

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国の  
反応

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エデュケーションTV局のTV討論会


原稿

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外務大臣殿

在ニューヨーク  
奈良総領事



沖縄問題に関するテレビ討論会  
(報告)

1. 当地教育テレビ局(WNPT-TV)は4月29日午後10時から約15分間 Newsfront番組で沖縄問題に関するテレビ討論会を行った。このプログラムの transcript を入手し、以下別添送付す。

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2. 同討論会には当地 Japan Society の N. Thayer 氏、コロンビア大学の G. Curtis 講師及び近著 "Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail" の著者 M. D. Morris 氏が参加し、その発言の概要次は以下の通り。

(1) 平和条約の解釈

Thayer: 外長が1951年の日本が沖縄に対し潜在主権を持つことを認め、その後大統領がその意味を明らかにしたことは、沖縄を日本に返還するに当たって

(沖縄返還によって日本が旧領土に対して潜在的領土権を再要求すべきことになった) 北方領土と琉球諸島以外に實際の問題は存在しない

笠原諸島は既に返還されている。

Curtis: 我々は沖縄は(他の領土と)別  
と考へて来た。今やそれは返還はする  
つもりだ。返還の趣意は本国政府の正式  
声明に示されており、尚ほ是は時期である。  
戦争中の署名は太平洋憲章で本國は  
世界における領土の野心を捨てた、と  
宣明している。

Morris: 潜在主権と云う言葉は各々の  
大統領が沖縄統治の對に修正命令  
で使ったものである。

### (2) 歴史的背景

Curtis: 少なくとも過去数百年間琉球  
は日本の一部と考へられ、沖縄住民は自  
分達を日本人と思つてゐた。彼ら本土の

對其惡感情の一部は他の日本人と同様  
に取ら扱つてゐるに云ふことであり、それは  
寧ろ自分達は日本人であるに云ふ彼等の  
感情を示すものである。

Morris: <sup>琉球は</sup>1609年以降日本及び中国と朝  
貢關係にあるが1879年の日本の完全  
に吸収した。しかし人種的には琉球  
人は日本人ではない。

### (3) 沖縄住民の感情

Jhayer: 吾々向本國人は沖縄住民が  
日本の復興に望んでゐるに云ふ言ひ  
彼らの文化、言語の研究を助けたる外資  
金と云ふは、彼らは日本語を話してゐる。

Curtis: 沖縄は重要な独立運動は  
ない。肝心のものは沖縄住民の國民

感情は日本人の負荷であると言っています。

Morris: 1966年数ヶ月日本の行方の際時事通信の社長は沖縄問題には向かえばいかに早くおと述べた。

日本人、米国人、沖縄住民の間には多くの ambivalence があり、日本人は米国が急に沖縄を返還せよと云う他問題はいかにせよとせよと云う。米国は沖縄に投資した240万ドルと経済援助の代りもを採るに付した。米国人は沖縄の負担を維持せよと同時に日本との友好関係の内部にあるべき子孫に云う。沖縄住民は沖縄を有する米国人に云うべきと思っており

及米軍動向は沖縄住民の意見と代表に付す。

(4) 基地

Morris: 沖縄は太平洋の要所であり、米国は戦後その基地を築いて来た。

問題は返還した時に沖縄からのミサイル発射の事、佐藤首相の同意を得た付す。日本の方針は皆無である。

Jlager: 日本人はミサイル発射の事で掘削を受けた前十分注意すべきかと考ており、これは米軍の国益也。米軍は基地の自由使用权を保持せよと望んでいる。

Curtis: 日本政府は本土及び沖縄に

強力な軍が、このことを欲している。国民の  
地と同様に  
間では基地は不評、反対運動がある。  
しかしこれより基地は存続することを認める。

(5) 日米関係に対する影響

Jhayer 沖縄住民は日米関係を望む  
(この関係は) (F. D. I. の)  
このことは日米関係に不利である。  
(このため)

Ambivalence に対する問題について  
である。希望については Ambivalence  
である。我々は日米友好関係の維持  
と云う政治的考慮と沖縄の基地の保  
持即ち沖縄の工業の維持とを比  
較衡量する必要がある。

3. 参考: Jhayer は放逐後領土に対して  
Morris の沖縄独立論及び論議の  
間では、沖縄早期返還が日米友好関係

の維持の如何の重要性を十分説明することは  
出来ず、その残余下にあることは述べた通りであ  
る。

本稿を送付先 (在米各公使館) ~~(在米各公使館)~~

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REPORT ON OKINAWA

MITCHELL KRAUSS: Now Newsfront looks at the world as it looks from the vantage point of Japan and Okinawa, a pairing of geographical points that has produced tension in the usually excellent relations between post-war Japan and the United States. Okinawa, the largest of the Ryuku Islands, whose million people have long been a part of Japan. But since the war, Okinawa has been under US rule, with local self-government, and it has become a key American military outpost off the coast of Asia.

But protest grows in Japan as the military base treaty comes up for review next year and key decisions are in the offing. For some background tonight, this Newsfront perspective report. Our guests are Dr. Nathaniel Thayer, Director of Public Affairs Programs for the Japan Society, an organization designed to better relations between the United States and Japan. Dr. Thayer, a Columbia graduate, was a Department of State officer from 1960 to 1967, served four years as press attache of the US Embassy in Tokyo under Ambassador Reischauer. Dr. Gerald Curtis, lecturer in

political science, East Asian Institute of Columbia University. A graduate of the University of New Mexico, he is also the Associate Director of the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, and he is presently editing a book on US-Japanese political relations which will be published later this year. And M.D. Morris, author of the recently-published book, "Okinawa: A Tiger by the Tail". Mr. Morris, a graduate of Cornell, was stationed in Okinawa during the war with the Army Corps of Engineers and following the war, became the Army's real island -- real property control officer. He's presently teaching technical writing at Long Island University.

Gentlemen, with all of the talk today over the fate of Okinawa and its implications for American-Japanese relations, we go back to the peace treaty of just seventeen years ago this week and I wanted to begin by asking you, Dr. Thayer, that treaty rather specifically says that Okinawa shall not be Japanese territory, and under what basis is this now being raised again?

NATHANIEL THAYER: Well, you remember, back in 1951 that Dulles also made the statement at the time that he recognized the residual sovereignty of the Japanese over Okinawa and it's -- now, this is a new word in international law. Our international legal scholars have spent a great deal of time since that time trying to define just quite what residual sovereignty is. I think subsequent Presidents have clarified it, and that is that this territory will at some time revert to Japan.

KRAUSS: Well, does that mean, then, in your view, that -- and I was looking in the appendix to Mr. Morris's book which has the

peace treaty relevant portions that Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, to the Curial Islands, to the Ryukus, of which Okinawa is a part, to Korea, and to a number of other islands. Now, does this mean to a degree that many of these areas are re-opened to potential Japanese ownership or claim?

THAYER: Well, I don't think there's any real question on any of these matters except for some of the Northern territories. And for some of the -- and for the Ryukyu Chain. That includes the Bonins and a few other islands. The Bonins have gone back.

KRAUSS: Give us some of your comment.

GERALD CURTIS: Well, I would just add that it's only in the case of the Ryukyus, where the American government has admitted from the beginning that the Japanese did have residual sovereignty and that when the situation would permit, in their terms, Okinawa would be returned to Japan, so it's never been a case of we had always -- you know, we had considered Okinawa separate and now we've changed our minds and we're going to think about returning it. The intention to return has always been there in all official government -- American government statements. The question is when.

M.D. MORRIS: I should like to differ with that if I may. The term residual sovereignty was a term used by President Kennedy in an amendment to the order that governs the Ryukyus Islands, and this seems to have been something new in world politics these days, that a war is over and we give back the territory and stack up the chess for a new game.

KRAUSS: You're referring to that statement of President Kennedy's of March 19, 1962 that -- in which he states that in governing the Ryukyu Islands, this is a temporary thing. What is your view of that interpretation?

CURTIS: I'm not clear of the Kennedy statement. If this is the -- I think the statement he's referring to is the one that was made at the conclusion of the Cason (?) Committee report, which was at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. I was honored to be able to work on that Cason Committee -- not -- I didn't travel with the group that went out there, but it was a group of distinguished scholars and men from various parts of the government who went out there to re-survey the Ryukyus and decide what to do with them.

KRAUSS: So that, Dr. Curtis and Dr. Thayer, you are saying, both of you, although Mr. Morris tends to disagree, that through all of this, regardless of the public statements by the military or others that Okinawa is an essential part of our Far Eastern defense establishment, there's no question that eventually Okinawa will go back to Japan. It's just now a matter of when. Is that the view?

CURTIS: Yes, very firmly. And I'd even go back to the Atlantic Charter, which was signed by -- during the course of World War II, in which the United States made it very clear that it had no territorial ambitions on any part -- in any part of the world.

KRAUSS: What about the people of Okinawa themselves? Is there a Ryukyuan population that, like we have heard of Taiwan



or Formosa, that is independent of Japan as Taiwan or Formosan populations have been referred to as being -- not being Chinese?

CURTIS: Well, there's a long history of the Ryukyus relations with -- as an independent kingdom several centuries ago. But two points are to be made, and that is that for a considerable period of time, the last hundred years at least, the Ryukyus have been considered part of Japan. The -- what was then the Satsama Han or feudatory part of the Tokogawa (?) regime in Japan, had a tributary relationship with the Ryukyus. The Ryukyus would pay tribute and so on. In any event, the Ryukyus are part of Japan and most importantly, regardless of how one might view history, it is a fact that Okinawans today consider themselves to be Japanese. In fact, part of their great bitterness toward the mainland or toward the home islands of Japan is precisely that they haven't been treated as, you know, as much as Japanese as the other Japanese or -- it's an indication of their own feelings about being Japanese. I think this is an important point.

MORRIS: Well, here again I should like to disagree. A thumbnail sketch of Ryukyuan history would have it that recorded Ryukyuan history starts about 1183 and runs on as an independent island kingdom through the chain and about 1300, for five hundred years, the Chinese had sort of a tributary dominance, wherein the Okinawans were sending tributes to the Chinese emperor without ever getting anything in return. They weren't getting any military protection. They weren't getting any trade.

KRAUSS: This would make them anti-Chinese, I would think.

MORRIS: Yes, but along with this, from about 1609, which was a significant date in the founding of the English colonies in America, to establish a fixed time in history, the Satsumas were granted by the Shogunate a sort of a lion (?) on open seas and on the Ryukyus in order to keep them from expanding at home. And Okinawa then went through about two hundred years of the ignominy of dual subordination, where they still maintained an independent kingdom that had to pay tribute to both -- China ran the cultural affairs and Japan ran the -- what you might call the ministries of interior and foreign ministries. And in 1879, about eight years after the beginning of the Meiji (?) Restoration, when it became official. I think it's the centennial this year. Okinawa was completely absorbed by the restored Meiji emperor, and consequently, the doors were closed. All the jobs, even down to the local level of police captains and schoolmasters became Japanese, and the Ryukyuan culture was swept under the carpet and the people of the Ryukyus were then Japanized. They stayed there for some 66 years, until the Americans landed, of course, in 1945.

But ethnically, to begin with, the Ryukyans were not Japanese people.

KRAUSS: Well, is there an independence movement in the Ryukyus at all? I wonder whether you could comment on that, Dr. Thayer.

THAYER: No, I don't believe there is today. For a long time we, for example, believed that the Okinawans didn't want to go back to Japan. Remember, that was the scene of some very fierce battles. And there was -- we're talking back in the terms of 1945,

now. This was one of the great battles in the Pacific, and for a long time there was a feeling that the Okinawans perhaps felt that the Japanese had used them to defend their own -- to defend their home islands. And for a long time, funds were made available through the military out there, our military out there, to sponsor such things as Okinawan culture and dance, the Okinawan dance, and these funds were put forward so that the Okinawans could even study their own dialects. Now, they do speak Japanese, but it's a dialect.

KRAUSS: Is it your feeling that perhaps...

THAYER: But it didn't take under this...

CURTIS: Let me -- if I could just add a word. As of now (?), there isn't any significant independence movement in Okinawa. And more importantly, the truly great nationalist spirit in Okinawa is, -- the people who represent this spirit are the ones who are leading the whole movement towards reversion of the islands to Japan. I don't know if Mr. Morris...

(CROSSTALK)

KRAUSS: ...Japanese stuff. But now, the Japanese seem to feel that the United States is not anxious to get out. At least, the demonstrations that occur periodically and of course, this year with the renewal of the treaty coming up next year, are these demonstrations, in your view, in Japan, directly related to Okinawa, or is Okinawa merely an issue being used?

MORRIS: I would like -- I was in Japan and Okinawa for a few months in 1966 in research of this book, and I spoke at length

at an independent person not associated with US government or any sponsoring organization, I spoke at length both to Japanese and Okinawan leaders independently of each other. And I find the general feeling in the Japanese hierarchy-wise first, that there's no magic medicine of one dose. Nothing is going to happen immediately. The president of the <sup>Jiji</sup> Press told me confidently that with patience and time eventually Okinawa will cease to be an issue and he also told me that the general feeling is that it's a rallying cry. If -- you see, the situation -- I call my book "A Tiger by the Tail" because all three people -- the three peoples involved in this thing have a good deal of ambivalence. The Japanese, because if we suddenly were to say, well, all right, take Okinawa back, then there would cease to be an old rallying cry, so to speak. Something else would then have to become a major issue. They would also be forced to find a substitute for the two hundred and forty million dollars plus that the United States is pouring into the civil economy there. With the Americans, we need to keep this hardware that we have all over the island, and at the same time, we don't want to keep a thorn in the side of our good relations with Japan.

THAYER: Well, perhaps there's some value at this point to put in perspective what the basic problems are and what some of the alternatives are. I'll indicate a couple and maybe the other gentlemen will add to this. The basic issue is that the United States occupies Okinawa. It runs Okinawa. It governs Okinawa. It has ever since the end of the war. Okinawans want to be returned to

Japan. Japan wants the islands back. The question is, does America return the islands and if so, under what form? The alternatives are, one, not to return it at all. And that's one alternative that several people think is useful. Another one is perhaps to try to foster an independence movement in Okinawa and get the island independent. I gather Mr. Morris might find it one more appealing.

The third is to return it in some form, and this can be -- and this is where the real argument is now, whether Okinawa is returned according to the so-called mainland formula, which means that all the American bases on the island will then be subject to the same conditions as American bases on the mainland -- on the main islands under the security treaty -- the US defense security treaty. Or whether some special arrangement is made for use of bases or for their stationing the weapons. This is where the real fight is going on. And I would just, in response to Mr. Morris's general comments,

-- that there is no doubt in my mind at least that Okinawa has to be returned and as a Japan specialist rather than an Okinawan specialist, I think it's essential for the good relations between the United States and Japan that these be returned at the earliest possible moment. That's my own view.

KRAUSS: I think the question really is what is holding up this return at this point. Is the United States staying on Okinawa mainly because we have at the moment found no alternative for the military base situation we have there?

MORRIS: That's one of two questions. There are really three things involved here. One is the military security of the Far East

and the United States. Since Okinawa what is in the cliché called the keystone of the Pacific or the perimeter -- the rim of Asia, this is the first thing. The second thing is ever since the end of the war and during the time I was there in 1946 and early '47, we started to build and have been building all this time this hardware which includes silos for firing missiles and air bases for taking off with a store of nuclear weapons. And the point is, of course, according to international law, that if Okinawa were returned to Japanese sovereignty, can you picture, for instance, a situation of somebody one rainy morning about 3:00 A.M. knocking on Prime Minister Saito's door, seeking permission to fire missiles in return of an initiated attack from some point in Asia. This is the real reason, and we are also, with these bases, defending the Japanese, because with their budget, they have next to no military allocation.

KRAUSS: Well, Dr. Thayer, this recent tension regarding the incident off Korea this year and last year with the Pueblo, has this complicated the issue of Okinawa?

THAYER: Yes, it did.

KRAUSS: How has it done so?

THAYER: Well, first of all, this is the image that has been put forward several times, that somebody's going up and knocking on Prime Minister Saito's door early in the morning and saying, "Look, we want to fire some missiles at China." Now, this frightens the Japanese, because they don't want to be in the position -- they think we'd better talk a long while before starting to talk about

firing missiles at China so that bothers them. It also bothers our military -- not so much -- these very realistic men in our military, and they can't very well picture this scene, but -- except hypothetically, but they would like to have freedom of the bases. These bases are the only bases that we have in the Pacific with which there are no strings attached -- to which there are no strings attached. We have complete and absolute freedom of those bases today. That's on paper. And they want -- and the military would like to maintain this.

KRAUSS: Well, now, knowing the Japanese political situation as you gentlemen do, I wanted to really conclude in this general area, if we could, with regard to the options that are open to the United States -- we of course are used to demonstrations, and demonstrations are not always indicative of either the mass of opinion or what the government will do. How does the Japanese government feel about this issue and how confident are they of the importance of maintaining a strong US presence in the area in the face of these developments?

CURTIS: First, they want a strong US presence, both in Japan itself and on Okinawa. These bases contribute to their own security. They want us there. Popularly -- this is among the people -- the bases aren't -- bases in any place are not very popular. And there are movements against the bases. But I don't say you can dismiss these popular movements, but I think that the bases both in Japan and on Okinawa, no matter what the final political settlement is on who's going to run the civilian side of the show, I think the

bases will continue.

KRAUSS: Do you see this situation deteriorating into a serious strain on Japanese-American relations?

TRAYER: Yes, if there isn't positive motion on our part to getting that -- the island of Okinawa and all of the islands of Okinawa back under the civilian control of the Japanese.

KRAUSS: Mr. Morris?

MORRIS: Yes, I...

KRAUSS: Two minutes.

MORRIS: ...wanted to say that the ambivalence of the Okinawan people, for instance, is that they need the Americans there because this is what has fostered the local economy. And the ideal Japanese in a high place told me they really don't want us. There isn't anything that we can do for them the way you do. The feeling is that the Okinawans, although they will say this in riots, and this is the first time there have ever been riots in the history of Okinawa, but these riots -- rioters can't speak for the Okinawan people any more, say, than Mark Rudd can speak for the entire student body of Columbia.

(CROSSTALK)

TRAYER: One final word on this point. I think it's a disservice to the Japanese and to the Okinawans and US-Japanese relations to try to paint any kind of picture that would seem to imply that Okinawans don't want to go back. The ambivalence is there about what their fate is going to be once it's back in the hands of Japan, but there's no ambivalence about wanting to go back to Japan,

and I think this is a point that has to be constantly kept in mind and when you weigh, you know, the benefits to be gained from some military presence on Okinawa, you know, and complete freeze against the political harm that's done to relations between our countries, I think you come out on...

KRAUSS: So that if I may say in conclusion here that between now and 1970 when that military treaty is to be re-negotiated for the bases in Japan, the United States must either decide to change the status of its bases in Okinawa to conform with the situation elsewhere in Japan or it must get the Japanese to revise their relationship to bases. Is that correct?

THAYER: Well, I think the briefest way to say it is that you've got to weigh the political considerations of maintaining good relations with Japan -- this is the political considerations -- against the military presence on Okinawa, maintaining -- keeping Okinawa under our control. Now, forming -- where you're going to draw the line between there is going to be the judgment that's going to have to be made between now and next year.

KRAUSS: Well, gentlemen, I want to thank you for briefing us on this issue very far away from home, but important nonetheless, Dr. Thayer, Mr. Curtis, and Mr. Morris.