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米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国の
反応

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米國特派員記事

STAUNCH U.S. POLICY BACKER

Prosser STAR's Editor

Robert M. Prosser, editor of the Okinawa MORNING STAR since it was founded nearly 15 years ago, has been a staunch defender of Free World causes in the Far East through his editorials which appear daily in the STAR.

Prosser is a native of Omaha, Neb., and started his newspaper career there with the World-Herald.

At the outset of W.W. II he enlisted in the Marine Corps and covered the Pacific campaign as a combat correspondent with Leatherneck Magazine. Following the war he also covered the Bikini atomic bomb tests for Leatherneck.

After a brief tour of the U.S. following the Bikini tests, he returned to the Far East and served his first post there in the Office of Chief of Information on Gen. Douglas MacArthur's staff when MacArthur was Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).

He resigned his post there to work for Newsweek magazine in Tokyo in 1948. In 1952 he was hired by the Associated Press.

In these posts Prosser covered the Korean War for both Newsweek and AP.

In 1954 he came to Okinawa to serve as editor of the MORNING STAR, which had been recently founded. The paper was founded by John Servaites, the STAR's present



ROBERT M. PROSSER
Editor, Okinawa Morning Star

publisher, because at that time there was no newspaper in Asia to act as a voice for U.S. policies and explain them to both Americans living and serving in the Far East and the Okinawans and Japanese who follow the English language newspapers published in the Orient and America.

Since the outset the STAR's editorial policy has been highly critical of any proposed reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This policy has been motivated by a strong belief that any restrictions placed upon

the U.S. military operation on Okinawa would severely damage the U.S. defense posture in Asia.

Should Okinawa again become part of Japan, Prosser believes, the control the Japanese government would have over U.S. military here would badly weaken the Free World cause in Asia. At present, Okinawa is the only base in Asia in which the U.S. can move militarily at will without first clearing their tactics through diplomatic channels.

His editorials are often hard-hitting, sometimes humorous when twitting a pompous left wing leader who shouts for reversion and backs his arguments for it with nonsensical comments, and they are always to the point and well read.

Prosser believes that the Japan and Okinawa leftist elements are closely aligned with Peking and their efforts toward returning Okinawa to Japan are guided by the Red Chinese behind the scenes. Without a strong military force on Okinawa Peking's bosses could rest easier at night, he believes.

As a result, he never ceases his fight to explain to Americans, Japanese, and Okinawans alike the importance of the U.S. retaining control of Okinawa as a military keystone for the Far East.

Compromise Takes Two, Japan Editor Emphasizes

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

The art of compromise was reviewed the other day by Masaru Ogawa, senior editor of the Japan Times, in connection with the recent and somewhat explosive statement issued by the Japanese ambassador to the United States earlier in connection with the possible return of Okinawa to Japan.

In the light of a possible Adults day truce it might be appropriate to review Ogawa's analysis of the statements by Ambassador Takeso Shimoda, veteran diplomat for Japan, and perhaps add a few notions of our own for the benefit of Americans and others who may have missed the opinions of a Japanese writer who is not a member of the Japanese left wing brotherhood of crisis creators. Ambassador Shimoda told the Japanese that if they expect the return of Okinawa they must be willing to do so on American terms which also seem to be acceptable to the majority of the Japanese people. The Americans might be willing to turn Okinawa

over to a friend, Ogawa reasoned, but it is the duty of the Japanese ambassador to the U.S. to explain to the Japanese people that the Americans are unlikely to release Okinawa to an avowed enemy.

The ambassador is not a traitor to the Japanese people when he explains these facts of life to the Japanese, Ogawa said. The ambassador is only doing his duty when he explains to the Japanese people what responsible thinking in the United States dictates, Ogawa wrote. Shimoda said that anti-American struggle with helmets and staves is not the answer to the return of Okinawa to Japan and those who feel that this is the answer to all current problems are not realistic.

It is not only the task of the Japanese ambassador to the United States to explain Japanese feeling in Washington but it is also the duty of the Japanese ambassador to explain American opinion to the Japanese. Compromise and information exchange is a two-way street. Critics of Shimoda (See COMPROMISE, P-2, C-7)

Compromise Takes Two, ---

(Cont. from P-1)

in Japan have complained that Shimoda is something less than a honorable Japanese because of his having relayed American opinion to Japan as well as carrying Japanese opinion to Washington.

"We feel strongly that it is unworthy of an independent Japan to seek the return of territory without being prepared to make due payment," Ogawa told readers of Japan Times. "Due payment" in this case is proper assurance that the American military base on Okinawa does not fall into hostile hands.

"To expect the return of the islands (Okinawa) immediately and unconditionally as our leftist elements insist, is indeed, a sign of subservience and of mendicancy, a throwback to the postwar occupation period when we depended heavily on American generosity — which we came to expect as our due.

"If we want to deal with the U.S. as an equal, we must be prepared to hold up our end. And in the instance of

Okinawa, it would mean an eventual willingness to compromise after due negotiations on the status of the bases while building up our own capability for self defense which would in time enable us to replace the American presence there," Ogawa concluded.

In violently criticizing Ambassador Shimoda the Japanese leftists have contrasted Shimoda's reports with the opinions from the former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer whom the leftists charge is more pro-Japanese than the Japanese ambassador to the U.S. Perhaps this is a splendid time to begin our compromises. How about trading ambassadors with Japan for keeps. We'll keep Shimoda and the Japanese can keep ex-ambassador Reischauer who still insists upon talking like the sole voice of American opinion. This arrangement might please a wider spectrum of American and Japanese opinion than anything else that could be arranged on short notice.

28 YEARS IN FAR EAST

Tiltman Covers Japan


Hessell Tiltman, dean of the foreign press corps in Japan and veteran Asian correspondent for the MORNING STAR, was partly raised in New Jersey, returned to his native Great Britain, and began his journalistic career on the staff of a London Sunday newspaper 51 years ago, in the closing months of World War I.

His first foreign assignment was to New York in 1922, since when he has spent some 40 years covering the news in some 30 countries and territories — 28 of those years in Asia and the Western Pacific since he was appointed Far East correspondent of the DAILY EXPRESS (of London), with headquarters in Japan, in 1935.

During this time he has served as combat correspondent in six wars, including accreditation to the former Imperial Japanese Army in Manchukuo and China (1937-38); Chinese Nationalist Army (1938); Spanish Nationalist Army in the final phase of the civil war (1938/39); Polish Army (1939); U.S. Army (and some service with the Australians) in the closing phase of the Pacific conflict (when he was accredited to both the U.S. China and MacArthur Commands). He also saw, briefly, service with the French forces in the closing colonial phase in Vietnam.

During these phases of a varied career he was twice expelled from Poland; once from Rontania; once by Franco; and twice detained by the Japanese kempetai. (He has never been detained or expelled from the United States or Okinawa).

From late 1939 to mid-1944



HESSELL TILTMAN

he was chief American correspondent for the British Kemsley Newspapers—at that time the largest newspaper chain in the U.K. — for three years in New York and two years as a White House Correspondent in D.C.

Returning to the Western Pacific following the end of hostilities, he reported the Allied Occupation of Japan from the first day to the last — from 1945-50 as correspondent for the DAILY HERALD (of London); from 1951-64 as Tokyo correspondent for the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN; and from 1948-62 as contributor on Japanese affairs to the WASHINGTON POST and other U.S. newspapers and journals, travelling widely throughout Asia.

Tiltman is the author of some dozen books on international affairs, half of which dealt with Japan and the

gathering storm during the turbulent Thirties — including "Manchuria: The Cockpit of Asia"; "The Far East comes Nearer"; "Uncensored Far East," and "Nightmares Must End" — the latter completed in New York City a few days before the Nazi invasion of Poland, a country that he had left for re-assignment less than six weeks earlier.

In the British Honors List at New York, 1959 he was created an Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE), and in December of the same year the Japanese Government, in the name of the Emperor, conferred upon him membership of the Order of the Sacred Treasure (4th grade) for services in promoting international understanding of Japan — that being the first occasion in Japanese history a foreign newsman was so honored.

Since the restoration of Japan's national independence in April, 1952, he has continuously held the No. 1 Accreditation Card issued by the Foreign Office in Tokyo to foreign correspondents.

A three-term president of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tiltman is currently a Contributing Editor and Advisor on Japanese affairs to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Japan) Inc. and a regular contributor to the Okinawa MORNING STAR.

His reminiscences of 30 years in the ashps of Asia were both serialized and published in book form in the Japanese language three years ago, and will later be appearing in a revised edition in the English language in the U.S. Britain and Commonwealth countries.

Communist Peoples' Party Perfects Solution For Making Enemies on Okinawa and in Japan

By ROBERT M. PROSSER
Okinawa's bumptious Peoples' Party has again demonstrated its amazing ability to create ill-will, lose friends and alienate people. This time posing as the spokesman for 800,000 Okinawan people, one Saneyoshi Furugen accomplished the near impossible by thoroughly angering Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Furugen is the darling of, and the spokesman for, the wild, wild far left as the representative of the Communist-kowtowing Okinawa People's Party.

Furugen gained audience before Japan's prime minister as a member of a nine-man delegation which had gone to Japan to complain about the presence of B52 bombers on Okinawa. Furugen and the

People's Party are better known for the variety and quantity of their complaints than for their accomplishments. As the permanent self-appointed complaint department of the Ryukyus the OPP has a 20-year record of unending complaints, accusations and tales of unmitigated grief that would bring tears to the orbs of a glass-eyed process server. During this double decade of determined woe the OPP has frequently complained and benighted opposing causes, all in the same list of conflicting demands. To the OPP the complaint is all-important and the solution, if any, is to be avoided. Why spoil a good complaint by doing something about it, has been the political theory upon which the OPP has attempted to base its success.

As insurance against running out of things about which to complain the OPP has blandly demanded lower taxes, higher salaries for government employees and lower commodity prices all in the same breath. The local complaint department suffered a serious political setback recently when the high com-

missioner announced that in the future the post of chief executive would be filled through popular election. Better of one of their favorite and most durable complaints the OPP made haste to find some new source of political annoyance. They discovered the B52s and fell upon this new issue with shrill cries of delight like a flock of sea gulls finding a fresh cache of oil. Furugen was in the act of sticking political pins into his path when he made bold and told Japan's Prime Minister Sato that he wasn't satisfied by worried about the B52 issue with which the OPP was currently attempting to worry the nation. If Furugen's reasoning was bad his manners were worse. Prime Minister Sato was quick to tell Furugen that he was in no mood to be admonished on behalf of a phony complainant by a professional complainer and that Furugen could perform a great service for all by getting lost, preferably on a permanent basis. No one should feel sorry for Furugen. He has been denounced before and no doubt will be conspired against in the future for his boorish conduct

unless his manners undergo radical improvement. It is unfortunate, however, that Okinawa must be represented in Tokyo by persons of Furugen's caliber. Furugen's amazing conduct in the presence of his betters is particularly unfortunate in that it occurred at the time when Okinawa is attempting to gain the political and financial sympathy of Japan. Okinawan demands for seats in the Japanese Diet for Ryukyuan observers have not been furthered by the actions of Furugen or the busy-body delegation which accompanied him to Japan to complain about the conduct of the Americans on Okinawa.

The Japanese reason with considerable logic that if they are to be beset by complaints from the Ryukyus even before Okinawa becomes Japan's official problem, then what will the conduct of the Ryukyuns be after reversion? If Furugen's conduct in Tokyo is a sample of what Japan is to expect from the Ryukyus the Japanese are likely to postpone reversion for as long as possible. And we can't say that we blame the Japanese.

OKINAWA'S FUTURE COURSE STILL SAME, DECLARES HIGH COMMISSIONER LAMPERT

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

No new policies have been recommended for the future course of events on Okinawa, Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, high commissioner of the Ryukyus, told the American Chamber of Commerce on Okinawa yesterday noon at the Top of the Rock.

Lampert had returned only an hour earlier from a background briefing in Hawaii by military officials. The three-star general emphasized the importance of foreign business on Okinawa and then outlined some of the problems facing the American administration of the Ryukyus. Answers to the problem are not immediately available but are being sought the high commissioner said.

The major topic of discussion concerning Okinawa is the question of the reversion of administrative rights of the Ryukyus to Japan, the general said. The high commissioner emphasized the "unofficial" aspect of conferences which recently took place in Kyoto concerning Okinawa and its return to Japan. The general found encouragement in the fact that there is considerable talk concerning reversion in Japan and that the subject is gaining some attention in American newspapers.

Other problems which the general said were present in-

cluded objections to B52 bombers on Okinawa by left wing groups, the gold flow and labor problems. Foreign investment in the Ryukyus is a problem that has come to the fore of late the general said, with the passage of a foreign investment law by the Ryukyuan legislature. The law at present is in conflict with a military ordinance covering the same subject and the military ordinance takes precedence over the law. Despite this the GRI is attempting to place its law in operation despite its illegality. The U.S. Civil Administration in the Ryukyus has objected to the GRI law covering foreign investment on the grounds that it needlessly restricts investment in the Ryukyus. Lampert said that he was hoping that the GRI and the U.S. administration could find a "mutually acceptable" solution to the problem in order to raise the economic role of Okinawa.

Foreign business has been an important factor in making Okinawa the "economic keystone of the Pacific" the general said.

Maintenance of Okinawa as a stable and strategic military base is still the high commissioner's prime function, General Lampert said. After describing his back-

ground in the peaceful development of atomic energy, General Lampert who described himself as "a tourist in residence" said that on a recent

Sunday drive he purchased a quantity of freshly caught fish from a shop in Nagu. The fish came from the immediate offshore waters. They tasted fine

the general added. Left wing politicians have conducted a campaign recently similar to earlier drive in Japan to convince the people of the Ry-

kyus that atomic submarines were contaminating the seas of Okinawa and making fish caught in these waters unfit to eat.

DETERRENT TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Maj. Gen. Page Cites

Okinawa's Importance

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

Okinawa's importance as a military base will be increased rather than lessened with the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Jerry D. Page, commander of the 313th Air Division, told members of the American Chamber of Commerce on Okinawa yesterday at the Tokyu hotel.

Okinawa by itself has no great economic potential nor is it a tourist paradise, the two-star general said. The prime and continuing usefulness of the Ryukyus is as a

military base and as a deterrent to Communist aggression in the Far East, the general said.

"Within the past 25 years every time that the Communists have smiled at the outside world the United States has bent over backward to smile back," the general said. Each time that the Americans have smiled the Russians have taken advantage of the situation with aggressive military moves. When the Americans smile military budgets are slashed

and if the Soviets were to smile on a sustained basis the American military potential would disappear entirely, the general reasoned. The Communists have not been able to maintain their good behavior for longer than seven years at a time, Page said a fact which keeps the United States on guard. Before the Korean War, which Page described as the Soviet's greatest military blunder, the American military budget had been to \$11 billion. After the North Korean attack on

South Korea, however, American military spending rose to \$43 billion. The general reasoned that the Communist attack was brought about by the fact that the Russians believed that the Americans would not defend South Korea against attack and that America's soft posture toward the Communists invited attack. Inviting the chamber members to think as Chinese Communists, Page asked what they would do if they saw an undefended Okinawa or a Ryukyu chain that the

Americans were prepared to give away.

"The Communists have not changed their objectives in the past 25 years," Page said. "Only their methods have been changed. They still hope for world conquest."

"Military capability plus military resolve equals deterrent power," the two-star general said. "We are attempting to deny the Communists the use of war to attain their objectives by maintaining a strong deterrent force in the Ryukyus. By denying the

Communists the use of war to attain their objectives we force them to compete with us on a peaceful basis. Under the circumstances military power is a creative force since it makes it possible for us to force the Communists to face us in peaceful competition."

"If our will to defend ourselves is lacking then our military strength is meaningless," Page said. Unless the United States maintains a flexible posture in facing the Communists then we forfeit

leadership and provide the Communists with the ingredients for the decisions that they will make. We have made wrong decisions in the past and they have been expensive mistakes paid for in both lives and money. In protecting ourselves against the Communists we have any of three alternatives, Page reasoned. We can do nothing and prove to be paper tigers, we can fight a conventional war or we could fight a total war. When the United States abandons necessary bases in order to win friends the United States loses flexibility and narrows the choice that it may have to make in case of a showdown with the Communists. When we lose flexibility we must choose between being paper tigers and all-out war. Polaris missiles can be used in total war but they are not sufficient by themselves to create doubt in the minds of the Communists concerning their ability to win an all-out war.

"South Korea and Taiwan

would welcome the American military bases that are on Okinawa," Gen. Page said. "However, there are disadvantages to both of those locations. Besides, he added, Okinawa provides a greater degree of flexibility than any other available base.

"Americans on Okinawa do not communicate adequately with the Ryukyans," the general commented. As the result the Ryukyans are not sufficiently well-informed concerning the value of American presence on Okinawa. "The Okinawans are good people but they are not astute or sophisticated," the general said. Few of them realize the dangers involving reversion because they have not been told.

The Air Force general described the recently released figures covering the American contribution to the Ryukyuan economy as "low." According to figures carried yesterday in the Morning Star, U.S. direct and indirect expenditures in the Ryukyus during 1968 amounted to \$260,700,000. Gen. Page said that he felt that this figure was low because the Air Force and Air Force personnel alone spent \$116,000,000 in the Ryukyus during 1968. Not included in the calculations made by the military, Page said, were 3,600 Air Force personnel who were on Okinawa every day on temporary duty status during 1968 nor was the spending of 80,000 Air Force passengers who were funneled through Air Force installations on Okinawa each month last year. These TDY personnel and passengers were described by the general as being heavy spenders since they were away from home. As such they contributed a great deal to the civilian economy of the Ryukyus, a fact which was not taken into account by financial observers.

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-CHANGING POLITICAL TRENDS IN JAPAN-

Can Sato Gain a Fresh Mandate?

By HESSELL TILTMAN

TOKYO (Special) — In the immediate prewar years, the political pattern existing in Japan was as formalized as social conventions and the lives of the people of that land. One or the other of the two rival Munseito and Seiyukai conservative parties won Lower House elections conducted on a restricted register of voters, formed cabinets, and conducted such of the country's business as was not the sole prerogative of the Emperor or the heads of the armed forces. Citizens possessing votes cast them for either the "ins" or "outs" according to their inclinations or as instructed by local political bosses, content to leave the business of government to those who understood such matters. The two main political parties tended to be faction-ridden, as are the conservatives in today's Japan. A handful of dedicated Marxists desirous of founding a Communist party were banned from public life and most of them languished in Japanese jails for years before being released by order of the allied supreme commander shortly after the end of the Pacific war. Aside from the Munseito and Seiyukai parties, the membership of the House of Representatives was confined to a few independents and the slim ranks of the progressive Social Mass party (forerunner of the present Japan Socialist party), which reached its

peak strength when it won 36 seats in a general election held in February, 1936. Such was the enduring political complexion of the country up to the beginning of the militaristic era, when political parties and democratic debate alike, save for a few brave liberal Diet members who refused to be silenced, went into the discard.

With the beginning of the occupation and the enactment of a new constitution and other political reforms, the names of the reconstructed post-war parties changed, and new "progressive" groups emerged on the scene. But apart from short-lived coalition cabinets headed first by Tetsu Katayama, a Socialist, and later by the late Hitoshi Ashida, a moderate conservative, the pattern remained much the same for some years — with the conservative elements split into the Liberal Party led by Shigeru Yoshida enjoying firm majorities in the reformed Diet, and a rival Progressive party headed by Ichiro Hatoyama, a veteran prewar conservative, jockeying for office and power until the two eventually united as the Liberal-Democratic party in 1955 following the resignation of the fifth and last Yoshida cabinet in December, 1954. Since when the united conservatives have been continuously in office to this day, and the Socialists, the largest opposition group, failing in successive elections, to breach

the "one-third barrier" and remaining a minority in the national Diet, complaining of "the tyranny of the majority" he sought to make up for what it lacks in strength within the Diet by demonstrating in the streets.

The Liberal-Democratic administration and party, judged by votes controlled in the Diet, remains securely in power at this time, but there are signs the Japanese political outlook could be due for a shift in direction. Three significant developments contribute to that belief. The first is a growing impression in informed political and press circles in Japan that, despite statements to the contrary, Sato may exercise his prerogative as premier and dissolve the present House of Representatives and call a general election by the end of this year or early in 1970 to seek a new people's mandate for the policies of his administration concerned with the Security Pact and Okinawa, and to test his personal popularity rating and that of the ruling party before the "Amphoto" confrontation reaches its climax. The second is the announced intention of Komeito (the "Clean Government party") to contest an appreciable number of seats in the Lower House whenever the next election is held. And the third, linked with the still-growing public support gained by Komeito, a newcomer to Lower House elections, is the

emergence in local government elections of a growing public trend towards multi-party politics (especially in the large cities) which, if duplicated in the national sphere, could significantly affect in the present balance of political power, alike in the Diet and the country.

On the first point, Prime Minister Sato recently stated in the Diet he would resign his post if he lost the confidence of the Japanese people over the Okinawa reversion issue. Sato has further declared he does not intend to dissolve the House of Representatives before his scheduled visit to Washington next autumn.

Regarding his views on conditions to be agreed upon by the parties for Okinawa's return to Japan, Sato has been accused by political opponents of being considerably less than frank with the nation. Touching on that issue recently, a Japan Times commentator stated: "Prime Minister Sato is suspected of having decided to permit the United States to retain her nuclear bases, or at least free base rights without nuclear arms. . . . In public, however, Sato appears to be trying hard to hide his genuine intention by frequently referring to his attitude as 'still undecided'. Herein lies, it seems, his element of secretiveness."

Continued the Japan Times: "Many of his statements have indicated that he considers it

inevitable that the demands of public opinion concerning the type of U.S. bases in Okinawa should not be met completely if Okinawa's reversion is to be realized "at an early date." Thus he appears to be on the point of disregarding public opinion on the Okinawa issue.

"Sato would presumably believe that if it becomes certain that Okinawa will be returned to Japan at an early date, then public outcries against U.S. bases would probably fade amid the peoples rejoicing over the reversion."

Regarding the state of Japanese popular political opinion at this time when the two most explosive issues of the postwar era—security arrangements and reversion of Okinawa — are approaching maximum intensity both within and outside the Diet, while opinion polls are not always infallible guides two recent surveys (one conducted by the Mainichi Newspapers on popularity ratings of Japan's political parties; and the second by the Asahi Shimbun on the overall pattern of Japanese sentiment on the Security Pact issue) provide some interesting clues to popular sentiment.

According to the Mainichi poll, the ruling Liberal-Democratic party outranks all others with a popular support rate of 41 percent, followed by the Socialist party 20 percent; Democratic Socialist party five percent, Komeito Party

four percent, and Communist party two percent. (Stated the Mainichi Shimbun: "The results show that the situation has not changed very much during the past several years—the figures have remained pretty much the same," and continued: "When the conservative parties merged and the two Socialist parties united over ten years ago, great hopes were placed on the unified Socialist party. Two-party politics had been realized. But what happened? The Socialist party depended solely on the labor unions; became stagnant with only 50,000 members; lapsed into a state of being overly conscious of ideology; and neglected to maintain dialogue with the people in general. As a result, it implanted a deep feeling of distrust among the people."

The Asahi Shimbun poll indicated that 42 percent of those questioned were in favor of continuing the Japan-U.S. Security Pact for the present but of "moving in the direction of abrogating the Treaty when the opportunity arises." On the question of whether the Japan-U.S. security system had benefitted Japan, 33 percent believed it had; 29 percent that it had not. Reasons for believing the Pact had benefitted Japan included the economic development of that country, prevention of aggression by American military power, and maintenance of peace. Reasons given for not believing the pact

had benefitted Japan included no independent diplomacy on the part of that country, no need for such a security system, danger of the country being embroiled in war, and obstruction of Japan's peace diplomacy. To the question of whether they believed the U.S. would really protest Japan in the case of an emergency arising, 24 percent replied they trusted the United States to do this, while 51 percent did not believe it would.

In the Mainichi public opinion survey the Komeito Party ranked as the second "most promising" party (after the ruling Liberal-Democrats) with 19 percent of opinions canvassed to its credit — a noteworthy result, stated the newspapers, adding that "it cannot be denied that its energetic and fresh activities since its formation has done much to bring a feeling of hope to the people. The party now faces the problem of going beyond the framework of Sokagakkai members and establishing confidence among the people in general."

The Komeito party, which increased the total votes cast for its candidates in Upper House elections from 900,000 in 1956 to 6,660,000 in 1968, recently jolted Japan's political world by announcing it would run 75 party-endorsed candidates in the next general election whenever it is held — a piece of news which reportedly caused Sato to warn the ruling party that its strength

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in the House of Representatives might well be severely affected by the Komeito decision.

Which brings me to the third factor currently being closely watched and analyzed in Japan — the trend toward multi-party politics, at least in major cities, in a country that has for long been virtually a one-party state.

In this connection a local election of the Kita-Kyushu City Assembly which took place earlier this month (February) may well rate a footnote in Japanese political history. That contest resulted in the Communist party doubling its representation from five seats to ten the become the leading party in a 64-seat assembly—for the first time in any Japanese major city legislature—with the Socialists, Komeito and Liberal-Democrats trailing behind and the balance of power held by 25 independents.

Even more significantly, the Liberal-Democratic candidates polled 27 percent fewer votes, and the Socialists 15 percent fewer than in the previous Assembly election while the Communists and Komeito scored remarkable gains in votes of 85 percent and 74 percent respectively. Japanese local election-watchers are now eagerly awaiting the result of the Tokyo Assembly election scheduled to be held in July to see if the multi-party-trend continues.

OKINAWA, U.S. BASES, SECURITY TREATY

Sato Faces Hottest Political Issues

By HESSELL TILTMAN

TOKYO (Special) — One notable fact about Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's easy victory against two contenders in his bid for re-election to a further term as president of Japan's majority Liberal-Democratic party (and premier of that country) is that when his new two-year term ends, his six-year tenure in the nation's highest political office will have exceeded that of any Japanese premier of this century, save one, by a wide margin. (The average period in office of Japan's prime ministers in this century has been around 2 1/2 years. Sato's three two-year terms—assuming no upset occurs before 1970—will rank second only to the late Shigeru Yoshida, his political mentor, who presided over five cabinets for a total period of seven years and two months).

Sato's re-election will — in the words of the influential Asahi Shimbun, "have grave

bearings on the national destiny and the livelihood of the people." And the newspaper added that "politics is a living thing. We believe that this has a particularly important meaning at present when the politics of our nation is on the verge of advancing into the stage known as the '1970 crisis.'"

Sato's victory, moreover, was won at a time when support for the ruling party among voters is at a low ebb: "The Liberal-Democratic party gave a vote of confidence to a leader of a cabinet" which "apparently has incurred the fixed distrust of the people. Does this not indicate a major gap between the ruling party and public opinion?"

Most important — or at least the most vigorously exploited — issue confronting the newly installed Sato administration, major Japanese newspapers are agreed, will be the Okina-

wa problem concerning which the Asahi Shimbun stated: "With the election of a progressive chief executive and the B52 explosion incident which followed, the political situation on Okinawa has entered a period of convulsion which has never been witnessed before." Commented the newspaper: "It is impossible to predict the scale or course in which the swiftly mounting anti-base movement will develop from now on."

On this issue, Sato — who more than once prior to his reelection declared he would stake his political life on the eventual return of the Ryukyus — is on record as saying that reversal would be difficult should Japan insist on scaling down the U.S. military bases there to existing levels in mainland Japan, while rival contenders Mihl and Maeno supported the scaling-down formula as the basic attitude of Japan in coming negotiations with Washington. (In a

statement issued on the day his new cabinet was installed in office, Sato gave high priority to his determination to "realize Okinawa's return to Japan.")

One forecast that can be made with confidence is that Prime Minister Sato will, in general, during coming months prefer a high posture and confrontation to vacillation and compromise — he is reportedly fully aware that the next two years represent his last chance of shaping Japan's policies as he desires.

Concerning the related questions of security and defense, the Mainichi Daily News stated, on the morrow of the formation of the new cabinet that "Sato will face the so-called 1970 crisis by officially proposing automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which... brought the present economic prosperity and stability," adding that the anti-Sato forces within the ruling party are in agreement

that automatic extension is the best under the present circumstances.

Regarding the government's handling of the Security Treaty issue and left-wing student unrest, the Yomiuri Shimbun, one of Tokyo's "big three" newspapers which enjoys a combined morning and evening daily circulation of more than eight million copies, recently commented: "The tensions that will surround the handling of the Security Treaty in 1970 make it all the more important for Mr. Sato to comprehend the direction of public opinion."

Basic reform of the Liberal-Democratic party, the election system, and in particular the Political Fund Control Law are vital for the healthy growth of political democracy in this country," stated the newspaper. "Even if he must use up all his remaining political capital, Mr. Sato should force through tougher controls over political donations which

the Kisyu scene

By HESSELL TILTMAN

"As things stand, the LDP remains in power as much by the stagnation of the Socialist party as anything else. Unless Mr. Sato puts things right in the ruling party, the LDP cannot expect to put things right with the country," and the public sooner or later will pass harsh judgment at the polls."

The victory of Sato—one of the youngest members of the old brigade which has occupied the seats of power in post-war Japan until now—is but one factor that made the recent party poll significant. In the recent convention, television played a more important role in influencing public opinion than ever before, and although in Japan premiers are

selected by ballot by party

dilemma and officials and not by popular vote, it was generally agreed that of the three contenders for the LDP presidency on this occasion, Sato had the most attractive "image" and measured up nearest to the plain man's idea of a national leader. (Former foreign minister Takeo Miki, a veteran of Diet debate, can express his thoughts on national questions more clearly and concisely, but suffered from the fact that he had, until a few days before the LDP Convention opened, been a prominent member of Sato's cabinet and therefore presumably basically agreed with its general policies.)

Assuming that Sato nurses no ambitions to seek a fourth term as party president and he is now in a position to ignore personal popularity and to promote policies which in his view conform to the best interests of the nation, based upon realism in international affairs and Japan's relations with the United States, and the determined preservation

of law and order at home.

It may therefore be expected that the three main pillars of his new administration will be firm support for the continuance of the Security Treaty; securing from the U.S. a firm date for the reversion of Okinawa administrative rights (while deferring the question of the exact future status of the American bases in the Ryukyus for later discussion and agreement); and the adoption of firm measures to preserve law and order in the event of any attempt by extreme leftists and professional "gangs" to stage a repetition of the disorders in and around the Diet that erupted in 1960 and caused the downfall of the Kishi cabinet.

In approaching these basic problems, Sato is personally in the fortunate position of having little to lose personally—and much to gain for his party and country. His record on these delicate and controversial matters in the coming two years will go far to decide his place in the history of our time.

Okinawans Could Learn from U.S. Gov't Employees

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

Two different and conflicting philosophies are available for study this week as the American Federation of Government Employees observes its eleventh anniversary as a chartered institution and as the Ryukyuan employees of the American government tumble and foment against a new comprehensive labor ordinance intended to provide benefits and guidance for Ryukyuan counterparts of American employees of the government on Okinawa.

The contrast lies in the Ryukyuan approach in dealing with the American government and the American approach to the same problem. The American Federation of Government Employees is organized for the mutual benefit of federal employees and the government they serve. A union such as the AFGE is something special in that it deals with the government rather than private industry. The government has less room in which to maneuver than private industry since the government can make no move without enabling laws. Since the employees of the American government are employees of the American people they are dedicated to uphold the American Constitution and to serve the American people to the best of their ability.

Despite the limitations imposed upon the AFGE they have been able to accomplish an impressive number of services for their members. These include everything from improved working conditions, arbitration arrangements for employee disputes, shorter hours and greater pay, pensions, health benefits, overtime pay, retirement annu-

ities, compensation for employees who are injured on the job, sick leave and a wealth of other benefits. All of this has been accomplished without resorting to strike which is expressly forbidden government employees.

Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. Government are at the other end of the spectrum in their dealings with their employer. Ryukyuan employees have stated their intentions through their union spokesmen to engage in a general strike against the U.S. Government to enforce political demands upon the U.S. political demands which will be equally damaging to the Ryukyuan employees if they are fulfilled. It is apparent that the Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. Government lack both dedication and sophistication when they demand rights from the U.S. that the United States does not confer upon its own citizens.

Announcement of a comprehensive labor ordinance to replace earlier ordinances has created a flurry of criticism from Ryukyuan and Japanese sources. The further left the critics have stood, politically the more rabid their criticism has been of the new labor ordinance which guarantees a number of benefits for Ryukyuan workers which they do not already possess and benefits which are not necessarily available to Ryukyuan workers in private industry. The particular target of the critics of the comprehensive labor ordinance is the fact that it outlaws strikes against the government by Ryukyuan employees and places American installations of firms to strike. The ordinance also places

certain restrictions, a development which might handicap the Okinawa Teachers Association in their free-wheeling financing of leftist causes with money, much of which has been contributed indirectly by American taxpayers.

The pique of the leftist is to be understood when it is recalled that present Ryukyuan labor laws were authored by Kanejimo Senaga, the head of the Okinawa Peoples' party

and the Ryukyus' most durable promoter of Communist causes.

The dramatic difference between the approach of the American employees of the U.S. Government and the Ryukyuan employees to a similar set of circumstances is clear for all to see. Equally clear are the results which the AFGE has obtained for their own members. The Ryukyuan labor unions which insist on

violent confrontation to achieve political objectives have no such record of service on behalf of their own members. On the contrary the Ryukyuan labor unions have done distinct disservice for their dues paying members by making them the errand boys of politically ambitious leftist groups whose leaders have been the only ones to benefit by the sacrifice of the workers who are asked to forfeit

their wages for the glorification of vague and passing political adventures.

Let's hope that before the U.S. Government employees of the Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. Government be completely hopellessly committed on a course of violence that they take a few minutes out and ponder the achievements of the AFGE which has won its recognition and gains by being law abiding and reasonable.

RUSSIANS WILL KEEP KURILES

Japan 'Whisperers' Reversion Plea to USSR

By LEON DANIEL

TOKYO, Jan. 18 (UPI) — The Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union said yesterday the Russians are trying not to irritate Japan over the question of the Kuriles but they still have no intention of giving them back.

Ambassador Torn Nakagawa, here for consultations with his government, said the Soviet government's basic stand was that the question of the northern Pacific islands now held by the Russians has been settled.

In other words, as far as the Russians are concerned, the issue is not negotiable. Japanese leftists, and also a lot of conservatives, constantly demand that the United States return Okinawa to Japan, but they are remarkably patient about getting the Kuriles back from Russia.

The Russians got the Kuriles at the end of World War II by occupying them. The United States won Ok-

nawa in battle, the same way it won Iwo Jima, which was returned to Japan with the rest of the Bonin Islands last summer.

The United States reorganization of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands and negotiations are under way to return them.

The Japanese have had no such luck in their efforts to secure the return of the Kuriles from the Soviet Union. Japan claims that the four main islands — Habonai, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri — belong to Japan. The Soviet Union insists that Soviet ownership is justified under international agreements.

Nakagawa told leaders of Japan's ruling and conservative Liberal Democratic party that Japan should continue to press the Russians for the early reversion of the islands

at every available opportunity.

The fact is the Japanese do occasionally tell the Russians but they don't say it very often or very loudly. And every time they do say it the Russians say no.

Etorofu, the largest island in the Kurile chain, will be remembered as the one where Soviet MIGs last summer forced down an American jetliner carrying GIs to Vietnam.

Before the plane was released the U.S. government shipped up and referred to Etorofu as Soviet territory. This linked the Japanese government which asserted rather testify that the Russians may control Etorofu but Japan still owns it.

The U.S. government apologized to the Japanese and promised to refrain henceforth from referring to Etorofu as Soviet territory. Despite all the semantic

shenanigans it is a very good bet that the Russians are not about to give Etorofu back to Japan. The American GIs on the jetliner forced to land there reported that it appeared to be an important military installation.

The Soviet newspaper Izvestia calls Etorofu "Iturup" and has made it clear that Japan can forget about getting it back.

The islands are centered in the heart of Japan's vital fishing industry. The Soviet Union contends that its waters extend to within a few hundred yards of the Japanese port of Nemuro. The Japanese often imprison Japanese fishermen who stray into these waters.

Nakagawa said the problem of ensuring safe fishing operations by Japanese fishermen in northern Pacific waters will be discussed with the Soviet government along with the territorial issue.

Nakagawa said Japan-Soviet relations are making progress in all fields except the territorial issue.

Tokuji Tokonami, director general of the Prime Minister's office, asked the ambassador to cooperate in pushing a campaign to enlighten the Japanese people on the question of the Soviet-held Kuriles.

Nakagawa said he would do that but he reminded Tokonami of the "rigidity of the Soviet attitude on the issues."

It is estimated that 16,500 Japanese evacuated the Kuriles after Japan's short war with Russia. The Russians last year refused a Japanese request to permit visits to Japanese graves in the Kuriles by members of surviving families.

Little is known about the Kuriles once a striking area for the Pearl Harbor attack, and apparently that suits the Russians fine.

JAPANESE AMBASSADOR DEFENDS U.S. POSITION ON OKINAWA

The reversion of Okinawa to Japan will be brought about by mutual understanding between the United States and Japan and not by a feud between the two countries, Takezo Shimoda, Japanese ambassador to the United States, told a news conference in Tokyo Monday.

According to press reports, Shimoda made the statement

after emerging from a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi. Shimoda is currently in Japan to consult with his government on several issues, among which is Okinawa.

Shimoda compared the strategic role of Okinawa's military bases with that of Gibraltar and said that the

bases cannot be removed from Okinawa without endangering world peace. The role of the bases would be hampered if nuclear weapons, reportedly stored on Okinawa, were to be withdrawn, he added.

He also said that there is a need for Japan to possess a defense power in seeking the return of Okinawa.

When asked by a reporter

how he felt about the planned demonstration on Okinawa to demand the removal of B52s, Shimoda said the movement is a discourtesy to the United States because the U.S. is defending Japan and Okinawa with its bases and B52s on Okinawa. He added that he "did not know how to apologize" to the U.S. for the planned strike.

Shimoda's comments drew reactions from Okinawan politicians Tuesday.

Tomomasa Ota, secretary general of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic party (OLDP), said that Shimoda should take into account the Okinawan position on the matter. The OLDP wants the bases reduced to the level of those in Japan when reversion occurs, Ota added.

Kansai Miyara, chairman of the Socialist party, saw the hand of Sato behind Shimoda's remarks. He said Sato is sounding out local reaction. The Socialists want reversion with all U.S. bases withdrawn.

Tsunichiyo Asato, chairman of the Socialist Masses party, commented that Shimoda shows no regard for Japanese and Okinawan desires. Asato added that Shimoda should never have been allowed to make the remark.

Sanetoshi Furugen, secretary general of the Okinawa People's party called the statement traitorous and said Shimoda shouldn't have been allowed to make it.

Question of Okinawa Status Stirs Lively Senate Debate

By JOHN RODERICK
TOKYO, Feb. 10 (AP)—U.S. senators and congressmen yesterday pressed divided members of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party to say how far, if at all, the United States should pull back in Asia.

The question of the American military presence in the west Pacific arose in lively discussions during the second Japan-U.S. Parliamentary Conference which opened here Saturday.

An American organizer of the conference said afterwards the talks demonstrated primarily that the Liberal Democrats still thinking in terms of 15 years ago when the United States insisted on a military force-in-being in this part of the world.

Protestations by the American legislators that Washington wants to know how and to what extent — if at all — the U.S. should be committed were

received with some disbelief, said this source.

The American congressmen — they included Sen. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the minority whip, Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) and Sen. Frank Moss (D-Utah) — came to the conclusion that the Japanese government party has prepared no unanimous views on the subject of security, which includes reversion of Okinawa, the question of Communist China and U.S. bases in Japan.

The Japanese, among them former foreign minister Zentaro Kosaka, Takeo Miki and Ichiro Fujiyama and party Vice Chairman Shintaro Kawashima, presented sharply divergent views on the return of Okinawa.

All agreed that reversion is wanted soon but disagreed on when and what status the bases should have. Afterwards, Miki told reporters the majority of the party wishes

"hondo nami," elimination of prior consultation which now apply to American bases in Japan.

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has not yet finalized his position.

U.S. Congressman Jeffery Cohelan (D-Calif.) said he believed there may be a possibility of negotiations between Japan and the U.S. on a formula which removes the nuclear weapons but continues to give the Army, Air Force and Navy free use of Okinawa.

He said he had made it "very clear" to the Japanese that if the "price is too high" — restriction of free use — the United States might have to abandon the Okinawa bases.

FORCED DOWN A.F. VIETNAM-BOUND TROOP FLIGHT

Russ Used Kuriles Against U.S. Plane

By PHIL NEWSOM
NEW YORK (UPI)—When the Japanese carried out their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941, their airplanes flew off carriers that had rendezvoused in secret at Takan Bay, a deep cut in Etorofu Island, largest of the Kuriles.

In the summer of 1968, Russian MIG fighters rose from Etorofu to force down an American jetliner carrying American soldiers to Vietnam. The GI's reported it appeared to be an important military installation.

Beyond that, little is known of these bleak and little island

which before Russian occupation in 1945 primarily were of importance to fishermen who sought crabs in the icy surrounding waters.

But, like Okinawa and Bonin Islands in the south, the Japanese regard them as integral parts of Japan and they want them back.

The islands involved are Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri, located just north of Japan's largest northernmost island of Hokkaido.

The Russians got them by agreement at the Yalta Conference and under terms of the San Francisco peace treaty after the end of World War

II.

One basis for the Japanese claim now is that the Russians never signed the San Francisco treaty.

Aside from the territorial issue, an important factor is the safety of Japanese fishermen who find themselves in Soviet territorial waters almost the instant they leave Hokkaido.

The Russians have seized more than 1,200 Japanese fishing boats and arrested more than 10,000 fishermen since 1945.

Japanese ambassadors to Washington and Moscow are in Tokyo to report on progress

of negotiations with both countries.

The United States recognizes Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands and has agreed to their eventual return.

The Japanese have had no such luck with the Russians. The Russians even have refused permission to Japanese families to visit graves on the islands.

Despite the Soviet Union's rigid stand, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has declared that Japan cannot consider their independence restored until she has regained

sovereignty over Okinawa and the northern islands.

Under the Japanese concept of strict division between diplomacy and economics, the issue is not expected to affect trade relations.

The Soviet and private Japanese interests signed a \$350-million five-year agreement last summer under which Japan will buy much needed timber in Siberia. The Japanese and the Russians also are discussing joint development of copper, petroleum, natural gas, pulp and paper and a northern shipping route across the top of the Russians land mass.

JAPAN CLAIMS OKINAWA RETURN WOULDN'T AFFECT U.S. BASES

TOKYO, Jan. 24 (AP)—Japan's desire to regain Okinawa under a formula banning nuclear weapons from U.S. bases there does not necessarily conflict with its view that the bases are important, the foreign ministry said yesterday.

The important question is timing. Naraichi Fujiyama, director-general of the ministry's public information bureau, told a news conference.

If the United States agrees to return the island to Japanese control in three to five

years, Fujiyama said, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato hopes that the situation in Asia will have improved enough that the security of the Far East no longer requires bases with nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi told the Foreign Correspondent's Club of Japan Wednesday that the U.S. bases on Okinawa were important to the security of the Far East, "including Japan."

He also said "if it were at all possible" he would like the Okinawa bases put on the

same status as U.S. bases in Japan, which by mutual agreement cannot stock nuclear weapons or employ their forces against any country without prior consultation with the Japanese authorities.

Asked if these two statements were contradictory, Fujiyama said, "There is no contradiction if you take the timing into account. The matters of timing and the bases are closely related."

He added: "It has been explained to the Japanese people that the bases in Okinawa are

certainly serving as a deterrent power against any possible aggression. That, everybody understands."

On the other hand, Japan has a widely supported policy banning nuclear weapons. As long as Okinawa remains under U.S. administration, the Americans have a free hand in deciding what weapons to keep there.

The Japanese newspaper Mainichi reported yesterday that the United States has told Japan the rock-bottom American requirement is that Polaris-type nuclear-powered submarines be allowed to call at Okinawan ports.

If Japan agrees, the newspaper said, the United States would agree to remove land-based nuclear weapons from Okinawa.

Fujiyama said he did not know whether the report was true or not. He added: "I can clearly state that as far as the foreign ministry is concerned we have received no such information officially or unofficially from the United States."

★ ★ ★
TOKYO, Jan. 24 (UPI) — Japan's top Socialist said today the return of Okinawa to Japanese rule, if it can be accomplished this year, will make it easier for Japan to abrogate the Japan-U.S. security pact in 1970.

Tomomi Narita said if Japan can force the U.S. to give up its jurisdictional right over Okinawa, it will be a major "breakthrough" in the struggle against the security pact.

The chairman of the Japan Socialist party (JSP) was the keynote speaker at the JSP's three-day convention which opened today.

He called on 500 of the party faithful to "fully participate in 'Return Okinawa' struggles" and lend brotherly assistance to demands that the U.S. withdraw its B52 bombers from Okinawa.

The JSP and the Japan Federation of Labor Unions (Sohyo) are spearheading a drive to call an end to the security pact, under which the U.S. is permitted to maintain military bases in Japan.

A national committee set up by the two groups have mapped a year-long program. Narita himself was outside the main Tokyo station yesterday handing out leaflets that denounced the treaty.

Nuclear Arms Removal From Okinawa 'Mistake'

By LEON DANIEL

TOKYO (UPI) — Informed American sources in Japan insist firmly that removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa would be a grave mistake.

Although they do not say so for the record, it is known that many U.S. military leaders hold this view. It is a view that is shared by some American diplomats here.

Many Japanese demand not only the return of Okinawa to Japan, but also removal of nuclear weapons from the island base the United States considers the keystone of its Pacific defense network.

But some U.S. military leaders and American diplomats believe that the nuclear stockpile on Okinawa serves as a deterrent, particularly to North Korean Premier Kim Il-Song, who has vowed to "unify" the Korean peninsula.

The nuclear weapons on Okinawa are tactical rather than strategic, which means they are the kind designed for "limited war" rather than an intercontinental nuclear shoot-out.

In short, they are weapons that could be employed against North Korea if that Communist nation again marches against South Korea, as it did in 1950 to start the Korean War.

So some American military men and diplomats hold that what ultimately is decided on whether to keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, vitally affects South Korea, Taiwan and other Asian nations with which the United States has security commitments.

It is a problem that cannot be isolated to the parties directly involved — the United States, Japan and Okinawa — but must be dealt with in the light of the security of the free nations of Asia, they contend.

The United States and Japan have the question of Okinawa reversion under joint and continuous review. The United States recognizes Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands but how soon Japan lets them back may ultimately hinge on whether agreement can be reached on what to do about

the nuclear weapons there. If, for political reasons, the United States is some day forced to relinquish its nuclear capability on Okinawa, it might look around for an alternative site.

Guam is considered by some military leaders to be "too far to the rear" to be an effective site for stockpiling tactical nuclear weapons. But South Korea has indicated that its southern island of Cheju-do would be a likely site.

From a strategic standpoint, U.S. military leaders consider Okinawa the best spot to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons. It is situated 1,100 miles southwest of Tokyo, 780 miles south of Seoul, 400 miles northeast of Taipei, 920 miles northeast of Manila and 900 miles northeast of Hong Kong.

Another significant advantage of Okinawa, again from a military standpoint, is that the United States now has free use of its bases there.

So even if the administrative rights over the Ryukyus are returned to Japan U.S. military men want to hold on to "free access" to their bases and the right to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons there.

Before he became the No. 3 man in the State Department, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson told the Japanese

that if they wanted Okinawa back they were going to have to fish or cut bait. In other words, he told the Japanese that it was up to them to come up with a definitive plan for the reversion of the Ryukyus.

The American position, under former president Lyndon Johnson, was that any reversion plan must assure the United States free access to its bases on the islands. American sources said that "free access" principle was understood by both sides to include the continued maintenance of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

The government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan still has not come up with a definitive plan for reversion. If the plan it comes up with calls for the maintenance of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, Sato can look for vigorous opposition to it from the left.

These protests likely would contribute to the mounting opposition to the security treaty between Japan and the United States which is subject to review in 1970.

President Nixon has not tipped his hand on the reversion question, one that Sato plans to discuss with him during a visit to Washington next fall. That meeting is expected to have an important bearing on the future of U.S. Japan relations.

Okinawa in Spotlight While Russ Hold Kuriles

EDITORS' NOTE: In Japan the view is widely held that the postwar era will not end until not only Okinawa and the Ryukyus but also the "Jast" northern island territories occupied by the Soviet Union are returned to the motherland. The Soviet Union, which seized the islands in question — Rabaul, Shikotan, and Etorofu and Kunashiri, the two southern-most isles in the Kuriles chain — during the confused period that followed the termination of the Pacific war, denies that any territorial issue exists between the two nations and declines to discuss the question. These matters have rested since Japan retained its sovereign independence. Now, following the revision of Okinawa last June and with negotiations underway aimed at fixing a date for the revision of Okinawa, Tokyo is belatedly blimping plans to raise afresh the unsolved northern territorial issue, in the following article our Asian commentator tells the story of an issue that has been deadlocked for the past twelve years.

By HESSELL, TILTMAN
 TOKYO (Special) — One of the major curiosities of Japanese history as the 44th year of Showa draws consists of the fact that while public pressures are being whipped up among emotional Japanese for the immediate and unconditional return of Okinawa, little is said or read concerning the Russian-occupied island territories off the coast of Hokkaido: the only the recent item in the Japanese press being a Soviet statement that maybe 18 Japanese fishermen seized by Russian patrol boats for allegedly violating so-called Soviet territorial waters will be released and returned to Japan in the near future, presumably as a New Year "present" to that nation from the big-hearted Kremlin.

The contrast between the United States record in the south, and Russia's rollovered refusal even to admit the existence of any unsolved territorial question in the north forms an interesting study. On the one hand the influential Japan Times recently declared that a sane, dispassion-

ate appraisal of the Ryukyuan situation rules out any sudden return of the islands to Japanese control, adding "It would be most unfortunate if the impatient islanders should fall under the influence of the rabble-rousers to cause a major confrontation." On the other hand, there is little comment in Japan and a deafening silence from Moscow save only for Russia's persistent and faithful "Nyet."

Since plenty is heard in some quarters in Japan concerning the sins of wicked American "imperialists" who have already returned several chunks of real estate to Japanese control, and strangely little about the Soviet imperialists who seeped into Japanese islands in 1945 and have ever since declined to discuss the matter, a recapitulation of the facts concerning Japan's northern neighbors may be recomended as interesting bedside reading this year-end.

That story first came widely to public notice in the summer of 1956, four years after Japan regained its independence, when Russo-Japanese

negotiations aimed at terminating the technical state of war between the two countries ended inconclusively with an exchange of documents restoring diplomatic relations plus pictures of an historic handshake between Japan's late Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N.T. Fedorenko.

It took 11 years and four months (including the seven days that the Soviet Union was at war with Japan before the surrender) to reach that limited agreement. Another 12 years have since passed, during which nothing has changed and no progress toward a formal peace treaty has been made: the lovable Communists still occupy the two southernmost islands of the Kuriles chain plus Shikotan and Rabaul, all historically and geographically integral parts of Japan's home islands. And how many more years or decades will elapse before they quit and go home only God knows.

At the time the Soviet Union uttered its first "Nyet" in August, 1956, this reporter

commented: "The Soviet Union's flat rejection of Japan's territorial claims is viewed in many quarters in Japan as constituting Russia's revenge for nearly half a century during which Japan represented the main obstacle to Russian expansion in East Asia.

"In prewar days, Japan's troops in Manchuria were ordered to sleep with their arms beside them, for you know not the day nor hour when the Russian bear will strike, and border incidents — not excluding pitched battles between considerable forces — were frequent, with foreign newsmen in Tokyo wondering whether each clash would prove to be 'it' — the one-too-many that would touch off a second Russo-Japanese war.

"In the end 'it' did not happen until Japan's capacity to fight back had been broken by others. One week before Japan surrendered to the allied powers, the Soviet Union proceeded to make the most of the opportunity thus presented by grabbing all it had ever lost or tried to seize, plus a number of islands that had been part of the Japanese homeland throughout recorded history.

"For good measure the Red Army then proceeded to 'liberate' such machinery in the vast Mukden Arsenal as its experts considered worth shipping back to Siberia. When I visited the arsenal a few weeks after the Russians had withdrawn northwards, gaping holes in the workshops bore eloquent testimony to the thoroughness with which the Russians had accomplished that task.

"While Stalin's seven day soldiers' were thus looting

while the looting was good, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was establishing in Japan the most benevolent occupation in history — an occupation that was terminated seven years later by a peace treaty restoring Japan's sovereignty and self-respect which the Soviet Union and its satellite declined to sign.

"When, eventually, the Soviet Union got around to opening negotiations with Japan aimed at ending the technical state of war and the resumption of normal relations between the two countries, it quickly became clear that Moscow's conception of 'peace' was one dictated by 'Irrelevances such as increased trade, fishing 'rights' and the belated return of surviving 'war criminals' held in Russia were used to bait the hook dangled before the Japanese. But on the key-issue — the return of Russian-occupied Japanese territories (other than the Habomais and Shikotan under certain circumstances) to Japan the Russian reply was an adamant 'nyet.'

"The reply is still 'nyet.' Even though Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu had indicated that Japan would waive his desire for the return of the main Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin in exchange for Russian agreement to restore Etorofu and Kunashiri — the two southernmost islands of the Kuriles which have always been Japanese territory — Moscow, which lashes the West as imperialists, continued to stand firm in its determination to retain its hold on those 'islands' of the Soviet Union, Pravda and Izvestia, the

official newspapers of the Russian Communist party and the Soviet government respectively, have characterized the Japanese demands for what is termed 'territorial concessions' — Russian euphemism for the return of Japanese territory to Japan — as 'unreasonable and unfounded' and we are told that Moscow observers interpreted these comments 'as indicating that Russia believes it holds all the trumps and has no intention of giving up the island.' Nevertheless, in making 'nyet' the last word Moscow may well be miscalculating. The Japanese, like the Russians, have long memorized that a 'peace treaty' dictated by Russia would herald the beginning of a new period of tension in the North Pacific, with the former position reversed and Japan awaiting her chance to balance accounts. Moreover, before a 'peace-loving' Moscow becomes too certain that it holds all the trumps in its cynical offers to swap trade and fishing permits for Japanese soil, it would do well to devote some thought to the repercussions of its attitude on the rest of Asia.

"Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev have devoted considerable time, energy and charm to traveling around Asia and denouncing the wicked colonizers who exploited the weakness of other peoples, and to holding up the Soviet Union as the true friend of the under-privileged. The acidest of such logic, sentiments has now come, Russia has the chance of proving the genuineness of its declarations by conceding to

Japan terms as just and benevolent as those extended to that country by the 'imperialists' of the West."

And I concluded my reports to newspapers in Britain and the United States by saying: "Moscow may stand words on their heads but even Moscow cannot make a refusal to return Japanese territory to Japan appear respectable. Two little specks of land off Hokkaido — of scant importance to anyone except the fishermen who earn a living in those waters and the nation of which they have always formed a part — could build up into an international issue which will reverberate down the corridors of history long after the men who are making 'nyet' their trademark have departed from the international scene." That prediction stands.

Twelve years after the above words were written, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin told a visiting Japanese cabinet minister that there was no territorial issue between the two countries to discuss, and the Sato administration announced plans to mount an active publicity campaign shortly aimed at securing the return of the "lost" northern territories. "However," reported the Japan Times, "Government circles persistently believe that Soviet opposition to settling the (territorial) issue as Japan wants has become stronger than ever, reflecting the fluid international situation, the strengthening of Japan-U.S. ties, and other factors."

Just who are the imperial-

SELL OKINAWA TO HOWARD HUGHES

What To Do After Islands Revert?

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

At least two governments in addition to the Government of the Ryukyus are concerned with Okinawa because of its strategic role in maintaining peace in the Far East. Japan is apprehensive of the future of Okinawa from a point of view of its continued neutrality and as a continuing source of dollar earnings. The Japanese are aware that as long as Okinawa remains under U.S. administration there will be no question of its falling into hands hostile to Japan. Japan's original interest in the Ryukyus was to neutralize them militarily and to use them as a jumping off place for the conquest of Taiwan. Under American administration the Ryukyus are a bonus baby neutral zone as far as Japan is concerned. Last year the Ryukyus spent an average of a million dollars a day on foreign imports, most of which came from Japan. This

is neutrality plus green stamps as far as Japan is concerned.

Unhappily, some vocal Okinawans do not see eye to eye with either Japan or the United States on the future of the Ryukyus. They are demanding that the United States leave and that Japan provide Okinawa on a brotherly love basis with those things that the Japanese have been thus far selling the Ryukyans in exchange for American dollars. This proposal only the most idealistic and impractical Japanese are prepared to consider.

Perhaps we could offer an alternative solution that would please the United States, make the Japanese ecstatic and give even the most difficult to please Ryukyuan cause to smile with satisfaction. This is a solution that would keep Okinawa neutral, prosperous and cram it with foreign investment. Why not sell Okinawa to Howard Hughes and allow

Naha to become a sister city to Las Vegas and Okinawa and Nevada to become sister states?

Under the ownership of Howard Hughes, Okinawa could enjoy complete autonomy for the simple reason that no one ever sees Howard Hughes. It has been rumored that there really is no Howard Hughes but that he is simply an illusion with headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland but there is no proof to sustain this belief. At least he is never seen in Las Vegas where he has purchased hotels, built airports, established industries and acted in general as a civic benefactor. With Howard Hughes picking up the tab Okinawans could get top prices for their land, the American taxpayers would be saved further outlay on behalf of Okinawa and Japan would enjoy a rich market for cars, color television sets, roulette wheels and swimming pool equipment. If Howard Hughes were the pro-

prietor of Okinawa there would be no cause to complain of airline service through the Ryukyus. Whenever Hughes becomes piqued with the service of a given airline he simply buys the organization lock, stock and jet pods and runs it the way that he wants to. Under the circumstances Okinawa's strategic location could be exploited to its fullest value and it would indeed become the cultural and transportation hub of the Pacific. If Howard Hughes were to buy Okinawa, ban-the-bomb vocalists would be spared the expense of journeying to Okinawa to perform their calisthenics. Instead they could spend their time in Las Vegas where they could fill the empty air with their howls of anguish because no one ever sees Howard Hughes. The ritual could be completed by handing a petition to the doorman at the Sands hotel and then repairing to the nearest craps table where the protes-

tors could help support the government and contribute to the financial health of the Ryukyus by attempting to roll against the house.

The whole argument on behalf of reverting Okinawa to Howard Hughes is so convincing that we recommend that a committee of legislators be selected immediately to complete the task. All that they would have to do is form a pilgrimage to Las Vegas in search of the elusive Howard Hughes. He may prove a bit difficult to find at first but with patience and perseverance the legislators are sure to establish contact sooner or later. Certainly finding Howard Hughes should be no more difficult an assignment than pinning down a number of Japan's Dietmen on the subject of how they plan to provide for the welfare of the Ryukyans in case Okinawa were to become their responsibility.

OKINAWA'S AIRPORT REFLECTS LETHARGY OF LOCAL PLANNERS

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

It is difficult to tell which is the more tragic, a nest without a bird or a bird without a nest. Then there is a situation that is somewhat on the ludicrous side. That is a bird that is too big for its nest. From the point of view of civilian aviation Okinawa belongs in this final category. Her birds have not only outgrown the nest but they no longer have room in which to turn around.

Naha's civilian airport is the bane of the Far East and the plague of aviation planners who are attempting to keep the Ryukyus abreast events in the Far East. Blessed with a strategic location, Okinawa is on the verge of forfeiting the advantage of this geographic good fortune during the next three or four years unless immediate steps are taken. Unless Okinawa modifies its airport facilities to accommodate newer, larger and faster jet planes, Naha airport might just as well resign itself to the role of being an auxiliary or emergency airfield to be used only when there is no alternative. There is no money to be made by being second class, no matter what the Avis buttons say.

The problems of Naha airport are not necessarily those of space alone. In this space age new area can be created through the filling of land and the reclamation of submarginal lands near to the existing installations. Hong Kong's Kai Tek airport has been lengthened several times to accommodate larger and more modern aircraft. Each time new land was created out of the waters of Hong Kong harbor. In the creation of new land for an airport site Hong Kong was motivated by self-interest since without air travel Hong Kong would wither and die. It would quickly revert to a modest fishing village on the rocky banks of the Pearl river. With an old fashioned airport in a modern jet age Okinawa would lose whatever economic momentum it has gained in an equally abrupt manner.

Okinawa's problems in keeping abreast the jet age are political rather than physical. It is a relatively simple matter requiring only time

and money to scoop sufficient coral and rock from the reef area off Naha airport until new land has been created which will allow the planes of today and tomorrow to land at Naha with comfort and safety. But first a law must be passed which will give the community the right to accomplish this necessary mission and to control the airport and its facilities once they have been created.

The present airport facilities are deficient in that modern jets are unable to turn around with sufficient maneuvering space and when two jets arrive at the same time parking space near the present airport passenger facility is woefully inadequate. The future promises jumbo jets by 1970 which will require even more space for ground maneuvering and which are capable of disgorging 400 passengers at one time. Baggage, customs and passenger

facilities at Naha are barely adequate for their present tasks and only chaos can be anticipated if the airport and its ground facilities cannot be expanded in time to accommodate the new jet age planes that will land in Naha if conditions are favorable. If conditions are not favorable they will bypass Okinawa and the people of the Ryukyus will be the ultimate losers.

In the meanwhile modified and stretched out versions of existing planes are making new demands on Naha airport every day. This far Naha has been unable to respond to the challenge to the dismay of both the airlines and the local promoters of tourism.

Airport planners estimate that it will cost \$7 million to build a new airport terminal and to lengthen the existing runway to keep abreast aviation developments. With proper legislative backing of the (See OKINAWA'S P-2, C-7)

Okinawa's Airport - - -

(Cont. from P-1)

airport this amount of money can be raised and the airport can become self-supporting. It can pay for its own improve-

ments if money created by the airport itself is allowed to go back into a public corporation or even into private hands under the strict control of an airport control authority. Three million dollars are needed for the first phase of this modernization program which will start this summer if it has the proper legislative backing. The money is already available.

Japan Air Lines, only one of the carriers now serving the Ryukyus, estimates that within six years its passenger load will increase by 500 percent as far as Ryukyuan landings are concerned. This offers assurance that a municipal airport can be both self-supporting and an economic asset to the community providing it is backed with the proper legislation.

Before a plane can fly long sessions on the drawing board are required and before a plane can land, properly regulated and adequate airports are needed. Before airports are possible legislation is required to assure that these installations are properly financed and managed public facilities. The Ryukyuan legislature must take the step that will permit the engineers to get to work on airport improvement here. That is the step toward legalizing airport improvement by creating an airport authority that will have control over existing and future facilities and operations.

Okinawa Has Gold Problem: It Has No Gold Outflow

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

The United States is not the only country with a gold problem. Okinawa has one if its own but unlike the U.S. question, Okinawa's difficulties arise from the fact that it has no gold outflow. Japanese dealers in jewelry and other objects made from gold object to the importation of gold craftsmanship from the Ryukyus because they consider Okinawan imports to be unfair competition.

Japanese objections to Ryukyuan competition in the gold field highlight the basic differences between the two areas and tend to devalue the oversimplified solutions that are advanced daily at home and abroad in connection with the return of Okinawa to Japan.

Okinawan dealers in gold buy jewelry gold at roughly \$1.14 a gram while Japanese dealers in the same product must pay \$1.92 per gram. The difference in the cost of gold makes it possible for Okinawa to produce wedding rings at a lower price than similar products made in Japan. In the booming wedding band market in Japan one million rings are sold each year. Japanese grooms must pony up 4,000 (\$11.12) to 5,000 (\$13.89) yen for a wedding ring that is made in Japan and are able to cut the cost of marriage by a few yen by buying Ryukyuan-made products.

The difference in the price of jewelry gold between Japan and Okinawa is brought about by the fact that Ryukyuan jewelry manufacturers buy their raw materials on the international market and in-

Japan users of jewelry gold are "protected" by the government. Japan's government protection raises the price of gold items in Japan so that Japanese manufacturers cannot compete with free competition from the outside. Rather than attempt to compete with Ryukyuan goldsmiths the Japanese simply exclude Ryukyuan exporters from the Japanese market in order to protect the Japanese goldsmiths whom they have already protected into an indefensible position.

This display of fraternal affection between Japan and Okinawa offers an aspect of reversion that is overlooked by the egg-heads and do-gooders who can see nothing but a happy reunion between Okinawa and Japan at some time in the future and dire consequences if the reunion does not occur immediately. Like say yesterday.

It is quite apparent that in any contest for the affection of the government between persons of Japanese and Ryukyuan origin, the Japanese will be the chosen people. The Ryukyus will get what is left over. It has always been thus. Ryukyuan commercial interests will be sacrificed to Japanese ambition and convenience or else be gobbled up by monolithic Japanese companies in the name of efficiency and brotherly love.

Ryukyuan commercial interests are painfully aware of this and do not enjoy the prospects of reversion. This is in spite of the idealistic pabulum that is fed them by politicians and voiced in the somber halls of congress by Oriental experts.

When the chips are down patriotism and brotherly love will play a small part in the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Self-interest on the part of both the Okinawans and the Japanese will be the deciding factor. At the moment there is sufficient self-interest on the parts of both the Japanese and the Okinawans to keep them apart for considerable time to come.

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Okinawa Reversion Dialogues Like Dog Chasing Own Tail

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

Current dialogues involving the return of Okinawa to Japan closely resemble a dog chasing its own tail. With a completely straight face Japanese political leaders are talking of the return of Okinawa to Japan, placing Japanese style restrictions on American military bases in the Ryukyus, the removal of atomic weapons from the Ryukyus and continuation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

If American military bases are removed from Okinawa or placed under the same crip-

pling restrictions which govern American bases in Japan including that of the prior consultation with the Japanese government in advance of all troop movements how can there be a mutual security pact? Under the strict ground rules that the Japanese Socialists insist upon the Americans would be unable to protect themselves on Okinawa, let alone hold a protective arms umbrella over Japan and the rest of free Asia. It seems apparent that the Japanese must decide which they want, Okinawa or mili-

tary protection.

The Ryukyus must also make a few decisions. They must decide between solvency or a return to a degree of the pre-war poverty that blighted the Ryukyus for generations. Military spending, expenditures by individual foreign residents and service personnel and U.S. aid are the cornerstone of the Ryukyuan economy. Without an American military base on Okinawa the Ryukyuan economy would suffer the most disastrous economic collapse in the history of the islands. This fact

has never been challenged by the advocates of reversion. On the contrary the Socialists, speaking through the militant labor leaders of Sohyo, have called for the economic collapse of Japan and the Ryukyus as the first step in a Socialist takeover of the government.

Club swinging students who are unaccustomed to public listening have already taken a disastrous toll of Japan's cultural, academic and technical life to prove that a Red Guard style revolution attempt is possible even in well disciplined Japan. The removal of the American military base from Okinawa or the downgrading of the American military base to a Socialist picnic ground would spell the beginning of the end for law and order in Japan as it is known today.

Much of the rest of free Asia seems to be more aware of the dangers which Japan faces today than the Japanese themselves. Through their own unhappy association with communism the Republic of Korea is wary and highly critical of Japanese moves to attempt, for sentimental reasons, to limit the usefulness of the American military base on Okinawa. To their dismay Japanese newsmen who have visited the Korean Republic recently were told that, "Japan still lacks enough understanding of the necessity for a security guarantee in the Far East." Both private and government sources in Korea have told Japan that the Japanese attitude of attempting to deal with the Communists while keeping them at bay politically is a "betrayal" of the Government of Korea. For selfish reasons if not for humanitarianism the ROK is vitally concerned with the safety and political stability of Japan. They are bitterly critical of Japanese efforts to neutralize Okinawa.

Japanese who dare to voice such sentiments these days are sure to feel the wrath of the Japanese Socialists and Japan's multihued Communist parties. Something akin to a lynch party has been demanded by the Socialist-Communist groups for Minoru Genda, the former chief of Japan's air staff and a member of the Japanese House of Councillors, for saying that nuclear weapons on Okinawa and in Japan are necessary for the safety of Japan and the Ryukyus. Even though Genda was in the far-off United States when he made this statement his political opponents are currently preparing a welcome ceremony in anticipation of his return to Japan. That pot that they have boiling in the background is not necessarily to heat the sake.

And in the meanwhile the talks go on like a dog chasing his own tail. How do you conclude a mutual security pact with a nation with no army? That is a question that the Japanese and the Americans can each ask the other under the circumstances.

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Okinawa's Working Man Stalls Island's Planned General Strike

By ROBERT M. PROSSER

For a brief time until cooler heads prevailed in the matter of Okinawa's threatened general strike it looked as if still another subdivision had been born to plague a strife-torn world. This new mutation would be a departure from the north-south confrontation that divides North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam and such potential trouble spots as North or rural Thailand against South Thailand.

Okinawa's stance against itself was to have been the general strike advocates vs the non-strikers. A clearer distinction might have been the government employes vs the people who must work for a living. The most fiery of the strike advocates were universally those persons who enjoyed a guaranteed annual wage with ample built-in leave time so that time spent in striking and rehearsing for the strike might be written off as some sort of administrative leave.

Those who opposed the strike were universally those people who must scramble for a living, work extra hours to accumulate a nest-egg and look to tomorrow for a better day. When the \$2.65 million question came up it was the non-strikers who carried the day on behalf of private enterprise and economic sanity.

The \$2.65 million that the strike would have cost in lost wages and profits would have been almost entirely borne by small enterprisers, employes of private companies and self-employed. The teachers and the government employes whose unions backed the strike would have enjoyed their outing at the expense of their usual sponsors.

Failure of the general strike to materialize on schedule due to its lack of backing by private unions and individuals was clearly a revolt against government by union rule. It was also a dramatic reversal of the revolutionary theories that have been so patently advanced by Mao Tse-tung who theorizes that revolution will be forced on the world by the small employes, the individual workers and the farmers who will attack the cities and the production centers from the countryside. In the failure of Okinawa's private unions to support a general strike it was apparent that the private unions were less concerned with attacking the means of production than they were in getting the government unions out of politics and back on the job before they squandered any more of the taxpayers' money.

A general strike is an ambitious undertaking. There is

no record of a general strike ever having been successful in Japan or Okinawa. General strikes have been threatened but always cooler heads prevailed. The general strike is the ultra threat of the Communists and it rates just below open war as a means of achieving Communist goals.

During World War II the Japanese kept all Communists and many suspected of Communist leanings in political prison during hostilities. The

Communists were released by the U.S. forces following Japan's surrender and they immediately set about to fill a political vacuum brought about by the militarists having been discredited. The first major effort of the Communists was to announce plans for a general strike. The strike never came about for the simple fact that General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, simply and icily forbade the strike. Strike leaders publically wept but the strike was as dead as a Socialist campaign promise.

Japan went on to achieve economic miracles far beyond those offered by any of the Communist governments. Japanese influence in averting the general strike on Okinawa was considerable. Not the least important in Japan's reluctance to favor a general strike on Okinawa was Japan's own narrow escape from the dan-

gers that such adventures offer.

Enough time and effort has already been wasted by the reformists who have been snorting and pawing the ground in an effort to demonstrate their political muscle. The demonstration has not been convincing. Now is the time for Okinawa's reformists to get down to business and attempt to emulate some of Japan's success rather than its failures.

STAUNCH U.S. POLICY BACKER

Prosser, STAR's Editor

Robert M. Prosser, editor of the Okinawa MORNING STAR since it was founded nearly 15 years ago, has been a staunch defender of Free World causes in the Far East through his editorials which appear daily in the STAR.

Prosser is a native of Omaha, Neb., and started his newspaper career there with the World-Herald.

At the outset of W.W. II he enlisted in the Marine Corps and covered the Pacific campaign as a combat correspondent with Leatherneck Magazine. Following the war he also covered the Bikini atomic bomb tests for Leatherneck.

After a brief tour of the U.S. following the Bikini tests, he returned to the Far East and served his first post there in the Office of Chief of Information on Gen. Douglas MacArthur's staff when MacArthur was Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).

He resigned his post there to work for Newsweek magazine in Tokyo in 1948. In 1952 he was hired by the Associated Press.

In these posts Prosser covered the Korean War for both Newsweek and AP.

In 1954 he came to Okinawa to serve as editor of the MORNING STAR, which had been recently founded.



ROBERT M. PROSSER

The paper was founded by John Servaites, the STAR's present publisher, because at that time there was no newspaper in Asia to act as a voice for U.S. policies and explain them to both Americans living and serving in the Far East and the Okinawans and Japanese who follow the English language newspapers published in the Orient and America.

Since the outset the STAR's editorial policy has been highly critical of any proposed reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This policy has been motivated by a strong belief that any restrictions placed upon the U.S. military operation on Okinawa

would severely damage the U.S. defense posture in Asia.

Should Okinawa again become part of Japan, Prosser believes, the control the Japanese government would have over U.S. military here would badly weaken the Free World cause in Asia. At present, Okinawa is the only base in Asia in which the U.S. can move militarily at will without first clearing their tactics through diplomatic channels.

His editorials are often hard-hitting, sometimes humorous when twitting a pompous left wing leader who shouts for reversion and backs his arguments for it with nonsensical comments, and they are always to the point and well read.

Prosser believes that the Japan and Okinawa leftist elements are closely aligned with Peking and their efforts toward returning Okinawa to Japan are guided by the Red Chinese behind the scenes. Without a strong military force on Okinawa Peking's bosses could rest easier at night, he believes.

As a result, he never ceases his fight to explain to Americans, Japanese, and Okinawans alike the importance of the U.S. retaining control of Okinawa as a military keystone for the Far East.