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岸総理、マツカーサー米大使会談要旨

(訪米予備会談第七回)

(昭和三二、五一—)
文書課長

岸総理は、五月十一日外務省にマツカーサー米大使を招致して、午前八時半より十時までの約一時間半、訪米予備会談の第七回を行った。要旨左のとおり。

(大野次官、朝海大使、千葉局長、モーガン参事官、ラム一等書記官、竹内同席)

一、まず、大使より、四月二十五日の会談において、貴総理は(イ)世界情勢の判断及び(ロ)自由諸国がいかにこれに対処すべきかの方途、の二つの問題について見解を示されたが、自分もまた(イ)第一に情勢判断において共通の見解に達すること、(ロ)しむうして、第二段としてこの判断に基いて、これにいかに対処すべきかにつき共通

の理解に達することが、最善の方法であるとの点において見解を同じくするものである。けだしかくすれば、爾後において諸般の問題を手掛けるための基礎ができるからである。

四月二十五日（第五回会談）の日本側の書き物は本国において検討されていたが、今回本国において世界情勢に関するもつとも新らしい情勢判断と、自由諸国がとるべき政策をゆの（produced）した。自分は本日この米政府のもつとも新らしい研究をまとめたトーキング・ペーパーを持参した。これは最近におけるソ連の国内経済体制の変更に關する最初の判断をも含むほど新らしいものであり、本国でこれを作成した者と貴総理以外には未だ誰もこれをもっていないと述べ、別添甲英文二部を総理に手交した後、これを読み上げた。

大使は、右朗読の間に、二点につき左のとおり補足的説明を加えた。

(イ) 別添甲第十一頁(c) (衛星諸国の項) に関連し、米國としてポーランドにおいて反乱が起つた場合の危険を痛く心配している。ポーランドにおける事変は、東独に影響を与えずにはおかぬであろうし、これが東独に波及する場合には、西独政府の意向いかんに拘らず、西独の人民がことを起し、東西両ドイツの境界線を越えて事件が発生する危険があるからである。

(ロ) 同第十二頁(d) (台湾政府に言及している箇所) に関連し、「二つの中国」という際、東南アジアにおける華僑の問題が極めて重要となると思う。これら華僑の拠り所としての台北の意義

(utility of Taipei as the rallying point) は重要であり、二つの

中国という場合、台北のこの意義は全く失われてしまふである。
う。

一 右を読み終つて、大使は、貴総理がアイゼンハワー大統領と会談される場合、世界中において大統領ほど世界平和のため献身しているものはないことがお分りになると思う。大統領は戦争の実体を身をもつて経験しており、それ故に正義に基く平和の維持には非常な関心を有する人である。いずれにしても、この書き物は先般の貴総理の見解に対応（correspond）する米国政府のもつとも新らしい判断であり、これをお手許に残して行くから御検討ありたいと述べた。

これに対し総理は、只今のお話は方向において大体わが方の見解と同じと思う。なお詳しくはこの書き物を検討することといた

したいと述べ、大使は是非そうお願いすると述べた。

一 次いで総理より、別添乙の趣旨を述べた。右を終つて、総理より、国際情勢については、方向として日米双方の判断は同じと思ふ。また自由諸国に対する共産主義諸国の政策についても双方の見解は大体一致している。先般安保条約の改正と領土問題の解決についてサジェスチオンを行つたのも、只今自分が述べた意味でこれを行つたものである。けだし以上のような国際情勢において日本の地位を考えれば考えるほど、日米両国が十分な相互理解をもつ必要が痛感されるのである。日米両国間に誤解があるときは、共産主義者が乗ずることとなるので、日米関係は彼らをして乗ずる隙のないようにしなければならぬのであると述べた。

一 次いで総理より、この前の会談で申したとおり、自分は五月二

十日から六月四日の間東南アジア六カ国を訪問するが、この旅行より帰国後訪米までの間に約十日間ある。よつて今後の会談は五月中は十五日及び十八日の二回、六月は八日に行うこととしたい。しこうしてできるだけこれまで提起した問題について一応の結論をうることとしたい。もし六月八日の会談においてもなお問題が残れば、六月十二日にさらに一回行うこととしてもよいと考える。いずれにしても最後の会談においてはワシントン会談の後で発出されることが望ましいと思われる共同声明について話合い、一案をえたいと思つている。以上の諸点についてなんらコメントあれば伺いたいと思つた。

これに対し大使は、実は自分は総理の訪米に当り帰国せよとの訓令をうけており、六月九日夜出発を予定している。そして貴総理が

到着されるまでにワシントンで丸一週間の余裕を見込んでいるが、これは必要と思う。従つて六月八日を最後の会談といたしたいと述べた。

総理は右を了承し、自分が東南アジア旅行中、五月十八日の会談と六月八日の会談の間においては外務省と米大使館の間において事務的にできるだけ話を進めることといたしたいと述べた。

大使は右を了承した後、共同声明については、互にこれを盛込むべきことについて考えておくことはよいことであるが、案文を作ることは実際にワシントンの会談が行われるまではできない。実際問題としてわれわれの予備会談は実情を討議し、ワシントン会談を有益ならしめるものと思うが、ここで案文を作ることは適当でないと思うと述べた。

総理より、言葉として案文を作るといふことは適当でないかも知れない。卒直に申して、貴大使に申したことを大統領及びダレス長官との会談においてそのまま繰返す心算はない。いかように問題を持出し、会談を取運ぶかは自分としても考える。しかしほぼ会談の結論として考えられるものを今から考えておくことは有意義と思うと述べた。

大使は、自分は大統領のみがもっている権限を侵す（*usurp*）

President's prerogative）わけにゆかぬが、共同声明について考

えておくことは、起草委員会の仕事を容易ならしめるものと思う。

今一つ、自分は十五日及び十八日の両回会談することに客かでないが、残された米側のオブザーベーションは十五日の会談で全部申上げられると思うし、また自分は十七、十八の両日沖繩視察を

予定している。自分は沖繩を未だみておらず、一時帰朝前に他に
適當な機会がないので、そうしたいと思つてゐる。しかし総理の
御意向によつては勿論この予定を変えて差支えないと述べた。し
かし総理は、予定変更される要なしとて、残された五月中の会談
は十五日のみとなつた。

一 次いで新聞に対する応対振りを別添丙のとおり打合せ、会談を
終つた。

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May 11, 1957

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1. Despite the large number of significant developments in the Communist Orbit since the death of Stalin, the threat posed to the survival of the free world by the Communist conspiracy remains in our view basically undiminished. The Communist leaders continue to be completely hostile to the peoples and institutions of the free world. They retain the objective of waging a continuing campaign, in one guise or another, to undermine and ultimately destroy all rival power. They continue to command a military capability of truly formidable proportions and are unstinting in their efforts to augment it at the maximum rate possible. They retain in the world Communist apparatus a pliable instrument of subversion. They continue to enjoy the advantage inherent in a policy which seeks to exploit and magnify the world's ills rather than to overcome them.

2. Nevertheless it is apparant that erosive forces are operating within the Communist world. These offer a solid basis for hope that if the free world preserves its strength, unity and resolution, the time may come when the Communist threat will be reduced to acceptable proportions, if not dissolved.

(a) Significant stresses and strains exist in the Soviet economy and these seem likely to increase. Difficulties are being encountered in agriculture, in the control and management of the increasingly taut economic machine, in meeting the mounting manpower requirements, in expanding the supply of materials required to attain production goals, and in effecting physical investment in accordance to plan. For several years, various indices have indicated a growing economic imbalance and a slowing down of the rate

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of economic growth. Add the economic problems of the satellites, and the prospect of growing economic pressure on the Kremlin appears real. The benefits of the "decentralization" program currently being publicized are questionable. There is an inherent contradiction between real decentralization and a planned economic system like that of the USSR.

It seems unlikely that in practice decentralization will be carried far. Whatever is done in the way of decentralization may well add to the confusion and difficulties, at least for the next two to three years. It should be emphasized that in general what is anticipated is not a breakdown or severe crisis of the Soviet economy, but increasing problems for the Soviet leaders in the allocation of resources, the necessity of repeated modification of established goals, and a decline in the rate of economic expansion to a level more comparable to that of free countries.

(b) The ideological base on which the whole Communist system rests has been severely shaken. The Kremlin has tried desperately to reverse the trend toward ideological disintegration, but the damage done to the Communist mythology remains essentially unrepaired and probably unrepairable. The principle of the infallibility of leadership, the most important ingredient of the mythology, has been dealt a shattering blow. A complicating factor is that within party ranks the impression appears to exist of a division within the leadership between "stalinists" and "anti-stalinists." The result is uncertainty as to who really is in a position to speak ex cathedra. The party system now lacks what was most important for its monolithic character under Lenin and Stalin: the fixed principle that there is a final voice of authority

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from which there can be no appeal. Many "revisionist" concepts have been put forward in party circles, and literary and artistic elements are insisting upon and enjoying a certain amount of freedom from the ideological strait-jacket. Cynicism, both within and outside party ranks, appears to be on the increase and some observers see a strong trend toward a "nihilist" point of view.

(c) Popular attitudes within the USSR also appear to present a problem. We have no evidence that anything approaching an uprising is in the offing or is at all possible. There is, however, widespread evidence of growing dissatisfaction among intellectuals. It appears also that the masses are less responsive to Kremlin demands for continuing forced-draft efforts with minimal material returns. Moreover, the effectiveness of "terror" to drive the people forward has diminished. The most we can reasonably expect from this situation is a greater "dragging of feet," but coupled with other difficulties this could be quite important.

(d) The leadership situation may also constitute a weakness. While direct evidence is lacking, there is a possibility of conflicts over policies. Moreover, ~~while~~ the leadership has shown a greater flexibility than did Stalin and perhaps a better grasp of objective realities, it has on several occasions given evidence of confusion and uncertainty. It has produced something of a record in false starts, sudden reversals in important and costly programs, incidents of bad judgment in domestic, party and foreign affairs.

(e) The European satellites continue to present problems of serious proportions. Moscow has strengthened its physical control over all

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except Poland, and another Hungary appears unlikely. What has been done, however, has not touched the basic problems that led to last year's crisis. The people remain bitterly hostile; economic conditions are if anything further deteriorating; intellectual fermentation continues widespread. In brief, all the old sores are festering.

It seems certain that Moscow will have to pay an increasingly greater price -- in the psychological as well as the physical sense -- for the privilege of ruling the satellites.

(f) Poland offers a special problem. The Gomulka regime appears to enjoy a significant degree of independence in domestic affairs. It is following a program markedly different from the USSR and the other satellites. If it should be able to continue on its present course, it could hardly fail to prove a cancerous body in the Soviet-satellite structure. Yet for Moscow forcefully to reverse the situation in Poland would involve great costs and risks. Thus Moscow faces a real dilemma.

(g) The attraction of "Titoism" as an alternative course still appears to be strong. Although Moscow is energetically attempting to withdraw the respectability granted Tito's "heresies" in 1955 and 1956, it appears to be finding it difficult to do so effectively. The "Yugoslav way" seems to affect the thinking and, in thinly disguised form, many writings throughout the Orbit.

(h) While the evidence is less firm than in other areas, there are some indications of mounting economic difficulties in Communist China. Should these continue and grow, they might add significantly to Moscow's

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own troubles.

3. We feel that the above problems and difficulties add up to a potentially serious situation for Moscow. However, we consider it necessary to stress that nothing in the present situation justifies the assumption that the Communist power structure is in jeopardy, or that a factor is operating that will compel a change in heart of the Communist leaders or force them in the near term to abandon any of their objectives. What is at work is a group of erosive rather than explosive forces.

These may, over a period of time, produce a significant evolutionary change. Meanwhile, the Soviet-Communist power is and will remain a hard reality. In this connection special attention should be paid to the following points:

(a) The Kremlin, although doubtless hurting, shows no intention of unilaterally reducing its efforts in the armaments field. Its concentration on the technological race remains feverish and highly productive.

(b) Moscow gives every indication that it is integrating nuclear weapons into all branches of its military forces and that it is getting into a position where large-scale armed operations would be likely to involve nuclear operations.

(c) The present Soviet rulers have demonstrated a willingness to be as ruthless as Stalin when it comes to matters that directly or indirectly threaten their hold on power.

(d) The Communist apparatus outside the Bloc remains an effective and dangerous instrument of Soviet policy. While de-Stalinization and Hungary

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produced an important impact on fellow travellers and a limited number of the rank and file membership, hard core Communists in the free world obviously remain completely loyal to Moscow.

4. With respect to intentions, the pressures now operating within the Bloc have clearly not produced a modification of basic objectives. Beyond this, the following generalizations can be made about Communist intentions:

(a) Basic to all Soviet actions and policies is the preservation of the security of the regime and of the territory of the USSR. Second only to this is the concern to preserve Soviet control over the satellites and to maintain Sino-Soviet solidarity. It seems almost certain, therefore, that the Kremlin in pursuing its long-term goals will avoid actions that would clearly jeopardize either the USSR or the Orbit.

(b) Subject to the limitations imposed by this consideration, Moscow's basic aims are, in the sequence given:

- (I) the elimination of United States influence and bases in Eurasia, the neutralization of United States allies, and the isolation of the United States;
- (II) the expansion of Bloc influence and power throughout Eurasia;
- (III) the elimination of the United States as a rival power center; and
- (IV) the ultimate spread of Communist power throughout the world.

(c) Chinese Communist aims appear to be identical to those of the USSR except more influenced by regional considerations. Thus Peiping gives first priority to the Taiwan problem, Japan, and the continued United States

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influence in Korea and Southeast Asia.

(d) In view of security considerations, it appears that short of gaining a decisive technological advantage neither the USSR nor Communist China will deliberately resort to general war. The danger of general war would become great, however, if the free world relaxed its defense efforts. Under existing conditions, a general war might occur in consequence of Soviet miscalculation of United States intentions or in consequence of a series of actions and counter-actions not intended to produce general war. Moreover in a totalitarian system the possibility of a "madman decision" can never be completely ruled out.

(e) There can be no assurances that the Communists will not again resort to local aggression. For the time being, concern that local aggression might precipitate general war may be an effective deterrent. As however their nuclear capability increased, the Communists may calculate that free world fear of a nuclear holocaust would rule out anything worse than counteraction on a local level and perhaps not that. The principal danger spots are the Taiwan Straits, Indochina, and Korea, but other areas cannot be ruled out.

(f) Currently the Communists are concentrating on their long-standing aim to drive the United States out of Europe and Asia and break up its alliances. They are actively using the "carrot and stick" tactic, coupling "atomic blackmail" in their notes and propaganda with conciliatory overtures and gestures. In connection with the latter, they are especially seeking to regain pre-Hungary respectability.

(g) Communist activity in the economic and technical assistance sphere is directly tied in with the campaign to isolate the United States and

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to fragment its alliances. The Communists can not be said to have transformed the struggle into one of economic competition. They still adhere to the "two world markets" concept. Their trade and assistance maneuvers are all directly related to specific political ends. The Communists clearly do not expect to attain "victory" in any area through economic means but to prepare the ground for the use of other means.

(h) In the Middle East, the Communists are seeking on the one hand to keep the situation inflamed and on the other to get big-power acknowledgment of a special Soviet interest in the area. They have also sought to use Middle East developments to divert attention from their military crushing of Hungary.

(i) In respect of major issues in dispute, the Communists are holding fast to their long-standing position on all with the possible exception of disarmament. The logic of the situation, including the terrible danger of a continued nuclear race and the increasing high cost of modern armaments, as well as the greatly increased expression of interest in disarmament, suggest that Moscow may be willing to make some concessions to get a partial agreement on disarmament. So far, however, Soviet proposals retain provisions that make them obviously unacceptable to the free world. It is entirely possible, therefore, that their objective in the disarmament field remains simply that of inhibiting the free world from developing its nuclear capability and from retaining the will to employ it if necessary. A significant recent development is the public reversal by Zhukov of the long-standing Soviet contention that in a new war the use of nuclear weapons might be eschewed as were chemical and bacteriological weapons in the last war. Zhukov says the

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situation is basically different.

5. In view of the situation within the Communist Bloc and the nature of current Communist policies, the requirements of the United States and free world policy appear to be clear:

(a) Within our own ranks we must:

(I) Avoid courses of action that would increase the danger of general war.

(II) Maintain the military capability both to retaliate massively in case of Communist attack and to resist effectively any local aggression; for this latter not only must the United States maintain mobile forces and the overseas bases necessary for their deployment, but effective local forces must be provided. (Failure of the free world to maintain a capability against local aggression would involve the gravest risks since it would leave the free world with no other defense against such aggression than the precipitation of a general nuclear war).

(III) Existing free world alliances must be preserved and strengthened.

(IV) Economic and technical assistance programs must be continued and strengthened to the end that maximum viability will be achieved throughout the free world. Communist efforts in this sphere must be watched and where necessary countered, but a shift of effort simply to reacting to Communist maneuvers should be avoided.

(V) Emphasis on economic and technical assistance must not be at the expense of other defense measures, since the Communists clearly are not relying principally on this line of attack; they have the capability and the will to use other types of weapons.

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(VI) Maximum cooperation should be sought among the free countries in the economic, ideological, and political spheres; energetic efforts should be made to resolve or neutralize differences that exist or may arise.

(VII) Full support should continue to be given to the United Nations and efforts made to strengthen its capability to prevent or defeat aggression.

(b) With respect to policies vis-a-vis the Communists, the principle of the free world should be to maintain policies and postures that will maximize the erosive effects of forces and pressures operating within the Bloc power structure. To this end:

(I) Further extensions of Communist power must be prevented.

(II) No concessions should be granted the Communists in return for paper agreements or declarations.

(III) The USSR should not be conceded the revived respectability that it is now seeking.

(IV) Any arms agreement, partial or total, should be accompanied by concrete arrangements that will guarantee adherence.

(V) Maximum efforts must be made to achieve world understanding of the true nature of Communism and its purposes and to marshal world opinion against the ~~methods and practices of the Communist leaders~~ the thinking

(VI) Maximum efforts should be made to influence the thinking and attitudes of the peoples held in bondage by the Communists.

(VII) Cultural contacts between free and Communist-dominated peoples should be promoted but **only** in ways and to a degree such that advantages will redound to the free world and not to the Communists.

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(c) Special attention should be concentrated on the problems raised for the Communists in consequence of their forceful rule over the satellite peoples. Under present circumstances, actions and policies that might precipitate popular uprisings on Hungarian model should be avoided. Further uprisings clearly would be militarily suppressed by the USSR. While this would increase the costs of empire for Moscow, it would entail a terrible human sacrifice and would involve risks of general war particularly if Poland or East Germany were affected. The free countries should, however, continue to refuse to accept the permanence of enslavement of once-free states by the Communists and should refuse to enter into any arrangement with Moscow or Peiping that would in any way legitimize Communist rule over those states. To the extent possible without precipitating Soviet military action against them, the Poles should be encouraged and supported in their efforts toward greater independence. Similar policies should be adopted for other Communist regimes that resort to a more independent course, but only after a capability and intention along this line have been demonstrated.

(d) Moscow and Peiping are bound firmly together by ideological, military and economic ties. The overriding emphasis placed by Peiping on Communist Bloc solidarity at the time of the Hungarian crisis strikingly demonstrated the Chinese Communist leaders' commitment to the goals of world Communism. It would be unrealistic to expect any action by the free world to induce a split between Peiping and Moscow. Only extreme disillusionment with the USSR and discouragement regarding the future of world Communism could lead to such a development. Every indication today suggests that the Chinese

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Communist leaders regard their future as inseparably intertwined with that of the USSR and that they have supreme confidence in the final victory of Communism. Under such circumstances, the free world must persist in the policy of strengthening the free countries of the Far East militarily, to deter overt aggression, and politically and economically, to prevent Peiping from increasing its influence and that of local Communist parties by non-military means. It is essential to maintain the position of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan and in international affairs as a vital element in combatting Chinese Communist efforts to increase their power and influence. A "Two-China United Nations" solution to the problem of a divided China has been rejected with equal vehemence by both Peiping and Taipei and any attempt by outside powers to impose such a solution could only result in destroying the position of the Government of the Republic of China and contributing substantially to the growth of Communist influence in Asia. In Asia, as in the rest of the world, United States policy is to strengthen free world countries, to prevent general war, and to exert such pressures on the Communist world as will contribute to evolutionary changes favorable to free world.

(e) Free world policy as a whole should rest upon the premise that at some point the combination of free world strength and erosive forces within the Communist world will lead to changes either in the Communist power structure or in Communist policies and attitudes that would reduce the threat to the free world. We should therefore explore every indication of Communist willingness to adjust, in part or in whole, to the requirements of a peaceful and stable world order. Where solid ground is found in the form of concrete deeds and actions, the free world should stand ready to enter into appropriate

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agreements and arrangements. Where, however, deeds and actions are not firmly put on the line, concessions and deceptive declarations must be avoided. Any other course would invite disintegration of the whole free world program to attain peace without war.

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日米協力に対する日本政府の決意

(昭和三二 五一〇)

日本は今後あくまで自由民主主義体制を堅持すべきであることはいうまでもない。すなわち、日本は、自由諸国の一員としてこれら諸国との協調を図ることをその外交政策の基調とするものである。

自由諸国は、自由民主主義を擁護するためには、共産主義勢力がこれ以上伸張することを阻止するよう、一層団結を強固にすべきであると考えらる。日本の安全は、自由諸国全体の安全に依存せざるを得ない。時に、日本の向背はまた自由諸国全体の安全、すなわち共産主義勢力に対する力のバランス（単に軍事上のみならず、より広い世界政治的意味において）を維持する上に重要な比重を占めていると信ずる。特に極東における日本の地位は重要である。自分は、このような日本の地位と、その地位に相応する日本の役割の重要性を自覚す

ればこそ、極東における自由陣營の利益擁護に同じく重要な役割を演じている米國との協力関係を不可欠と考え、その強化發展を希望しているのである。

しかるに、日米關係の現状は、遺憾ながらこのような協力關係の強化發展に相応しい状態にあるということとはできない。これにはいろいろの原因があるであろうが、敗戦と長期の占領を経験した日本にとつてある程度避けえられなかつた結果であるということができる。

兩國政府は、過去において執つた政策や、これに関連したいろいろの経緯に拘泥している時期ではない。日米の協力關係が新たなる出発点に際会しているという気持ちに立つて、今後兩國間に眞のパートナーシップを確立するためには、いかにすることが最善の方法で

であるかを、真剣に考慮すべきであると考える。

自分は、冒頭に述べたとき日本の進むべき基本的方向を今後積極的に国民の前に明らかにして、保守勢力による政體の安定を図る確固たる決意を有するものであり、また憲法改正、その他各般の国内体制の整備に努力する覚悟を有するものである。

この際特に強調したいことは、ソ連、中共の最大の狙いは、日本を中立化すること。すなわち、日米の離間を図らんとしていることである。彼らがそのような政策をとるに至つたのは、戦争を賭するよりは、日本を中立化することの方がはるかに賢明であり、また有効であると考えているからにほかならない。すなわち、もし日本を中立化することができれば、そのことは極東地域における自由陣營の団結に致命的な打撃を与えることを意味し、ソ連、中共はその目

的とするアジア地域全体の共産化にとつて計り知れざる有利な地位を獲得することとなるからである。彼らは日米関係の現状からみて、このような政策を成功せしめることが可能であると判断し、その目的のためにあらゆる術策をとるであろうことを見逃してはならない。

従つて、この際日米両国政府が真剣に考慮すべきことは、このようなソ連、中共の意図をいかにして破碎するかという問題でなければならぬ。そのためには両国が彼らの軍事力に対抗する備えをすればこと足りるといふものではなく、彼らからくさびを打込まれる隙のないような心からなる両国協力関係をこの際確立しなければならぬ。このことなくして単に両国の軍事体制のみに頼るといふことであれば、かえつて日本国民の支持を失う結果、両国の同盟関係を弱めることとなると考える。これこそソ連、中共の術中に陥るも

のといふべきである。自分が安保条約の改正と、領土問題の解決を提案しているのも、このような観点からにはほかならない。自分はこうすることによつて、日本国民の支持を獲得し、真の日米協力関係強化の基礎を固めることができると確信するものである。

前述したとおり、自分は今後政局の安定を図るとともに、日本国民を指導して自由陣営の強固を一員たらしめて行くことを強く決心をしているのであるが、そのためにはまず日米協力関係の新らたな基礎が確立していることが是非とも望まじいと考える。衆議院議員の総選挙はいずれ遠からずやらねばならない。参議院議員の半数の選挙は二年後に行われる。これらの選挙には、自分としては、安保条約を改正し、南方諸島の問題を解決した上で臨みたい。そうすれば両院とも憲法改正に必要な三分の二の多数を獲得できるであろう。

と思う。そうしてこそ初めて、自分の年来の主張である憲法改正を具体的に日程に上らせることができる。

また、民主主義政治の健全な発達のためには二大政党の存在が不可欠であるが、その一方の社会党が特に外交政策の面において極端に走る傾向にあることを、私は日ごろ憂えているものである。社会党の中には穏健な良識ある者も少なからずいるのであるが、現在社会党において左派の勢力が強いため、これらの穏健分子は抑えられている。自分としては、彼らの力が社会党内において指導権をにぎるような環境をつくって行きたいと考えている。それには反対党といえども外交政策上多数の国民の支持を犠牲にすることなくしては、まづどうから反対できないような状況を、保守党の手でつくって行くのが最善の途であり、そうなればいきおい社会党内でも穏健な分

子の勢力が増大してくるに違いないと思う。これは労働組合についても同様のことがいえると考える。

このように、私は、政治面、外交面における新日本の建設の第一着手は、対米関係の調整にありと考えている次第である。

~~トをお、安全保障条約の改正の試案と領土問題に関する交換公文の試案を差し上げるから、この二つの問題の検討に当つて参考にされたい。~~

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添
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May 11, 1957

The United States Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at 8:30 this morning and stayed for about one hour and half.

Further talks took place on matters relating to the Prime Minister's prospective visit to the United States. Mr. Asakai, the newly appointed Ambassador to the United States took part in the talks.

Japan-U.S. Exploratory Talks

Japanese Paper No. 11

Confidential

Needless to say, as I stated previously, Japan will adhere strictly to the principles of freedom and democracy. As a member of the Free World, the fundamental basis of Japan's foreign policy is to promote cooperation with all the free countries of the world.

It is my conviction that, in order to uphold the principles of freedom and democracy, the free nations of the world must strengthen further their unity and check the spread of communist influence. While the security of Japan depends upon the security of all the free nations, Japan itself occupies, on the other hand, an important position in the maintenance of security of the Free World, in other words, in the maintenance of the balance of power against the communist world, not necessarily only in the military sense but in the broad world political sense. The position of Japan in the Far East is of special importance. Because I am fully aware of the position Japan occupies and the great responsibilities that go with such a position, it is my earnest desire to strengthen Japan's cooperative relations with the United States which is likewise playing an important role in protecting the interests of the free nations in the Far East. I am convinced that such a close cooperation is indispensable.

However

However, the existing state of affairs between the United States and Japan, unfortunately, can not be said to be wholly conducive to the strengthening of the relations between the two countries. There are without doubt many reasons for such a situation. But, it must be said, that this situation was to some extent unavoidable for Japan in view of her defeat and the long period of occupation that followed. It is not the time for the two Governments to brood over the various policies taken by them in the past and the difficult circumstances arising in connection with such policies. It is my firm conviction that the time has now arrived to give new impetus to the cooperative relations between our two countries by giving serious consideration to finding the best means for setting up a truly genuine partnership between Japan and the United States.

I am determined to establish political stability with the support of the conservatives of the country by making clear to the people the basic policy and course that Japan should follow, and shall exert my utmost efforts for the consolidation of various domestic conditions including the amendment of the Constitution.

It should be particularly emphasized at this time that as has just been mentioned in your statement, the paramount aim of the Soviet Union and Communist China is to neutralize Japan, in other words, to drive a wedge into the relationship between our two

countries

countries. The Soviet Union and Communist China resort to such a policy because neutralization of Japan is far more prudent and effective than to risk a war. If they should succeed in neutralizing Japan, it would amount to dealing a fatal blow on the unity of the free nations in the Far East, and their gaining an immeasurably advantageous position in their design to communize the entire Far East. They seem to have decided that it is possible for them to succeed in their policy of neutralization in view of the present condition of the relations between Japan and the United States, and we must not overlook the fact that they will resort to whatever means possible to attain their objective.

Consequently, most careful consideration should be given by our two Governments to the problem of how to crush such designs of the two Communist countries. For this purpose it is not sufficient merely to prepare ourselves against their military power. We must, at this time, bring about a genuine cooperative relationship between our two countries, strong enough to withstand any attempt on the part of the Communists to drive a wedge into it. If attempts were made only for the building up of our military strength without such a close cooperation, it might be difficult to retain the full support of the Japanese people, thus weakening the unity between our two countries. If such a situation were to come about, it, indeed, would amount to our two countries letting themselves

themselves become the victims of the strategy of the communist powers. It was only from this point of view that I suggested a revision of the Security Treaty and settlement of the territorial problems. It is my firm conviction that, in this way, it would be possible to win the solid support of the Japanese people, thus creating the basis upon which to build a genuinely sound cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States.

As I said before, I am determined to stabilize the political situation in Japan and to lead the Japanese people so that they will be reliable members of the Free World. In order to attain these objectives, it is essential that a new basis should be established for Japan-American cooperation. We shall hold a general election of the House of Representatives sooner or later. An election for half of the members of the House of Councillors will take place two years later. Before these elections, I hope to be able to carry out a revision of the Security Treaty and to resolve the problem of the southern islands. When these are realized, I believe the Conservative Party can win the two-thirds majority in both Houses necessary to amend the Constitution. Thus, for the first time, it will become possible to place my long insisted on plan for the amendment of the Constitution on the agenda of the Diet.

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The existence of two parties is essential for the sound development of democracy. But I am always concerned that the Socialists are apt to run to extremes, especially in the field of foreign policy. Although there are many moderate Socialists of good sound judgment, the leftist group in the Socialist Party is predominant, obscuring the moderate members. I hope a situation can be brought about whereby the moderate elements can take the leadership in the Socialist Party. And the best means to bring this about is for the Conservative Party to create a situation in the field of foreign policy, which the Opposition can not oppose without losing the people's support. In this way the influence of the moderate members can be increased. The same is true in the case of the trade unions.

Thus, I am convinced that in building up a new Japan in both the internal and external fields it is necessary, first of all, to adjust the relations between Japan and the United States.

I believe that our two governments are generally in accord in their estimates of the international situation and the policies of the communist powers vis-a-vis the free nations. It is with this purpose, which I have mentioned previously, in mind that I suggested a revision of the Security Treaty and settlement of the territorial problems. The deeper I think over the position of my country in

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the present international situation, the more strongly I feel the need for our two countries to gain full understanding of each other. I believe it to be most essential that any misunderstanding between the two nations should be removed and that no chance should be left for the communists and other leftist elements to exploit to their advantage.