

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1960年1月の安保条約改定時の朝鮮半島有事の際の 戦闘作戦行動に関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書 No.5

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-15 キーワード (Ja): 朝鮮半島有事, ロジャース国務長官 キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43886

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特秘

大臣	事務局長	事務次長
次官	参事	事務次長
事務次官	事務次官	事務次官
同僚大臣		

沖縄返還問題に付 P.140 頁、210-1 頁に於て

4.8.12
米北

南12日 15:00 頃 1 時 16 分に於ける会議内容以下の通り
(当方米北一石、英方エリソン参事、レヒ一書記長出席)

本議は本議の原則的承認事項の北側の

(1) 英方エリソン参事、英方エリソン参事、英方エリソン参事
の通り、一読せしむるコメントに次の如く述べた

(1) (通商手続の財政問題) 二つある、各 P.140 頁の通り
加つて、(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

同、12日 7 時 15 分 2 分 11 分。南 9 月 11 日、P.140 頁に於ける
本日の新自由(2)に付し、(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

(2) (通商手続の財政問題) (1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

GA-5

外務省

通商手続の基礎の南側の P.140 頁、210-1 頁に於ける
英方エリソン参事、英方エリソン参事、英方エリソン参事

の通り、一読せしむるコメントに次の如く述べた
(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

色々の信託に、(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に
の通り、一読せしむるコメントに次の如く述べた

P.140 頁の通り、(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

(2) (通商手続の財政問題) (1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

本議の原則的承認事項の北側の
通商手続の財政問題(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

承認事項の北側の
(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

承認事項の北側の
(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

(1) 通商手続、(2) 財政問題に

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外務省

これは英政府の権限を越えての可成り強引な
 総統府の権限に反するものかと

(4) (台湾の問題) 韓国の問題と一応区別して

7-7-77 頃より 台湾は 2012 年 迄は

ない。(台湾の台湾政策は 中共と衝突する外 支那
 側は 台湾を 支那の一部と見做す) (しかし 最近の政策は 支那側は

右方 中国の立場は 2012 年 中国と行くことより 台湾は 支那の一部
 として 台湾への政策は 自由と安全を 行い DIRECTLY

AFFECT とは 言うなりのか? (台湾の PUBLIC DOCUMENT 等は
 24 冊が あり 支那側は 2 冊) 二対に 関係し

米軍のありか、安全保障の自然の INHERENT な
 権利を 言うより 支那側は ありか? (台湾側は

韓国の範囲の 統一見解は 2012 年 迄は 2012 年 迄は 2012 年 迄は 2012 年 迄は

程子の権限は 必要とあり、米側との関係は 2012 年 迄は 2012 年 迄は 2012 年 迄は

(支那側は 2012 年 迄は)

(5) (アジアの問題) (1) 運送時に 台湾と 支那との

運送 支那側は 運送時に 台湾と 支那との

運送 支那側は 運送時に 台湾と 支那との

(台湾は 運送時に 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(10) 運送時に 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(11) 運送時に 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(12) 運送時に 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(13) 運送時に 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(可能性は 高くない)

(6) (安全保障 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

の 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

の 支那側は 運送時に 支那との

(支那側は)

本報告は余り詳細的でない旨説明)

(7) (核問題、即ち EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE について) (停泊有年)

この頃の「条件を待たないで」(注) 計 7 国、核問題の解決
(注) (注) (注)

不交渉後のものとの解散は成立したか? (並行の国々の

この中の PUBLIC CONSENSUS による、両国に不満がある、現在停

核問題、現在はとも、何れに支持され、というように存在を指摘)

(8) 計 7 国の EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE の意味は? (並行の有年)

この頃の、並行の有年の意味を踏まえ、現在も解決され、と説明

せよ、計 7 国、この有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明(注)

(9) (共同声明に、7 国、この有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明)

本報告は、本報告に、両国に不満がある、現在停

「前向きのもの」を、7 国、この有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明(注)

CONFLICT 防止、この有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明(注)

(当方の検討等については、先般の報告、見解の趣に

ついて、この頃、この頃、この頃、この頃、この頃、この頃、この頃、

ことを述べておいた)

2. 今後の進め方については、次の如く信じて

(1) (VOA の協力) 先方の早速御報告(注) 本報告に

英国での御報告(注) USA-GB 間の交渉は、

現在も解決され、と説明(注) 本報告に

(2) (四位協定に関する留意) 先方の、本報告に

(注) 本報告に

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明

本報告に説明、本報告に、今後の進め方については、

この頃の、並行の有年の意味、現在も解決され、と説明(注)

2001. (1) 前) 同人 (2001. 11. 15 - 外口放送局 務変更作業 - 1) 局) が多数 結核 (2001) と なる こと を 希望 した。

(先方 2001. 11. 15 の 例 あり と 記 載 あり)

(2) (後 部 準備 期間 の 経過 12. 20. 2) 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

共同 声明 書 等 9 通 (空 白) 等 2 通 重 複 と 検 討 中 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

日 米 政 府 委 託 会 正 置 文 件 書 2 通 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

代 表 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

リ ン ク の 状 況 等 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

(3) (結 核 症 状 等 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

に 関 して 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2 先 方 2001. 11. 15 の 結核 12. 20. 2

極 秘
無 期 限
追 了 部 の 内
2 号

SECRET

極 秘
無 期 限
12 部 の 内
5 号

別 添

(August 12, 1969)

Draft Joint Communiqué

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his Government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.
2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of Asia, assured that the United States would always honor her treaty commitments in the Far East.
3. The Prime Minister and the President noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. Referring to the accelerated development of nuclear arsenal by Communist China, the President expressed his concern over the future trends of its foreign policy. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would eventually assume a more cooperative external posture. Recalling that Communist China refused to accept the proposal to refrain from the use of force against Taiwan, the President referred to the treaty commitments of his country to the Republic of China. The Prime Minister expressed his understanding of the position of the United States and stated that the Japanese Government kept close attention to the security situations in the Taiwan Strait. The President described the sincere efforts made by the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. The Prime Minister expressed his

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- earnest hope for a substantial progress towards peace based on justice. He further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indo-China area.
4. In the light of the present situation in the Far East, the Prime Minister and the President highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, and mutually affirmed the intention of the two Governments to maintain firmly the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and the common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two Governments should maintain closer and constant contact with each other on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
 5. The Prime Minister emphasized the need to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between Japan and the United States and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed due appreciation of such need. The Prime Minister and the President also recognized the vital role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion by 1972. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The Prime Minister and the President also agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.
 6. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that, upon reversion, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and

its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without any additional arrangement. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan in the manner agreed above should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his understanding of the position of the Japanese Government and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.

9. (pre-reversion arrangements)

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.