

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 1960年1月の安保条約改定時の核持ち込みに関する 「密約」に係る調査の関連文書No.3

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東洋外務省  
アフリカ局長  
部内

極 秘  
無 期 限  
4 部の内  
1 号

事前協議制友に付て

48.1.25  
米 保

1. 1月24日午後 アフリカ局長を来訪した スタイ  
一次官補代理が 当方メンバーに付て  
2x11付と3 次のとおり (江ミツ、秋田  
出席)

1. 配置に付て

(1) 特に内題はないと思うが、1.9 transit  
visit は 日本側の 新しい見解が

どうか承知したい。(当方より 促来入  
る 解新である 旨 述べたのに対し 改定

の 促来の 答着例を 示した 旨 希望した。

(2) 2.9 船舶の 配置 が by actual

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manner で 決まらぬという場合、  
配置に該当する例を specific に

示して欲しい。

2. 装備に付て

最終エンタは 事例の 伝達等を表現に  
照らし 若干内題あり。

3. 新聞作戦行動に付て

(1) 1.9 objectively というのは 内題。  
装束の 時点で、 装束の結果が

objectively に 判るというの は 示さない。  
(装束の 降の 音調、目的、任務 などは

当然 判るが)

(2) 2.9 例示中、 上陸部隊の 装束に

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ついで 別評に表現が望ましい。  
(澤上待我、海友限の場合と)

讀譯みり。

(3) 2. の ケース・バイ・ケースで決める  
 表12112の 米例の 理解は 朝鮮

戦争時の如く、日本が参戦国と同  
様の立場にあれば、相手方の報復が

理論的には、 $\alpha \rightarrow 0$  の場合  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$  である。

(4) 3. (i) 通常の補給と、追加

新創 112811

(5) 3(14) 新院移動の場合と区画11を  
明確に11とする。

(6) 3(iv) の最終中心式が 187 型になる  
11.0 より明確にわかる。

二、半制2128 上述a 2x128 部分wcf  
128 内題 811。

但し、余り細かい議論は 1つで  
flexible にしておくか 811と 思う。

(これに對し、<sup>當方</sup>細かに便宜を立つて、 $\gamma$ - $\alpha$  スタイルをやめ、<sup>當方</sup>も反対に“ $\alpha$ ”

交換公文、F.M 問題の解決は 来降肉  
題に 運用と考初 二に於て


今、現に 69 年には 米田 太  
 田 かい 討論 を 1877 年 出 出 17

775 年 11 月、乙反論 12-2-3、5、  
18、20 を認む。結局 白澤例 9

考証の程の細かさに議論を(8)  
といたしてはどうか?)

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三 29.8号果 東京において 22.7℃  
29.10に 訪へ 8号中 22.7℃



Attachment 1

Certain Specific Meanings of the Prior Consultation  
Mechanism as Understood and Explained by  
the Government of Japan

I. "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces"

1. "Deployment into Japan" refers to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan in a manner involving the use of facilities and areas provided under the Status of Forces Agreement as operational bases. Accordingly, the concept does not refer to various types of action by U.S. forces of temporary nature, such as transit, visits for logistic purposes and refuge from typhoons, even if they involve the use of facilities and areas.

2. The concept of "deployment" as defined in paragraph 1 above is applicable not only to land and air forces but to naval forces as well. However, whether certain U.S. naval vessels are "deployed into Japan" can be determined only by the actual manner in which ports provided as facilities and areas are to be used by such vessels. The so-called "homeporting" of CVA Midway at Yokosuka is not regarded as "deployment," for it is essentially the matter of residence of the families of the crew of the vessel and, therefore, does not fall within the defined concept.

3. "Major changes in the deployment into Japan" is clearly understood by the two Governments to refer to the deployment of U.S. forces the minimum size of which would be about one divisional strength in the case of land forces, a comparable air force unit, and a navy task force.

II. "Major changes in the equipment"

"Major changes in the equipment" of U.S. forces is clearly understood by the two Governments to mean "the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, including intermediate and long-range missiles as well as the construction of bases for such weapons." No nuclear weapon of any type has ever been introduced into Japan as there has been no prior consultation by the U.S. Government.

III.

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III. "Military combat operations"

1. The term "military combat operations" referred to in the Exchange of Notes, which provides, inter alia, that "the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan" shall be the subject of prior consultation, is understood to mean all types of military action to engage directly in combat. Accordingly, whenever the launching of a certain operation from Japan is to be objectively regarded as the use of facilities and areas for "military action to engage directly in combat," such use by U.S. forces shall not be permitted without prior consultation with the Government of Japan. Whether or not the combat forces are to receive a specific order to undertake a "military combat operation" prior to leaving facilities and areas in Japan cannot be the sole criterion in this regard. The nature of military action must be judged according to the manner in which facilities and areas are to be actually used for such action.

2. Typical examples of "military combat operations" that may be considered to be initiated from facilities and areas in Japan are: bombing by air force units; dispatch of air-borne units to combat fields; and launching of landing operations from Japan. There may be some other types of military action which will be regarded as "military combat operations," but determination can be made only on a case-by-case basis according to the mission of each action and the manner in which the use of facilities and areas is to be involved in such action.

3. A few additional examples may be cited to clarify certain ambiguities in the term "military combat operations":

(i) Although ordinary logistic activities do not fall within the category of "military combat operations," supply by air of weapons and ammunitions directly to land forces engaging in combat is considered "military combat operations." Thus, if such operations are to be undertaken from facilities and areas in Japan, prior consultation will be required.

(ii) Fuel supplying activities to be undertaken by aerial tanker-transport using facilities and areas in Japan for bombers engaging in bombing missions from

bases

✓ bases outside Japan are not considered "military combat operations." If such bombers, however, are to land at air bases in Japan provided as facilities and areas on their way to bombing missions, such use of facilities and areas will naturally require prior consultation.

(iii) The use of facilities and areas in Japan by aircraft engaging in a combat mission (e.g. bombing) will become the subject of prior consultation even if such aircraft stop on their way at bases outside Japan for fuel supply and other purposes.

○  
○  
✓ (iv) Departure of naval vessels from facilities and areas in Japan to combat areas may not be necessarily regarded as the initiation of "military combat operations" even if such vessels will eventually engage in such activities as cannonading or launching of aircraft for combat missions. If, however, the combat areas are relatively close to Japan and if, therefore, as in the case of supporting landing operations, engagement in specific combat operations by such vessels is clearly envisaged at the time of their departure, the use of facilities and areas in Japan by such vessels will require prior consultation.

○  
○ ✓ 4. With regard to "military combat operations," prior consultation is applicable only to the use of facilities and areas in Japan. This, however, does not mean that U.S. forces which are engaged in "military combat operations" from bases outside Japan may freely pass through the territorial waters or territorial airspace of Japan. Inasmuch as the transit of U.S. forces of such a nature is not anticipated under the present Security Treaty, it will require the consent of the Japanese Government if such transit ever becomes necessary.

参

三 委員会は、日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約（安保条約）の運用に関する事項を討議し、また、これに関連して、このほど両国政府の外交及び防衛当局者で構成される安保運用協議会が設置されたことを歓迎した。委員会は、同協議会が安保条約及びその関連取極の円滑、かつ、効果的な運用について協議及び調整を一層促進するのに資するものであること、並びに、その設置がこの主題について両国政府が密接な協議を続けて行く旨の昭和四十七年九月のハワイにおける田中総理大臣とニクソン大統領との間の合意を実施するのに資するものであるとの、同協議会設置の際に表明された外務大臣及び米国大使の見解と希望を了承した。

四 委員会は、安保条約第六条の実施に関する交換公文に規定されている事前協議制度の運用に関連する事項を討議した。双方は、同制度の運用上の基本的枠組みについての双方の合意を再

確認するとともに、その運用は基本的には相互信頼及び現実の状況に即した双方の密接な意思の疎通に依存すべきものであることに意見の一致をみた。委員会は、また、現在の国際情勢の下にあつては米国による事前協議が必要とされる事態は予想されないことに留意した。