

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1972年の沖縄返還時の有事の際の核持ち込みに関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書No.2

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-15 キーワード (Ja): 核持ち込みに問題, ジョンソン次官 キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43897

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極 秘
無 期 限
許 可 内
号

次官 嘉喜代 田中大使	事務局長 子 子 子 子	アチバ 子 子 子
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東郷.ス+イ=会誌 (8月27日午前)

4k. 8. 27
朱北-長

核内題等内訳

会誌概子 次のとおり (先方 WARELE 空軍大佐 田中大使
秘書官巧配を以て右の MISS CAROL MOOR - 二等書記
の ATTACHE, 当方朱北-長 同席)

1. 核内題

(1) 当方より 沖縄返還に当りて 七の軍事的側面を
充分 徹底して 合理的解決を圖りたる (8) 総理
と 12月 ~~12月~~ 熟考の後 安保条約の (4) 修正取極
を ~~先方より~~ 沖縄返還に当りて (沖縄内題を解決
の 核内題) 之の 正当なる 運用に当り

予り 此の方針を打出し 愛知外務大臣 及び 先般の
訪米に際し 二の (2) 備明 (左ニと (1) 3) 新協成
物に 7月24日 所謂「南地論」の 右片寄の 説明を
排し 正帯の 基に 次の上述 軍事的側面を プロモート
す 二 (1) 他方 核内題は 現在 (国民感情上)
動かす べからざる 限り 右の 内題が 存在し
政治的 上は 核内題、 既に 7月 11-12 日 には 甚しい
い ながら、 政府と して 所謂 プロモート せしむ べき こと
を 説明の上 (2) 非核三原則の 由来と 意義 及び
わが 国内の 核内題に 関し 核内題の 知識
認識の 欠除 (8) 所謂「核内軍備備分」
が (モ 当初は 米国の 核持込み 並に 排外
(1) 20-21 日 右様相 表示) (使向が
強し) と思 考 された こと 之を 補足 した。
(2) 二の 対し 田中-ル 大佐 巧 次り 如く 述べ たる

(二) 中野月との間 国務省や日米政府の努力は中野月内政34年の
認識が大幅に向上した。また防犯は7112の自衛隊の考案を
77712としており、英米を相手とすると大々ありかたの243と243の面124

(1) 軍と改^改基地の有効性確保が最高課題
であり、種々研究を重ねるが、核・通常の

両核能力 (DUAL CAPABILITY) を備えて432としか
抑止力の大きき有要求である。核とぬくとニ432の

駐留の部隊の^{駐留の}有効意義は右に在り^{沖縄上7112}と云ふ、色々代^代を
検討し^した^たら^らし^した^た場合も抑止力の低下は

免れな^い、との結論であった。

(2) 亦^亦に在^在る^るは^は侵略者^者に^に対^対して^{して}本^本土^土を^を守^守る^るに^に

極^極度の^度に^に甚^甚大な^な新^新望^望を^を有^有する^る。内^内部^部正^正
統^統治^治を^を保^保持^持す^るに^に必要^{必要}な^な国家^{国家}安全^{安全}保^保障^障層^層に^に

上^上に^に、現^現在^在最^最高^高首^首脳^脳 (大統領) ^(その)の^の
決^決定^定は^は行^行々^々大^大統^統統^統の^の向^向に^に決^決定^定さ^さる^る
着^着 (極^極東^東情^情勢^勢に^に種^種々^々の^の変^変化^化が^がみ^みら^られる^る所^所に^に、

ニ^ニと^と思^思わ^われる。その^{その}決^決定^定は^は中^中国^国の^の国^国際^際情^情勢^勢
が^が作^作戦^戦計^計画^画の^の態^態様^様に^に変^変化^化を^を生^生ず^ずる^る。

軍^軍の^の予^予算^算が^が益^益々^々取^取り^り上^上る^る環^環境^境と^と相^相俟^俟つ^つて、
軍^軍と^とは^はも^も早^早く^く日^日米^米側^側と^と合^合意^意に^に達^達し^し詳^詳細^細の^のル^ルン^ン

ト^トの^の作^作り^りに^に入^入り^りな^ない^いと思^思う^うて^てい^いふ^ふ。

(1) 右^右が^が核^核装^装備^備部^部隊^隊に^につ^つい^いて^て、長^長年^年の^の兵^兵衛^衛思^思
^(の^の使^使用^用)

想^想と^とは^は根^根を^をお^おき^きに^にお^おき^きに^に、人^人員^員と^と兵^兵器^器を^を分^分け^け
お^おき^きに^にお^おき^きに^に、^{(これは}出^出来^来な^ない^い、^とい^いう^う原^原則^則に^にお^おき^きに^に、^{(これは}
分^分散^散駐^駐留^留の^の場^場合^合に^にも^もあ^ある^る、^人と^と兵^兵器^器が^が別^別に^に居^居る^るに^にお^おき^きに^に、

陸^陸上^上戦^戦斗^斗用^用の^の或^或る^る種^種の^の戦^戦場^場兵^兵器^器の^の場^場合^合 (ニ^ニは^は例^例として^{して}
沖^沖縄^縄自^自衛^衛隊^隊に^に使^使う^うに^にお^おき^きに^に、前^前線^線支^支援^援用^用に^に使^使用^用に^にお^おき^きに^に、

と^とい^いふ^ふ、空^空軍^軍に^につ^つい^いて^ては^は塔^塔架^架電^電等^等と^と航^航空^空機^機
と^と核^核兵^兵器^器を^を別^別々^々の^の所^所に^にお^おき^きに^にお^おき^きに^に、

現^現代^代戦^戦の^の要^要求^求は^は日^日々^々高^高ま^まる^るに^にお^おき^きに^に、従^従っ^って^て若^若し^し核^核戦^戦
と^とい^いふ^ふ、右^右に^に示^示す^す如^如く^くの^の予^予算^算を^を要^要し^し、抑^抑止^止力^力を^をお^おき^きに^にお^おき^きに^に、

右^右に^に示^示す^す、その^{その}部^部隊^隊全^全部^部を^を沖^沖縄^縄か^から^ら引^引上^上げ^げる^るに^にお^おき^きに^に、
右^右に^に示^示す^す、その^{その}部^部隊^隊全^全部^部を^を沖^沖縄^縄か^から^ら引^引上^上げ^げる^るに^にお^おき^きに^に、

2. 日英共同声明書及び總理発言

当方の別添 1. 本文 2 のテキスト (並 8A270付) を
本文の上 従事との相違点 とは 次々如く説明 (左の

口対し、先方は 概ね ご了承 仰ぐ。

(第2項) ASIA & THE AREA と云。

(第3項) ⑩ 本 1 文 ^{全体} 及び 本 2 文 の SPECIFICALLY と 削除 (注)

○ 中 文 の 概 略 等 に 関 する 文 章 を 削除、そ の 代 代
半 例 事 に 関 する 中 文 の 研 究 稿 子 に 関 する 1 文 挿 入

○ ⑪ ⑫ ⑬ ⑭ ⑮ ⑯ ⑰ ⑱ ⑲ ⑳ ㉑ ㉒ ㉓ ㉔ ㉕ ㉖ ㉗ ㉘ ㉙ ㉚ ㉛ ㉜ ㉝ ㉞ ㉟ ㊱ ㊲ ㊳ ㊴ ㊵ ㊶ ㊷ ㊸ ㊹ ㊺ ㊻ ㊼ ㊽ ㊾ ㊿
(第4項) THEIR EVALUATION OF と 削除

○ FAR EAST & INCLUDING JAPAN の 句 の コー 2
削除 (以下 本 5、本 6 項 に 同 じ 同)

○ 本文の FAR EAST の 項 に INCLUDING JAPAN を 挿 入

(第5項) TIME HAS COME & HAD COME と 77

(注) 英 文 稿、こ の 以 降 同 じ 77 0 2 1 並 7 4 3 並 味 方 3 並 保 有 同 じ 外

○ COME の 次 の THE TWO GOVERNMENTS 及び

○ PEOPLE OF JAPAN の 次 の PROPER と 削除

代 々 ⁰⁷² OF BOTH THE MAINLAND AND OKINAWA 並 2
と 73

○ CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS
FOR の 次 に ACCOMPLISHING を 挿 入

○ 1972 年 の 文 章 を WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING
THE REVERSION DURING 1972 BY CONCLUDING
THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE
NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT. と 73

○ 本 文 の FACILITIES AND AREAS の 項 の MILITARY を 挿 入
本 文 の
(第6項) REVERSION & RETURN OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
RIGHTS と 73


○ 本 1 文 本 尾 を WITHOUT MODIFICATION THEREOF と 73

○ 末尾が英文の OKINAWA の次に TO JAPAN と改定
 (初項) ○ 我々存続とあり
 (初項) ○ 同上
 (初項) ○ 以下の COMPLEX PROBLEMS と COMPLEXITY
 OF THE PROBLEMS とする
 ○ ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY と ADMINISTRATIVE
 RIGHTS と改定 (2ヶ所)
 ○ SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE の SENIOR と改定
 3. ワシントン での 調停 事項
 先方の 説明 決 の と あり
 (1) 非公開 の ASSURANCES — ワシントン での 共同 声
 明、総理 発言 と 曖昧 と が 大 白 了 場 合 は 非 公
 開 の ASSURANCES を 本 文 中 記 載 加 入 11 (存 続 非 公開 11
 有 能 要 望 の 後 11
 60 年 の 11-11- の 内 容 と 関 連 3.3.)

(2) 共同 声 明 書
 次 の 諸 英 文 要 望 11
 (初項) 末尾 を DEFENSE TREATY OBLIGATIONS
 (挿入)
 IN THE AREA と する (FOR DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES 改定
 (当 方 異 議 対 し 理 由 不 明 確 と 認 定 前 の 内 閣 議 決 文 上 の 内 閣 議 決 文
 (初項) ○ 中英 核 備 条 約 上 の 文 章 削 除
 ○ 韓国、台湾 の 取 扱 方 針 に 差 違 と 有 せ ぬ
 二ヶ所 3ヶ所 程度 如何 2ヶ所 非 公開 ASSURANCE
 1ヶ所
 ○ ワシントン での 平和 達成 を 中 韓 後 部 門 内 閣 決
 定 文 中 記 載 加 入 11 EXPRESSED THEIR
 EARNEST HOPE THAT PEACE BASED ON
 JUSTICE IN V.N. BE ACHIEVED BEFORE
 REVERSION. と する (8月 19日 同日 文 言)
 ○ 英 文 中 内 閣 決 定 文 中 記 載 加 入 11 通 達 時 刻
 (先 方 決 定)

前記の戦争が終結した場合は、復帰を延期する
 支援の目的を戦時作戦行動と認められたり、選取に
 関する事項は、
 日本が協定するに必要とする方法 — 総論等
 及び非公開の保証を必要とする — 日本側が
 行った必要とするの保持が、と補足。 当方
 二つの案を、~~その~~ 共同声明の文言をもとに、
 (共同声明の文言が、) (これは、)
 と同じものに対し、先方の上記提案が USEFUL であると認め
 られた。 当方は、~~その~~ 共同声明の文言を、
 添字する慣習と一致させる。)
 (第5項) 1972年の文章は、
 の文言 (TO EXPEDITE THE CONSULTATIONS AND TO
 SEEK THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT
 WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING THE REVERSION
 BY THE YEAR 1972 IF NEGOTIATIONS AND
 DETAILED

IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVERSION
 ARE COMPLETED BY THAT TIME) と言った。
 1972年の通達に ARRANGEMENTS の語句に
 加えられたことは、
 日本側も全く同じ考えに達した。 半信半疑
 EXPEDITE の引受が、
 (1972年12月27日)
 1972年12月27日、
 1972年12月27日、
 PROVIDED THAT BY THAT TIME THESE SPE-
 CIFIC ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE CONCLUDED WITH
 THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT. と
 提案された。 当方検討した。
 WITHOUT MODIFICATION の文言が、
 有る。 削除する。



SECRET

(August 27, 1969)


Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan.

I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires.



SECRET

(August 27, 1969)

Draft Joint Communique

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his Government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its treaty obligations for defense of countries in the area.

3. The Prime Minister and the President noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area, and referred to the treaty commitment of his country to the Republic of China. The Prime Minister expressed his full understanding of the position of the United States and stated that the Japanese Government also continued to view the situation in the Taiwan area with close attention and concern. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The Prime Minister expressed his earnest hope for a substantial progress towards that end. He further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indo-China area.

4. In the light of the situation and the prospects in the Far East, the Prime Minister and the President highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and mutually affirmed the intention of the two Governments to maintain firmly the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and the common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two Governments should maintain closer and constant contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

5. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between Japan and the United States and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed due appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The Prime Minister and the President also recognized the vital role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed

that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 by concluding these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The Prime Minister and the President also agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

6. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his

Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his understanding of the position of the Japanese Government and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to

Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.

9. The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two Governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Government of Japan in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both Governments. They agreed that the Japan-United States Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The Prime Minister and the President decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission in place of the existing Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Preparatory Commission will be composed of a Representative of the Japanese Government with Ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with appropriate staff, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations

to the two Governments through the Japan-United States Consultative Committee.

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.