

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1960年1月の安保条約改定時の朝鮮半島有事の際の 戦闘作戦行動に関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書 No.5

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第

秘

9月11日大庭打会

互

11日夕刻大庭は下宿へ使と共に

下宿へ上り、華府到着。同日夜8時頃

1時頃、大使館に於て打会。出席

者大庭、下宿、田中西大使、米局長。

克生大使

席上大庭より、總理訪米中の時日

が速く過ぎ、今次訪米中に、核以外

の核2の問題に付、能力合意に達す

る様取違ひなき強き指示あり

轉示：台場、12月12日、新紙、1.2の

とあり、¹²12月12日は新紙3の

とありは米双方の一方的意見を以て

補足する事。核に712は軍事に

於て、参事官等、或の新紙4を

採り、12月12日の不協定と

の会談に臨む、と記した。(これ等

4等は、12日の会談に先立ち、早野

此半得長より、又、付台使に届け

置いた。)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Korea

(Prime Minister's Statement)

Therefore, should an occasion arise for the U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

(半農ニハニニキ)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Taiwan

A. (Communique)

2. by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. "The Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. should be in a position to discharge effectively its international obligations for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan." (c.f. U.S. proposals of September 11, 1969).

B. (Prime Minister's Statement)

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. Should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan. Therefore, in view of our national interest, we should deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the U.S. of its defense obligations. However, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today.

(半農ニハニニキ)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

A. Communique

The President and Prime Minister expressed the hope that the war in Vietnam will be concluded before return of administrative rights in Okinawa

Viet-Nam

B. 1. (Prime Minister's Statement)

Although it is a hypothetical question related to the future, it is my belief that, should hostilities unfortunately not have been concluded by the time reversion of Okinawa, is scheduled to take place, U.S. military activities relating to the conflict should not be ~~affected~~ affected by reversion, as the two Governments would consult fully on the implications of a prolongation of the war.

2. (President's Statement)

Even in the unfortunate event of a prolongation of the conflict in Vietnam, the reversion of Okinawa agreed upon between our two countries with the necessary legislative support would not be affected, since there are fully adequate provisions for consultation between the two Governments on the implications of such a prolongation of the war.

(
11-15-69
[Signature])

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Nuclear problem

(Communique)

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

(
11-15-69
[Signature])