

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1960年1月の安保条約改定時の朝鮮半島有事の際の 戦闘作戦行動に関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書 No.5

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-15 キーワード (Ja): 朝鮮半島有事, ロジャース国務長官 キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
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二、半年ほど前、閣議でも日本政府の努力により日本内政の修め、
防衛が大幅に向上した。また防衛に力を入れるのは、
77-78年と78-79年、共同声明等にも述べられている。同12年

(1) 軍に改修基地の有効性確保が最高の課題
であり、種々研究を重ねたが、概・通常の

両機能力 (SUAL CAPABILITY) を備えて43=とか
抑止力の大きき要求である。概と比べると43の

部隊の概と異なり、色々死守を
検討した場合は、抑止力の低下は

免れな、との結論であった。

(2) 抑止力は、侵略者に対する抑止力として

極車の安全に甚大の影響を及ぼす。問題は
統合軍本部より、国家安全保障会議に

上り、現在最高首脳 (総理、外相) の
決断が行なわれ、総理の意向に決り、

概 (極東) の抑止力に種々変化がみられる所あり、

と思われ、その決り方によって、米国の国防枠
組み作戦計画の態様に変化を生ずべく、

軍予算が益々取りにくくなる環境と相俟って、
軍に早く日本側と合意を達し、詳細のプラン

が作りに入りな、と思つた。

(1) 右の概整備部隊は、74-75年、長年の兵衛
(9使用)

概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42
あり、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42

陸上戦闘用の或る種の戦場兵器の場合 (二大兵器部
隊編制) については、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42

と、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42
と、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42

現代戦の要請と相俟って、従って若し概と
と、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42

右のと、その部隊全部を神龍から引上り、概
と、概と比べると、概と比べると、人員と兵器を42

2. 日米側共同声明書及び總理発言

当方均認保 1. 本文之のテキスト (註 8月29日付) 在
手文の上 従事との相違点 といふ 次々如く 説明したの

に對し、先方亦 概ね ご了承 仰いで いる。

(第2項) ASIA 及 THE AREA といふ

(第3項) 〇 本文 及び 本文の SPECIFICALLY 正訂條 (注)

- 〇 中央の核用 等に 関する 文章 正訂條、これに 代る
- 〇 本例 案に 基き 中央の 特殊 事項に 関する 文章 挿入

(第4項) 〇 本文 及び 本文の 本意 文に 関する
THEIR EVALUATION OF 正訂條

- 〇 FAR EAST 及 INCLUDING JAPAN の 句の コマを
削除 (以下 亦、本例 案に 照して 同)

〇 本文の FAR EAST の 次へ INCLUDING JAPAN 正挿入
(第5項) 〇 TIME HAS COME 及 HAD COME といふ

(注) 先方均、この 譯文に 對して、在りし 意味を 要保 有る 以外

〇 COME の 次へ THE TWO GOVERNMENTS 及び

〇 PEOPLE OF JAPAN の 次へ PROPER 正訂條

代り 〇 OF BOTH THE MAINLAND AND OKINAWA 及び
とす。

〇 CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS
FOR 〇 次へ ACCOMPLISHING 正挿入

〇 1972年の 文章 正 WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING
THE REVERSION DURING 1972 BY CONCLUDING

THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE
NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT. とす。

〇 本文の FACILITIES AND AREAS 〇 及び MILITARY 正挿入

(第6項) 〇 REVERSION 及 RETURN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

RIGHTS といふ。

〇 本文 本意 正 WITHOUT MODIFICATION THEREOF. とす。

○ 本尾の方文の OKINAWA の次の TO JAPAN を削除
 (才2項) 我方存続とあり
 (才2項) 同上
 (才2項) 才1次の COMPLEX PROBLEMS を COMPLEXITY
 OF THE PROBLEMS とする
 ○ ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY を ADMINISTRATIVE
 RIGHTS と改め (2才新)
 ○ SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE の SENIOR を削除
 3. ジェントウ 才1の 訓令を
 先方の説明の通り
 (1) 非公用の ASSURANCES — ジェントウ 才2の 共同
 明、総理発言と曖昧と加えられた場合は非公
 用の ASSURANCES とし、^{ない} 支持が強い (存続要件)
^{存続要件の項}
 60年の 11-11-11 の通と関連する)

(2) 共同声明
 次の諸点を要望する
 (才2項) 本尾を DEFENSE TREATY OBLIGATIONS
 (挿入)
 IN THE AREA とする (FOR DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES 等)
 (当該方向に対し理由不明なため、各分前の肉連の修正上の肉連は
 (才2項) 中英核用条に肉付文章削除
 ○ 韓国、台湾の取扱いに差違をせよ
 二才分を ~~非公用~~ 非公用 ASSURANCE
 とし
 ○ ジェントウ 和平の達成と沖繩復帰の条件
 を明記した中 EXPRESSED THEIR
 EARNEST HOPE THAT PEACE BASED ON
 JUSTICE IN V.N. BE ACHIEVED BEFORE
 REVERSION. とする (8月19日 同日の文書)
 ○ 二才分を肉連に、ジェントウ 才2の 通達時
 (先方)

行政松戦争 加統112113 場合 後帰正延期334
支援のみ戦作戦行動 正統112113 場合

共同声明2226

日米協定 協定 2226 行; 方法 — 総理発言
正統112113 場合 保証 2226 — 2226 本側 加統112113

丁411 休養 あり 2226 加統112113, と 補足. 当方
2226 加統112113 共同声明の 文章 2226 加統112113
加統112113 共同声明 2226 加統112113 2226 加統112113

と 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113
加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113

加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113
(加統112113) 1972 年の 文章 2226 加統112113 加統112113

の 文章 (TO EXPEDITE THE CONSULTATIONS AND TO
SEEK THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT

WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING THE REVERSION
BY THE YEAR 1972 IF NEGOTIATIONS AND
DETAILED

IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVERSION
ARE COMPLETED BY THAT TIME) 2226 加統112113

2226 1972 年の 過程 は ARRANGEMENTS の 過程 2226
加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113

加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113
EXPEDITE 2226 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113
加統112113 1972 年 2226 加統112113

加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113
加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113

加統112113 PROVIDED THAT BY THAT TIME THESE SPE-
CIFIC ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE CONCLUDED WITH

THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT. 2226 加統112113
加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113

WITHOUT 2226 加統112113
(加統112113) MODIFICATION の 文章 加統112113 加統112113
加統112113 加統112113 加統112113 加統112113

合同書発給の決定を修正する ARRANGEMENTS
をとりよめることの内題 (当方功効実 別途書面を)

明らかな(22211 旨表明)のほか、上記 非公明
保証との関連で、二外正院(電人2713。(22211

外し 当方功効実 告知 郵務大臣と124 節(和訳を
右と(22211 旨表明)

(279項) の22211 旨表明
の準備要旨
の準備代表正 高等弁務官と124 節(和訳を
右と(22211 旨表明)

検討中である。右方先日 ランポート弁務官に非公明
に思わせること、二外正院と述べた。

- (3) 總理 弁言案
- (当方功効実、二外正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日
在「12424 旨表明」を呈するに22211 旨表明
をとりよめること、二外正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日
在「12424 旨表明」を呈するに22211 旨表明)
- 韓国は 127424 PROMPT AND FAVORABLE と述べた
 - 台湾は 127424 末尾に ON THE BASIS OF

THE FOREGOING RECOGNITION を挿入した。(22211 旨表明)

方箋内に対し 同 117777 旨表明の IMPORTANT
FACTOR 云々を右と説明。

今後の方針

(1) 明日の 大正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日 在「12424 旨表明」


7日(月) 旨表明(但し MODIFICATION 云々
は 127424 大正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日 在「12424 旨表明」)

日本の内政事情ほか、127424 旨表明、台湾 検査の
大正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日 在「12424 旨表明」

(2) 127424 旨表明(星) 再度公明後、先次加付した
9月1日(月)の 旨表明(星) 再度公明後、先次加付した

飛行機に便乗して帰国(右方功効実、台湾 検査の
大正院(電人2713) 60年11月11日 在「12424 旨表明」)

述べた。



SECRET

(August 27, 1969)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan.

I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires.

秘
無期限
6 号の内
6 号

SECRET

(August 27, 1969)

Draft Joint Communique

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his Government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its treaty obligations for defense of countries in the area.

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3. The Prime Minister and the President noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area, and referred to the treaty commitment of his country to the Republic of China. The Prime Minister expressed his full understanding of the position of the United States and stated that the Japanese Government also continued to view the situation in the Taiwan area with close attention and concern. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The Prime Minister expressed his earnest hope for a substantial progress towards that end. He further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indo-China area.

4. In the light of the situation and the prospects in the Far East, the Prime Minister and the President highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and mutually affirmed the intention of the two Governments to maintain firmly the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and the common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two Governments should maintain closer and constant contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

5. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between Japan and the United States and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed due appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The Prime Minister and the President also recognized the vital role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed

that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 by concluding these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The Prime Minister and the President also agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

6. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his

Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his understanding of the position of the Japanese Government and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to

Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.

9. The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two Governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Government of Japan in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both Governments. They agreed that the Japan-United States Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The Prime Minister and the President decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission in place of the existing Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Preparatory Commission will be composed of a Representative of the Japanese Government with Ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with appropriate staff, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations

to the two Governments through the Japan-United States Consultative Committee.

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.