

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 1972年の沖縄返還時の有事の際の核持ち込みに関する「密約」に係る調査関連文書No.2

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特

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

外務省  
 次長  
 次官  
 参事  
 主計官  
 文書課長  
 秘書官  
 庶務課長  
 総務課長  
 企画課長  
 調査課長  
 情報課長  
 国際課長  
 領事課長  
 参事

総番号 (FA) 4060 / 主管  
 69年 9月 12日 21時 30分 米 国 発着  
 69年 9月 13日 11時 40分 本 省 着  
 外務大臣 殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん問題 (米側新提案)

第2858号 特秘 至急 (ゆう先処理)

往電第2820号に關し

1. 11日夕刻國務省アイン部長は冒頭往電2. の日米案を對比せる文書に更に米側提案をもち込んだ改訂文書をわが方に手交した (往電第2857号の1. 冒頭参照) とくる。内容次のとおり。

(イ) 朝鮮につき一方的発言末段を以下のとおりとする。

THE POLICY OF GOJ TOWARD P  
 RIOR CONSULTATION WOULD BE  
 TO GIVE PROMPT AND FAVORAB  
 LE CONSIDERATION TO SUCH A  
 REQUEST ON THE BASIS OF FO  
 REGOING RECOGNITION

(ロ) 台湾

(ハ) コミュニケ関係部分末文を削り次の文章を加える。

ア 参地中東  
 長 北 京 西  
 参 北 北 保  
 参 一 二  
 参 西 東 洋  
 参 國 東

近 参 審 近 7  
 次 参 總 經 國 万

参 参 官 統 國  
 参 参 政 技 二  
 國 一 課

参 参 家 的 服  
 参 参 政 經 科  
 参 参 社 專  
 参 参 道 内 外

特

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電信写

THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED  
 THAT US SHOULD BE IN A POS  
 ITION TO DISCHARGE EFFECTI  
 VELY ITS INTERNATIONAL OBL  
 IGATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE O  
 F COUNTRIES IN THE FAR EAS  
 T INCLUDING JAPAN.

(2) 一方的發言の末びに武力攻撃があつた場合事前協議  
 に対し PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CO  
 NSIDERATION を与える旨朝鮮の場合と同じ文章  
 を加える。

(ハ) ヴィエトナムにつきコミュニケ関係部分第2文を削  
 り次の2文章を加える。

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
 PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE HO  
 PE THAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM  
 WILL BE CONCLUDED BEFORE R  
 ETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RI  
 GHTS IN OKINAWA. THEY NOTE  
 D THAT THERE ARE FULLY ADE  
 QUATE PROVISIONS FOR CONSU  
 LTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO G

特

注意

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電信写

極秘

OVERNMENTS ON THE IMPLICAT  
IONS OF A PROLONGATION OF  
THE WAR IN VIETNAM ON THE  
REVERSION OF OKINAWA, SO TH  
AT THE RETURN OF OKINAWA W  
ILL NOT AFFECT US MILITARY  
ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE  
VIETNAM WAR.

2. 12日のアイチ大臣・ロジャース長官の会談を能率的  
にするため、以上の諸点につき大臣主眼の下に打合せの  
結果それぞれ往電第2857号別電1. 2. 3. 4. のと  
おりの案を作成し、12日会談前に米側に手交しおいた。

以上往電第2857号と前後せるも事情右のとおり。

(7)

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(米案) 会談

Redraft of Joint Communique, September 12, 1969

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area.

3. The Prime Minister and the President specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.





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was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. GOJ Version. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his understanding of the position of the Japanese Government and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

U.S. Version: The Prime Minister agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the U.S. military forces in the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.

(Not agreed)

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.

9. The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Government of Japan in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both governments. They agreed that the Japan-United States Consultative Committee

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in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The Prime Minister and the President decided to establish in Okinawa a preparatory commission in place of the existing advisory committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The preparatory commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with appropriate staff, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the commission. The commission will report and make recommendations to the two governments through the Japan-United States Consultative Committee.

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.

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