Okinawa negotiations are simultaneous talks on resolving conflicts in U.S.-Japanese trade, which now totals more than $7 billion a year. U.S. officials and many Members of Congress have expressed concern over the large U.S. trade deficit with Japan—more than $1 billion in 1968—which, along with U.S. military expenditures and about $24 million in economic aid to Okinawa, contributed heavily to the U.S. balance of payments deficit.

In addition, U.S. officials have been trying to obtain voluntary restrictions on Japan's textile exports as well as liberalization of the country's commodity import quotas (which apply to more than 100 U.S. products) and its strict foreign investment regulations. If the Japanese do not move more quickly in these areas, the Administration may be less willing to accede to their demands on Okinawa. The Japanese might accede to U.S. trade demands in return for the possibility of receiving a more sympathetic hearing on Okinawa. *(For fact sheet on trade problems, see Weekly Report p. 1292.)*

Form and Outcome of the Negotiations. The Nixon Administration has indicated it is willing to agree to reversion by 1972 (through an executive exchange of notes, rather than revising the 1951 peace treaty), contingent upon Japanese willingness to assume major responsibility for the defense of the Ryukyus. In return, the Administration has insisted on detailed guarantees—by way of an executive agreement binding on future governments—on free use of the bases in emergencies. The most difficult negotiations will come in reconciling the U.S. and Japanese positions on this question. If a satisfactory arrangement is obtained, the Administration might agree to remove nuclear weapons, provided they could be reintroduced in the event of a serious emergency. Working in favor of an acceptable agreement is the desire of both governments to maintain close defense relations.

Difficult negotiations lie ahead for the United States and its major Pacific ally. Their outcome may determine the nature and scope of the future U.S. commitment in Asia.