

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1960年1月の安保条約改定時の朝鮮半島有事の際の 戦闘作戦行動に関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書 No.5

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(2) 次いで先方の韓国と台湾正統地帯とは 外務省コメント
 以上の CREDIBILITY 保持上と云ふことは必要であると記述
 以下修正提案し、その際「台湾、及び台湾地域、金
 門馬祖等 OFFSHORE ISLANDS」は含めぬ(米のコメントは在)
 こと、但し實際上台湾の直接攻撃は現在予見(2116v-222)の
 体言(左。当方の検討とは述べたこと、先方の双方意見
 の合致は)に非ぬ(2116v-222)の旨を以て、
 ① 台湾の平和と安全を維持し、平和を確保し、
 TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE TAIWAN
 AREA」とす。② 同条文末尾に "IN THE EVENT OF
 AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST TAIWAN" とす。③ 同条文末段
 "U.S. GOVERNMENT" 以下を削除し、
 "SEEKS TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY WITH
 RESPECT TO TAIWAN." とす。

3. 共同声明書
 当方は昨19日の米側修正提案は概ね受諾
 出来たが、左に示す項が本文と本文の向と「外務省」
 対台武力攻撃が、明確な脅威の安全に危険がある、
 との一文の挿入を固く旨詔明後、先方と云ふ修正
 末尾に "THE PURPOSE OF THE SECURITY TREATY
 IS TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST COUNTRIES OF THE
 FAR EAST WHICH ARE DANGEROUS TO PEACE AND
 SECURITY." との趣旨(修正は当然必要)の一文を挿入
 するに示唆、先方は検討を約した。
 4. 台湾の問題
 (1) 先方より再び本問題に言及し、ウレイトと並んで
 基本的な問題と云ふと強調し、公刊の文書等に於ては
 如く述べるに可いといふことと云ふと 秘密文書も亦之

するに待たれしことと示唆し、(1) 半回と認め台湾自備と
 台湾防衛兵力を駐留地と認め対中実態を正確に述べた
 台湾以外の場所にも兵力を置く方針と認め(2) 右の地上
 兵力をなくす艦隊及び在沖在比の航空兵力であった
 と述べた。
 (2) 当方より(1)共同声明まで、米国の対華コミットメントの"FULL
 UNDERSTANDING"が表明され、総理の国会報告が
 華入部分で日本の国益の内幕を述べたことと台湾に於ける「国益に
 与る影響」を述べたこととを述べた。これは両々相俟つて台湾
 及び(2)43と認め、(1)台湾と韓国に於ける後者の
 対中政策が均等に CONCEIVABLE であることと述べた。旁觀的
 (先方から5年後の分派と認め) /
 する等の態度相違は均等に表現に差を認めた要旨
 指摘した。
 5. 秘密合意の廃止がホットライン構想
 (1) 当方の総理の強い意向に於て、外務大臣がそれ一

大使に1960年の10-10-14廃止とし、共同声明等既に
 二回に代えたい旨述べたことと指摘、~~等~~と認め、先方
 (先方の見解を述べた)
 現段階では何とも云えぬ、何と云えぬは「フロンティア」
 の「10-10-14」存続、の意向が「強硬」なものである。すなわち
 公々のステートメントの文言が如何に周到に表現されたか
 否かにかかると述べた。(待)
 (2) 上記当方本日は二の位に、左に大層なホットライン
 の設置は上記右「10-10-14」廃止の可能性を述べたこと
 正中し深慮を述べたことと述べたことと認め、先方は臨時
 に12 公表に於ける内容が場合によるホットラインの
 二の「10-10-14」の多かれ少なかれ有効である、リチウムの公的
 ステートメントが「LESS AMBIGUOUS」であると廃止を主張する
 と述べた。

6. 返還準備措置 (共同声明書9項)

(1) 先方が別添の「~~スチール~~」限りの修正私条を

手交し、当方の検討の上速に答へようことを約した。

次いで先方より「この部分の受領が2次訪米後

交渉を延期した」と述べたので、当方より外務省、

総務府の専断で早急な返還措置を(在米露出先

の改組等)の要否、そんなおかしな行方とは出来

兼ねる旨を述べたところ、先方より取り急ぎ日本側

から上記私条とモロモロに送ることに同意した。

(2) 先方の変更は速にせよ、日本側で総務府等が

過早に返還準備を推進するに際して問題があると

同報、半例にも「11月の総務府来米に於ける

細かな問題も片付かず、その後の圧力加増、自公二は拒

抗し2113から、その圧力を1023~~者~~者も返還実現前

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日有例に規定上沖龍を「オーバー」するに際して

法硬と主張(2113、従って~~半例~~半例としては返還準備

に2112は早急と詳細に加工し、その立場を明かに

し、勿論日有例と大綱に加工し、同じ用意を

し、9月のため、陸軍長官と同行に沖龍出先の加工

次官代理が事日付で、非公式に行使する旨

述べ、当方了承した。

(3) 右が先方の意向に対し、日有例未定は現球政府に

果敢に表すに際しての指導を意味する旨を述べた

先方半例私条2項が1文末尾に "INCLUDING NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE G. R. I." と付加することを

提案した。これは先方より日本側と2113返還10に在り

着板を拒みたるが、に於てことと2113を述べたに

対し、半例の「スチール」の場合には、沖龍返還協定の

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日本の国会 (野党が所存案上院に) を通過した
詳細は「ヤンセン」といふことでもうす。後部 後3-40月

過渡期間が一次とあるかも知れないとコメントした。

SECRET

VIETNAM

Guidelines for Unilateral U. S. Statement

1. The President and the Prime Minister firmly hope that the Vietnam war will be concluded before reversion of Okinawa.

2. Moreover, there are fully adequate provisions for consultations between the two governments on the implications of a prolongation of the Vietnam war on the reversion of Okinawa, so that the agreement reached between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato will not affect U. S. military activities relating to the Vietnam war.

SECRET

別添

極 秘
無 期 限
7 部の内
4 号

(August 20, 1969)

8A20B 又, 公経下部

SECRET

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The tranquility of the Taiwan Strait, as ~~an immediate~~ ^{and immediate} problem relating to the area surrounding our country, is also a matter of great concern to us from the point of view of

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Japan's security. A situation in which the United States and Communist China directly engaged in warfare over Taiwan must be avoided at all costs for the sake of peace and security in the Far East. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the United States has treaty commitments to the Republic of China. However, I do not today foresee a situation requiring these commitments to be invoked, and it is clear, too, that the United States Government is giving its mind to the furtherance of talks with the Chinese Communists. Our Government's policy is to keep a close watch on the situation and deal with it as our national interest requires.

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The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complex problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative authority to the Japanese Government in accordance with reversion arrangements agreed to by both governments. They agreed that the US-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The President and the Prime Minister decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of consultation locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative authority. The Preparatory Commission will be ^(including necessary assistance to the G.R.I.) composed of a Senior Representative of the Japanese Government with Ambassadorial rank and High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations to the two governments through the US-Japan Consultative Committee.

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極 秘
無 期 限
部の内
号

SECRET

(August 20, 1969)

SA 209 2, 内示分

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

Agreement was reached between President Nixon and myself that, upon reversion, the Security Treaty and its related arrangements should apply to Okinawa without any additional arrangement.

I explained to the President that the reversion of Okinawa in the manner I have just stated would not affect effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan. It would be only natural that a question should arise in this connection on the application of the prior consultation system on the use by U.S. forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations.

That action by U.S. forces under the Security Treaty must be in conformity with the U.N. Charter is clear from the provisions of Article I of the Treaty. This limitation therefore is applicable to the use by U.S. forces of facilities and areas in Japan for the security of the Far East, including Japan, under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty. The purport of the Exchange of Notes concerning the implementation of Article VI of the Security Treaty is to reserve the right of our final judgement on U.S. action involving Japan's vital national interest, or the country's own security, such as the

use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations, by making such action subject to prior consultation with our Government even though the action is to be in conformity with the U.N. Charter. The Security Treaty, however, is based on the common objective of Japan and the United States to maintain the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan. Since the prior consultation system should be properly maintained in accordance with this common objective, the system as such would not hinder U.S. forces from effectively contributing to the security of the area, including Japan.

Our primary objective in maintaining firmly the Security Treaty is, needless to say, to ensure the security of our own country. Yet, as I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The tranquility of the Taiwan Strait, a problem relating to the area surrounding our country, is also a matter of great and immediate concern to us from the point of view of Japan's security. A situation in which the United States and Communist China directly engaged in warfare over Taiwan must be avoided at all costs for the sake of peace and security in the Far East. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the United States has treaty commitments to the Republic of China. However, I do not today foresee a situation requiring these commitments to be invoked, and it is clear, too, that the United States Government is giving its mind to the furtherance of talks with the Chinese Communists. Our Government's policy is to keep a close watch on the situation and deal with it as our national interest requires.