

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

岸総理大臣第1次訪米関係一件 岸・マッカーサー
予備会談（於東京） 第1巻

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大臣

岸総理、マツカーサー米大使会談要旨

(訪米予備会談第五回)

(昭和三二 四二五)
文書課 長

四月二十五日岸総理はマツカーサー米大使を外務省に招致し、午後五時より約五十分間訪米予備会談の第五回を行つた。要旨左のとおり。

(大野次官、千葉アメリカ局長、モーガン参事官、ラム一等書記官、竹内同席)

冒頭次官より、総理の日程案を先方に手交し、カナダ訪問は結局ドロップした旨述べ、千葉局長より、本件は未だホワイト・ハウスの了承をえていない由につき、特に取扱いに留意する要ありと述べた。「マ」大使は日程案を読みつつ、サンフランシスコにて二日休まれることは、長途の旅行につき賢明と思う。また先般

極秘

千葉局長にも申ししたが、ニューヨークのファー・イースト・アメリカ・カウンスルは、米国の有数の実業家、特に日本と取引のある実業家をもつて構成しており、総理が日本の経済問題を取上げて話される場としては格好なものと思う。日本が米国市場に依存せざるをえないこと、日本が米国より綿花、小麦などを多量に買っているのに、日本商品の対米輸出を制限することは適当ならざることなど述べられることしかるべしと思う。これらの実業家は立派な人達であり、対日貿易につき視野の狭い人達の動きを中和する役をなすものと考えたと述べ、ホノルルは往路行事を予定しおらざるやと質した。千葉局長より、往路はワシントンの公式訪問まで公けの行事を予定しない方が適當であるとの総理の意向であると述べ、「マル」大使は、総じて日程は結構であると思う旨述

べた。

一 次いで総理より、本日は世界情勢についての自分の見解を述べると冒頭して、別添甲の趣旨を述べた。右を終つて総理より、冒頭に述べた如く世界情勢については、米国の方が情報を豊富にもつておられると思うので、本日述べた自分の見解につき、後日適当な機会にアメリカ側の考え方を伺いたしと述べた。

なお、総理が別添甲の第二頁「共産側は、日本に関しては *direct aggression* によつて目的を達せんとしている」との点によつて述べた際、「マ」大使は口をはさみ、右間接侵略とはサブバージョンの意なりやと質し、総理より、要するに国内の共産党及びシンパ分子を煽動し、中共のいういわゆる「日本の解放」を国内から達成せんとするとの意なりと答えた経緯があつた。

一 次いで総理より、次回は五月一日（水）に行うことといたした
いと述べ、大使これを了承した。さらに総理は、

(1) 自分は五月二日より六日までの間、伊勢神宮参拜、大阪及び
山口に赴くこと。

(2) 東南アジア訪問予定は、五月二十日出発、六月四日帰国の日
程にて、ビルマ、インド、パキスタン、セイロン、タイ、台湾
の六カ国を訪問すること。

(3) 長期防衛計画を審議すべき国防会議の開催については、これ
をなるべく早く行うよう督促しており、現在これがための幹事
会を四月二十七、八日頃に行い、第一回の国防会議を五月十日
以前に行う予定であること。

(4) 今後の予備会談については、前記の自分の旅程を勘案し、五

月一日（水）と、八日（水）、十一日（土）、十五日（水）、十八日（土）の五回行いたく、しかるときはこれまでの分と合せ、合計十回の会談となること。

(5) 五月一日の次回には、日米両国間の経済協力問題並びに議題の「その他」の問題を取上げることとする。これにてわが方のいふべきことは尽きるので、爾後の会談においてはこれについての米側見解を聞くことといたしたい。

旨を述べ、大使は一々うなずいていた。

一 大使より、本日の世界情勢に対するお話は興味深く伺った。お考えはワシントンに伝達すべく、ワシントンより貴見に対するオプザベーションなり、コメントなりあることを期待している。また具体的なサジェスションに対しては、具体的コメント（

specific comments on specific suggestions) あるかも知れない。自分は

一九五四年以来、自由選挙に関し、モロトフとテンプルをはさんで陰気な交渉を行つたことがある。一九五四年ベルリンにおいて、四週間続いた本件交渉中、ダレス長官がモロトフを双方四名あての小さなディナーに招待したことがある。食事が終つてダレス長官はモロトフに対し、米ソ双方は全く根本的に異つた信条をもつている、わが方は政府は人民のサーバントであると考えているのに対し、貴方は政府は人民の意思を統御するものと考えており、自由選挙の真の意義を解しないものであると述べたところ、モロトフは、それは間違いである、ソ連は自由選挙を信奉している、しかし自由選挙を行ふに當つては、あらかじめその結果がいかなるものかあらかじめ知つてから、これを行ふことが重要であると述べ

べた経緯がある。

いずれにしても、総理はお忙しいと思うので、他に議題がなければこれにて会談を終ることといたしたく、本日のお話を多とするものである、と述べた。

一、次いで本日の会談につき、新聞に対する応待振りを別添乙のとおり打合せ、会談を終つた。

別巻甲

世界情勢の検討

(原三三、四、二五全漢)

世界、特にヨーロッパ諸国の最近の動向等については、米国政府の方が情報も豊富にもつてゐることだし、その見解を詳細に聞かせてもらいたい。この際、長い眼で見て世界が今後どういう方向に進んでいくと見るべきか、また、アジアの一国としての立場から、自由陣営としてはそのような世界の動向にどう対処すべきであるかについて自分の考えを述べて、参考に供したい。

一 世界の情勢は、大局的にみれば、一つの不安定な平和の時代に入つており、しかもそれは相当長期間続く公算が大きいと考える。共産側は、世界共産化の理想は捨てないであろうが、そのために世界戦争をとする意図を有しているとは思われない。大量殺りく的な兵器の急速なる発達をあまりに恐ろしいものにして

極秘

しまつた。ソ連の経済、社会体制に内在している弱味も見逃せな
い。共産圏内部のストレーンは、ポーランドとハンガリーで顕在
化した。米国を中心とする自由諸国の団結もまたソ連の戦術転換
をもたらした一つの原因である。

極東においては、局地的な戦争の危険も、薄らいできている。
これは、朝鮮動乱に際し、国連及び米国が敏速に有効適切な措置
を執つたことに負うところが多いことは、いうまでもない。中共
には、台湾を武力でおとしめたいという意図は、もはやないとみてよい
であろう。ヴェトナムにおいても、国際的にきめられた線が引
かれたため、従前の流動的な状態よりも、はるかに安定した状態
がもたらされている。

ソ連が極東地域において相当大規模な軍事力を保有しまた中共

が軍事力の充実に努力していることも無視しえない。このことが日本にとって潜在的脅威を構成していることは否定し難い。また北鮮、北仏印において共産側が休戦協定に違反して軍事力を増強しつつあることも事実であろう。しかしながらこのことをもつて直ちに、共産側が極東地域共産化のプログラムの一環として、これら地域に対する軍事侵略をおこそうとしているものと速断するのは当たらない。他方極東地域においては、台湾の国民政府、南鮮の李承晩政権ともに、積極的に共産側に対する武力進攻を呼号し、むしろ第三次大戦の勃発を希望してゐるかのよ^うな印象を与えているのは、他の地域における東西対立関係に見られない特異な事態であることに注意する必要がある。

なお、極東におけるソ連や中共の第一目標は、日本であるとい

うようなことがよくいわれるが、これはいわゆる間接侵略の目標としてのことである。

二 以上のような世界情勢に対する見方から、自分は、今後の対共産圏政策のとるべき方向について、二、三の示唆をしたい。

(一) 経済協力の拡充

共産圏に対して自由諸国が執らなければならぬ措置には、三つの面がある。その一は、共産側からの大規模な侵略の阻止、すなわち、第三次世界戦争の防止という面である。これについては、もつばら米国による報復力の維持ということに頼らざるをえない。その二は、局地的な侵略を防止し、かつこれが起つた場合に備えるという面である。その三は、共産主義の浸透、すなわち、いわゆる間接侵略に対する防衛という面である。その

ためになさるべき最も基本的なことは、国民生活の安定を欠いて
いる諸国に経済的な援助を与え、共産主義に対する抵抗力を
高め、民主主義の成長のための基盤をつくるということである
う。

右の三つの要素は、いずれも欠くことのできないものである
が、問題は、この三つの間のバランスの点にある。共産圏の周
辺の全域にわたつて、水も洩らさぬような防衛線を布くことは、
実行不可能であるばかりでなく、力の浪費を意味する。局地戦
にヴァルネラブルであると認められる地域には局地戦に備える
ための軍隊の配備をしなければならぬが、そうでないところ
については、共産側がそこを攻撃したら米国の戦争になるこ
とがなんらかの形で明らかになれば、それで足るのである。

ないかと思う。兵力をコミットするよりは、その方が経済的であり、政治的にも好ましい。

このような観点からして、極東においては、米国が局地戦にヴァルネラブルであると認められる南鮮や台湾に重点を置いているのは、妥当ないき方であると思う。

軍事面に向けられた努力は、「冷たい戦争」を「熱い戦争」に転化させないことには役だが、「冷たい戦争」に勝つことには積極的には役だたない。この目的に役立ちるのは、経済面における努力である。だからといって、前者をないがしろにするわけには、もちろんいかず、結局バランスの問題ということになる。自分は今後の対共産圏政策においては、後者の目的の方にこれまでよりよほど重点を置いていくべきであると思う。

自分は、米国の友人として意見をいうことを許されるならば、
第一に、米国の対外援助計画においても、軍事援助に対する経
済援助の割合を漸進的に大きくしていつて、両者を少くとも対
等にするぐらいのところまでもつていくべきではないかと思う。

第二に、米国は、その経済援助については、侵略の意図をも
たないと認められるすべての国を対象とするためまえを宣明し
たら、どうかと思う。もちろん、現実に経済援助を与えるに当
つては、具体的な事情を検討した上できめなければならぬこ
とであるが、門戸は広く開放するためまえをとる方が、いろ
いろな意味で便策であるうと思ふ。

(二) 核兵器実験の禁止

われわれは、核兵器の実験ができるだけすみやかに、かつ有効に禁止されるべきことを要望してきた。今後ともこのための努力は続けるつもりである。しかし、これは、核兵器の製造及び保有までも今直ちに禁止すべしというものではない。米国による大量の核兵器の保有が戦争の阻止に役だつていふという現実には、われわれも認識している。ただ、米ソ両国における核兵器の技術的進歩の現段階からして、今日核兵器の実験をやめることが米国に不利でソ連に有利な結果になるといふ結論がでるはずはないと考えるものである。米国としては、たとえ実験の禁止を協定しても、ソ連がこれを守る保証がなく、協定に違反して実験しても外部からは探知できないことをけ念している

わけであろう。それならば、探知ができるような機構を設け、協定が守られるよう確保する手段を講ずればよいはずである。

私は、米政府が進んで右のような趣旨による具体的な提案をされることを切望する。これについては、日本政府が四月九日軍縮小委員会に提出した意見も参考にされたい。このような提案には、ソ連は応じないかもしれないが、応じなければ初めからソ連に誠意がなかつたことを天下に明かにする効果はあるわけである。

(三) 分割されている諸国における人民投票の提唱

国際情勢の安定化を現在妨げている一つの大きな要素は、世界の四つの国が各々二つに割れているという事実である。ドイツ及び朝鮮については、西欧側は、統一選挙の実施を提唱して

きているが、共産側は、これまでこれに應じなかつたし、今後これに應ずる見込みもない。また、統一選挙の方式は、これを中国及びヴェトナムに適用する場合、分割された人口の割合がらして、自由陣営に不利な結果になるおそれがある。

そこで、自分は、右の四つの国のすべてに適用しうべき一つの方式を提案したい。それは、分割されている各部分において、その住民に対して、現にその部分を統治している政府による統治の継続を希望するか、それとも、他の部分を支配している政府の統治下に入ることとを希望するかを問うことを自由陣営側が提唱することである。この人民投票は、国連の管理下に行われるものとし、関係の諸国及び諸政府は、これによつて示された多数意見を尊重すべきことをあらかじめ誓約することとすべき

ことをあらかじめ誓約することとすべきであろう。

このようなチャレンジに対しても、共産側は、おそらく応じないであろう。しかし、自由陣営としては、これを提唱するだけでも、いわゆる平和攻勢としての効果を挙げることができ。また、共産側が応じなかつたら、自由陣営に属する部分だけで人民投票をやることにしてもいいと思う。いずれにしても、人民投票の結果が自由陣営に不利になることはないであろう。前の会談で述べた二つの中国という事態に到る道も、これによつて開かれて行くかもしれない。台湾の現情がその住民の多数によつて支持されていることが証明されることになれば、東南アジアの諸国民のなつとくをうるのに資するところが少くないであろう。

No. 63/IC1

Tokyo, March 18, 1957.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith enclosed the text of the resolution on prohibition of atom and hydrogen bombs, adopted by the House of Councillors on 15 March 1957.

At the same time, I further have the honour to invite Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the House of Councillors adopted following resolutions in 1954 and 1956;

"The House of Councillors

Resolves to request the United Nations to take immediately appropriate measures in order to realize the establishment of effective international control of atomic energy, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the prevention of damages by experiments of atomic weapons, and to achieve the peaceful utilization of atomic energy for the promotion of human welfare."

(adopted on April 5, 1954.)

His Excellency
Mr. Dag Hammarskjold,
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
New York, N.Y.,
U. S. A.

"This House had adopted the "Resolution concerning the International Control of Atomic Energy and Prohibition of Atomic Weapons." Recently, the problem of atomic weapons has come to be one of the most important international issues, and many countries, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, appear to be taxing their minds on how to handle this problem. Subsequent to the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States of America at Bikini ~~two~~ years ago, powerful nuclear tests have recently been held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, it is reported that tests on a greater scale are to be conducted this spring by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

We earnestly desire the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and hydrogen bombs which could bring ruin upon mankind. Pending the establishment of effective measures among the nations, we desire that the United Nations and the countries concerned promptly take measures for the prohibition of the nuclear explosion tests.

The foregoing is hereby resolved."

(adopted on February 9, 1956.)

Since I wish to emphasize the strong hope of the Government of Japan that the most serious consideration be given by all Member States of the United Nations to the realization of the fervent desire of the Japanese people as repeatedly expressed in these resolutions, I shall be grateful if you would be good enough to circulate copies of this letter and the enclosed resolution to the Members of the United Nations as a United Nations document.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Nobusuke Kishi

Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan.

(Translation)

Resolution of the House of Councillors on
Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bombs (March 15, 1957)

It is resolved that:

This House adopted sometime ago a "Resolution on International Control of Atomic Energy and on Prohibition of Atomic Weapons" and a "Resolution on Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bomb Tests" requesting the United Nations and the Powers concerned to take appropriate measures. It is to be deeply regretted, however, that no steps have yet been taken for international control of atomic energy but atom and hydrogen bomb tests continue to be conducted either with or without previous notice and that the United Kingdom Government is now preparing to carry out new tests around Christmas Island notwithstanding the repeated protests from the Japanese Government.

This House hereby urges again that United Nations and the Powers concerned to take speedily effective and appropriate measures for limiting the use of atomic energy exclusively to peaceful purposes and for the total prohibition of production, use and testing of atom and hydrogen bombs; and, in view of the reasonable fear that if things are left as they are today the amount of fall-out from nuclear explosions may increase to the point of irremediably affecting human life, calls for

solemn

solemn reflection on the part of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America and requests those Powers to suspend all atom and hydrogen bomb tests now under contemplation, regardless of whether they are to be held with previous notice or not.

Confidential

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Japan-US Exploratory Talks
Japanese Paper No.8 (Agenda 6)

Review of the World Situation

The Government of the United States no doubt has much information on recent world trends, especially on the trends in various European countries. I would like to hear in detail the views of the United States Government on this subject. However, I should like at this time, to state my views on the direction in which the world is likely to move in the future, and also my opinion, from the point of view of an Asian, on how the free nations should cope with such a trend.

I. The world, generally speaking, seems to have entered into an era of unstable peace, which is likely to continue for some time to come. The Communists will never give up their final goal of world communization, but it is unlikely that they will risk a world war for that end. The rapid development of arms capable of immediate and widespread destruction of life has turned war into something too fearful even to think about. The weaknesses inherent in the economic and social systems of the Soviet Union can not be overlooked. These strains existing

within the Communist orbit have become evident in Poland and Hungary. Furthermore there is no doubt that the solidarity of the free nations under the leadership of the United States has contributed to bringing about a change in Soviet strategy.

The danger of an outbreak of local war in the Far East has also diminished. Needless to say, this is due greatly to the fact that the United Nations and the United States promptly took effective measures when the Korean war broke out. It now seems possible to say that Communist China no longer entertains the intention of taking Formosa by force. In Viet Nam, the previously fluid situation has been greatly stabilized with the drawing of the international line.

Furthermore it is often said that Japan is the principal objective in Asia of the Soviet Union and Communist China. But the means for their attaining this objective will be indirect aggression.

We cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union maintains considerable military forces in the Far East, and the Communist China is building up its military strength. It is difficult to deny that this constitutes a potential threat to Japan. It may also be true that the Communists are increasing their military strength in

both North Korea and Vietminh in violation of the armistice agreements. However, it does not necessarily follow that they are about to undertake military aggression in these areas as a part of their program to communize the Far East. Meanwhile, both the Nationalist Government of China and the Government of South Korea are advocating military action against their communist opponents, making it seem as if they desire the outbreak of a third world war. We must take note that this is a peculiar phase of the East-West conflict that does not exist in any other part of the world.

II. Based upon the views just stated on the world situation, I should like to make a few suggestions concerning the direction which future policy toward the Communist countries should take.

(1) Promotion of Economic Cooperation

There are three aspects to the measures which should be taken by the free nations against the Communist bloc. The first is to deter large-scale aggression from the Communist countries, that is to say, to prevent the occurrence of a third world war. In this respect, we must rely upon the United States maintaining

retaliatory power. The second is to prevent local aggression and to be prepared to cope with any such aggression. The third is to defend ourselves against communist infiltration, that is, indirect aggression. The fundamental measure to be taken for this purpose is to provide economic assistance to those countries lacking in economic stability, thereby enhancing the power to resist communism and establishing a basis for the development of democracy in those countries.

All of these three requirements are indispensable for safe-guarding against communist aggression. The question lies in striking the proper balance between them. Any attempt to set up a watertight defense line around the entire Communist bloc is impracticable and a waste of effort. Deployment of armed forces capable of dealing with local wars is necessary to those areas deemed vulnerable, but, as to other areas, it would appear to be sufficient if it is made clear to the Communists in one way or another that any armed attack against these areas by communist countries will lead to a war with the United States. This would be more economical and politically sound than to station armed forces in such areas. From this standpoint it is considered appropriate that, in the Far East, the United

States is placing emphasis on such countries as South Korea and Formosa, which are deemed vulnerable to local war.

Efforts in the military field will serve to prevent a "cold war" from turning into a "hot war", but will not play positive role in winning the "cold war". Efforts which will serve the purpose of winning the "cold war" are those which take place in economic fields. Nevertheless, military efforts should not be neglected. Therefore, due consideration should be given to the maintaining of an appropriate balance between military and economic efforts. In my opinion, much greater stress than before should be placed on economic efforts in the future policy toward the Communist bloc.

If I were to be permitted, as a friend of the United States, to express my views on the United States foreign assistance program, I would like to suggest first that economic assistance be increased so as to make it more equal and proportionate to military assistance.

Secondly, I would like to suggest that the United States declare the principle that it is prepared to extend assistance to all countries deemed to have no aggressive intentions. Needless to say, economic assistance should only be extended after a careful study is made of the specific circumstances of each case. But,

it is believed that an open door policy in economic assistance would in the long run be the best policy.

(2) Prohibition of Nuclear Bomb Tests

We have called for the early and effective prohibition of nuclear tests, and we are determined to continue to exert our efforts for this purpose. However, we do not mean that the manufacture and possession of nuclear arms should be prohibited immediately. We are fully aware of the fact that the possession of a large stockpile of nuclear arms by the United States has been serving to check the outbreak of a global war. In view of the present technical progress of the United States over the Soviet Union, we do not believe that prohibition, today, of nuclear tests, would result in an advantage to the Soviet Union and a disadvantage to the United States.

Perhaps the United States feels that, even if an agreement on prohibition is reached, there would be no guarantee of compliance by the Soviet Union, and there would be no way of detecting the tests conducted within the Soviet Union. Such an apprehension could be eliminated by working out an effective system of detection as well as the means of attaining compliance with the agreement.

I sincerely hope the United States Government will take the lead in making a concrete proposal in this line.

In this connection, I hope the observations recently submitted to the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee by the Japanese Government will also be taken into consideration (see attached paper). The Soviet Union may not agree to such a proposal, but in that event, it will at least have the effect of demonstrating to the world that the Soviets lacked in sincerity from the outset.

(3) Proposal for Plebiscite in Divided Countries

One of the principal factors preventing stabilization of the international situation today is the fact that four countries are each divided into two parts. With respect to Germany and Korea, the Free World has been proposing the holding of elections to unify each country, but the Communists have so far rejected and will continue to reject such proposals. On the other hand, it is feared that if the same method of election is adopted in China and Viet Nam, the result would be unfavorable to the Free World, because the balance of population between the divided parts is unfavorable.

In view of these circumstances, I should like to suggest a plan which, I believe, can be applied uniformly to all of the four countries. That is, the Free World should propose that a plebiscite be held in each of the divided areas for the purpose of ascertaining whether

the people in each area desire to remain under the Government of the area or whether they desire to be placed under the Government in the other area. Such a plebiscite should be carried out under the supervision of the United Nations, and the Governments concerned should agree beforehand to respect the view of the majority as shown by the voting.

This would be a challenge which the Communists probably will not accept. But such a proposal will have the favorable effect of a peace offensive on the part of the Free World. If the plan is rejected by the Communists, a plebiscite might still be held in the free areas. In any event, such a plebiscite will not have results unfavorable to the Free World. It might also pave the way to the realization of the "two Chinas" which I mentioned previously.

I believe that, if through such a plebiscite the present status of Formosa is endorsed by the majority of its people, it will contribute to a better understanding of United States policy by the peoples of Asia.

Attached Paper

The Japanese Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's Note of the 1st April, 1957, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations regarding the decision of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the 28th March, 1957, which invited certain countries to communicate their observations on their proposals which were referred to the Sub-Committee by the General Assembly on the 14th February, 1957.

Under instructions from his Government and in compliance with the above Note, the Japanese Ambassador has further the honour to submit herewith the official text of the "Observation of the Japanese Government", together with its Annex, for the consideration of the Sub-Committee.

London :
9th April, 1957

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April 25, 1957

The United States Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at five o'clock today and stayed for about forty-five minutes.

Further discussions took place on the Prime Minister's schedule and other matters relating to his coming visit to the United States.

- d) Meteorological and oceanographical conditions.
- e) Amount of radioactive fall-out to be produced by the explosion.
- f) (Other relevant data to be itemised by agreement).

A N N E X

Details of Registration System and its Operation

(1) Time of registration

Any country, which intends to carry out a nuclear test explosion, shall register the said test with the United Nations at least five months prior to the planned test.

(2) Object of registration

Nuclear test explosions to be registered with the United Nations shall include all nuclear test explosions irrespective of their size or type ; provided that those test explosions, which the General Assembly or the Security Council considers as having no effect on man and his environment, etc. on the basis of recommendations made by "the Committee", may be excluded.

(3) Data to be informed at time of registration

At the time of registration of nuclear test explosions, each country shall supply data, as detailed as possible, concerning the planned test, which shall include the following minimum data:

- a) Location, date, time and period of test.
- b) Type of nuclear explosion (fission, fusion or fission-fusion, etc.) and total energy.
- c) Place of explosion : on the ground, in water or in the air; in case in the air, the altitude of explosion.

/: d)

OBSERVATIONS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The Japanese Government, as clearly stated in the letter of Mr. Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, dated 18 March 1957, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (United Nations document DC/109 dated 25 March 1957), strongly hopes that an agreement of the prohibition of nuclear test explosions will be promptly reached among the powers concerned.

From the above point of view, and in order to do away with the current situation in which nuclear test explosions are carried out in an uncontrolled manner, and frequently without prior warning, the Japanese Government suggests the following with the object of prohibiting nuclear test explosions through practicable and effective measures :

- A. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, or a Nuclear Test Explosion Control Committee which may be newly established, (hereinafter to be called "the Committee") shall, first of all, study whether it is possible to detect all nuclear test explosions, and should it reach the conclusion that such detection is possible, all nuclear

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test explosions shall be prohibited in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly or the Security Council; if "the Committee" should reach the conclusion that such detection is impossible by means of existing detection systems and methods, a ~~new~~ international detection machinery shall be set up by "the Committee", methods of detection shall be improved and strengthened, and steps shall be taken to make such detection possible.

B. Until such time as the international detection machinery is completed and methods of detection progress to the stage where all nuclear test explosions can be detected, all members of the United Nations shall register in advance all nuclear test explosions with the United Nations in order to restrict such test to a minimum. The details of the registration are given in the Annex.

C. (i) When a nuclear test explosion is registered, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall immediately so inform all members of the United Nations and "the Committee".

- (ii) "The Committee" shall immediately study the effects of the proposed test upon man and his environment, and other effects.
- (iii) "The Committee" shall report to the Secretary-General of the results of the study, and when it deems that the planned test will adversely affect man and his environment, etc. outside the territory of the country planning the test, and that suspension of the test is advisable, it shall so report to the General Assembly or to the Security Council.
- (iv) The country concerned shall, in the event that the General Assembly or the Security Council, based upon the report of "the Committee", recommend the suspension of the planned test, comply with the said recommendation.

The Japanese Government considers it appropriate that the international agreement regarding the above suggested system and its operation should be attained in the form of a General Assembly resolution, based upon recommendations of the Disarmament Commission; that if a new "Committee" is to be

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formed, it should be formed within the framework of the United Nations, composed of the same members as that of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.