

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

1972年の沖縄返還時の有事の際の核持ち込みに関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書No.2

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第

極
秘

9月11日大臣打合

互

11日夕刻大臣は下閣工使と共に

ラヂオより 華府到着。同日夜8時頃

1時5分、大津波に訪ふ折、出席

者 大臣、下閣、田中西工使、米局長、

克生公使

席上大臣は、總理訪米中の時日

が迅速な進展し、今次訪米中に、核以外

の核の問題に付、能力合意に達す

る様取違ひなき強き表示あり

韓米台情 12月11日は 別紙 1.2 の

GA-6

外務省

とあり、^{12月11日}12月12日は 別紙 3 の

とあり、^{12月11日}12月12日の 一方の意見を以て

補足する事、^{12月11日}12月12日は 軍事に

対し 参事官等 1 人の 別紙 4 を

採るに 12月12日の 予備長官と

の 会談に 臨む、^{12月11日}12月12日。 (とれ等

4 事は 12日の 会談に 先立、^{12月11日}12月12日

北米 韓米 台情 又 任 二 台 使 記 録 付

量 あり。)

GA-6

外務省

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Korea

(Prime Minister's Statement)

Therefore, should an occasion arise for the U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

(半蔵ニハニ一ト)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Taiwan

A. (Communique)

2. by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. *The Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. should be in a position to discharge effectively its international obligations for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan.* (c.f. U.S. proposals of September 11, 1969).

B. (Prime Minister's Statement)

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. Should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan. Therefore, in view of our national interest, we should deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the U.S. of its defense obligations. However, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today.

(半蔵ニハニ一ト)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

A. Communique

The President and Prime Minister expressed the hope that the war in Vietnam will be concluded before return of administrative rights in Okinawa.

Viet-Nam

B. 1. (Prime Minister's Statement)

Although it is a hypothetical question related to the future, it is my belief that, should hostilities unfortunately not have been concluded by the time reversion of Okinawa, is scheduled to take place, U.S. military activities relating to the conflict should not be affected by reversion, as the two Governments would consult fully on the implications of a prolongation of the war.

2. (President's Statement)

Even in the unfortunate event of a prolongation of the conflict in Vietnam, the reversion of Okinawa agreed upon between our two countries with the necessary legislative support would not be affected, since there are fully adequate provisions for consultation between the two Governments on the implications of such a prolongation of the war.

(半農ニハスミ)

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Nuclear problem

(Communique)

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

(半農ニハスミ)