

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

日米関係（沖縄返還） 47

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椎名外相・ジヨソソソ大使会談 (4/11/26)

極秘

事務次官

別送(同)

政治課長(和段)

国際協力課長(和段)

北米局長

参事官

北米課長

横倉大佐・ジョーンズ大佐会談録

(41.11.26)
米比

26日午前 ジョーンズ大佐は横倉大佐を参訪(露友会館) 約30分会談した。電音次の通り

(同席者 庵川北米局長 ガーランド参事官 通訳 渡辺)

1. 沖縄援助問題に因り 先方は別添のトキン・ハーパーと交渉の上、その電文として、(1) 当初米側は

り 1,800万ドル台の提案を行なったのに対し 日本側から 2,830万ドル台の反対提案があった。米

側といは、森長官が 100億台というように政治的意図を述べたことによると、日本側対策には相当の

時間がかかったが、今は政府部内での調整をい

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おられた。その了解した。等から 日本側対策の
範囲により ~~受取~~ 協定を正式提案を行
受取していただけるかと

ない。その後も細目について 18日 完全に日本側を
おと容れられ、今より、従って、その後 新開

1. 米側から多額の電文をいただいたが、^{それ}非難され
た。苦痛であった。(2) 従って、米側の立場は

明らかであり、現在の提案のみ、最終的な案に
達したいというところから、日本側の立場、困難

を理解しようとして、どうしてもというところから、細目
の再検討に協力するつもりである。たゞ、その場合

は、早急に検討が終了するのを期待する。日本政
府としての最終決定が ~~ある~~ ^{ある}は、協定を調停
する。

し、そのことについて、(3) 以上から、新開の日本協
力関係が、総論(和段) 事前の調整がつく

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2. 18 協定書を調印したことを以て (4) 3
 らに かの事態が再び起ることを防ぐ 協

定書の事前の折衝の段階に大蔵省が参加す
 ることを願う。旨を述べた。

これに対し、大蔵省より、よく分った。早速内
 務省と協定の上、早速に退席することを以て

と答へた。佐川局長に、来月早くにも協定書
 が調印できるように努力をいかにという趣旨を述べた。

~~2. 中国代表の問題に因り、その際、大蔵省と大蔵
 省との交渉に因り、大蔵省、11月24日、花京中~~

~~国大蔵省と会談した結果、(1) 先ず、イ
 タリアン事案に賛成し、(2) 電請した。日本は~~

~~米国の同様、今より、反対ではない立場にあり、答へ
 たり、(3) 大蔵省、イタリアン事案に賛成する場合、大蔵~~

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TALKING PAPER

In July, the Embassy informed the Government of Japan that the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands estimate for the Government of Japan Aid Program for Japanese Fiscal Year 1967 was \$18.1 million. When Director-General Mori visited Okinawa, the Civil Administrator gave him a paper indicating that the United States would propose "some \$19 million." The Government of Japan then proposed working level negotiations aimed at reaching the fullest possible agreement prior to official submission in the Consultative Committee, and the Embassy and the Civil Administration agreed. After some delay, which we were informed was caused by the need to obtain Finance Ministry concurrence, the Government of Japan on September 30 handed us a Japanese proposal of \$28.3 million (including regular aid and typhoon relief). The United States side was urged to agree to the amount given in the Japanese proposal on the grounds that Director-General Mori had staked much on obtaining United States agreement to an aid program of "over ten billion yen" (\$27.7 million). Based on this presentation, and taking into account the desire of the United States to be cooperative with the political judgments of the Government of Japan, the United States side at the Consultative Committee Meeting of October 18 made an official proposal for Japanese Fiscal Year 1967 aid of \$28.73 million (slightly over ten billion yen). The Prime Minister's Office on October 24 gave a Civil Administration representative, who had remained in Tokyo after the Consultative Committee Meeting for that purpose, a list of individual projects on which the Government of Japan desires differed from the United States presentation. On November 4, the Embassy gave the Foreign Ministry a reply accepting practically all of the Government of Japan requests. The United States was therefore under the impression that all that remained was a Meeting of the Consultative Committee at which the final agreement of the two Governments would be announced.

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The information received by Minister Emmerson from Director Yasukawa on November 18 is disconcerting to the United States Government. The method of negotiating this year's aid program and the content thereof have both been agreed to by the United States on the basis of Government of Japan initiatives. The United States had been publicly criticized for demanding a large increase in Japanese aid, while in actual fact the demand for a large increase came from the Japanese side. The United States Government is neither required nor entitled to go behind the statements of and the documents handed over by Government of Japan officials to determine whether they have been concurred in by the cognizant Ministries of the Government of Japan. This year's aid negotiations had seemed to us a model of a cooperative effort to talk matters over at the working level, and produce, in privacy, agreements which could be adopted publicly at a Consultative Committee Meeting to mutual advantage. If these efforts come to naught, there is danger that our smooth working relationship will suffer, and that the Consultative Committee will become a forum for airing differences, something that the United States Government does not want and had thought that the Government of Japan did not want.

While the United States Government believes that the record supports its position as outlined above, we understand the factors that have interfered with final Government of Japan approval of the aid program, and we have no desire to have this become a matter of public controversy, which would benefit no one except those in the Ryukyus and Japan who are trying to disrupt US-Japan cooperation with respect to Okinawa and the efficiency of the military bases which are so important to the defense of both Japan and the United States. Thus we desire to go forward as previously planned and give final approval to the agreements already reached. If the Japanese Government, however, in spite of the points outlined above, insists that its interests require a reexamination of the individual projects within the total aid program, the United States Government is prepared to acquiesce in such a reexamination and would be willing informally to discuss any items desired in order to assist the Government of Japan in reaching its decisions. The United States would expect that this reexamination would be conducted as expeditiously as possible and

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that further action in the Consultative Committee would await the necessary decisions on the part of the Government of Japan to accept the United States proposals presented at the last Meeting of the Consultative Committee or to make detailed counter-proposals for consideration by the United States. Further, to provide against similar difficulties in future years, the United States would welcome the participation by officials of the Finance Ministry, on the same basis as officials of the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office, in the preliminary working-level discussions between the Government of Japan and the United States on the formulation of aid proposals.

November 24, 1966

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今32の32解を先で(254)
 ため 筆例 書工場の 筆韻を
 研究の上 官務員令 (平路政
 務令444内) 大蔵 弘道行 西大庄
 に 匠計 (通く=と

即

(石巻と増城の 結果、
 穀物とを 産する=と(10)