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(10)

米の
対日
政策

最近における米国の対日政策

最近相ついで発表された米国政府および議会関係各種委員会の対外援助問題に関する諸報告並びに最近の米官辺筋の言明および米新聞論調につき、米国最近の対日政策の傾向をみれば、ほぼ左の通りである。

フェアレスその他各種委員会の報告

これら報告は必ずしも同一性質のものではないが、これらを一貫して感じられるものは、自由世界防衛の重要な一環としての日本の経済を強化するため、自由諸国とくに米国の貿易政策を漸次自由化する一方、とくに自由アジア諸国の経済開発の積極的促進をはからんとする意図ならびに日本の防衛力の着実な増強への期待である。これら各報告につき、その要旨をみれば、次の通りである。

(一) フェアレス委員会報告

前 US スティール社長フェアレスを委員長とする本委員会は、正式には「相互安全保障計画に関する大統領民間顧問団」と称し、昨年九月米議会方面でソ連の新戦術に対抗し、米国の対外援助政策を一新すべしとする要求の抬頭に鑑み設立され、さる三月五日大統領にその報告を提出したもので、この報告は近く議会に提出される大統領の対外援助教書起草の参考資料となるものである。

まず本報告は個々の国家に対する援助につき論じたものでなく、全般的に見た米国の対外援助および集団安保計画の必要性を確認するとともに、今後の一層効果的な運用につき勧告を行つたものであり、特にわが国に言及してはいない。然し自由諸国全体に対する米の対外政策を取扱つた本報告は同時にわが国に対するものであることはいうまでもない。報告書は(一)集団安

保計画の緊急的必要性、(二)米国の能力、(三)目標達成の方法、(四)行政上の運営、(五)経費の規模と継続期間の五部から成っているが、まずその第一部において、対外援助の基本方針を次のように示している。即ち共産主義の侵略的脅威に対抗するには力が必要であるが、この対抗力の形成としては、集団的行動をとる必要があると確信する諸国と団結することが大切である。そして共産主義の武力侵略を阻止するに十分な軍事力を建設するところが、集団安保計画の第一目標とするところである。然し大局的勝利を得るためには武力のみでは十分ではない。同時に自由主義機構が官僚主義機構に勝ることを示さなければならぬのであるから、経済開発をも強調しなければならぬ。現在の集団安保機構はなお数年にわたり現在の世界の危機的緊張が存続する限り維持される必要がある、としている。

特にわが国の大きな関心を呼ぶのは第三部の集団安保体制の

目標達成方法に関する部分で、ここでは国際貿易の重要性を指摘し、関税の漸進的引下げ、関税手続の自由化を唱えるところにも、アジアその他における広域経済圏の設定を次のように提唱している。

「必要資源を十分に持ち、かつ資本および労働力の最も生産的な使用を許すに十分な広さの地域に、関税障壁のない経済地域機構を設定するならば、経済は最もよく発展するであろう。欧州共同市場は歴史的必然であり、同様の大市場をアジアおよび南米に創設する重大な可能性がある。これら経済力を発展せしめることにより、防衛負担の均分化を図るべきである。」

第三部でさらに注目される諸点は次の通りである。

(1) 借款形態については交換性のない外国通貨による償還は望ましくなく、むしろドル借款の条件を寛大にすべきである。

(2) 贈与は米国の利益となる場合とか、受入国が償還能力を欠く

場合のよきを例外的な場合にのみ行うべきである。前会計年度における贈与は四七億ドルであるが、そのうち三七億ドルは軍事目的であるところ、経済力伸展につれて各国は国防支出に対する自己の分担率を増加しており、軍事贈与に関する原則は、各国が共同防衛の負担を正当に負担すべきであるといふことにある。

(3) 援助の順位は、集団安保体制参加国を優先させる。

(4) 米国以外の経済先進国による対外援助は積極的に求められべきであり、米国の支持を希望する国に対する米国は以外の国からの援助見込のある場合は、共同援助を提供すべきである。然し経済援助分配のため新たに経済開発のための特別国連基金といったような機関の創設は不要と考える。

(5) 余剰農産物売却については、通常貿易の上積みという条件では農産物の売却は価格引下げを通じてのみ行われ、米国に不利な結果となるが、かかる不利な条件による売却は贈与ないしは借款の提供と結びつけるべきではなく、余剰農産物処理と対外援助は切離して行わさるべきであり、通常消費以上の買付けの意志ある買手に引下げ価格で売却すべきである。

最後に第五部では、(1) 世界の現状からみて軍事援助継続の必要性を認め、(2) 開発援助計画は長期化さるべきであり、米国が数年間継続援助の保障を与えるべきこと、(8) 援助費の規模は現在の年間八〇億ドル（軍事援助、経済援助、現地通貨による余剰農産物売却、米軍の海外支出、輸出入銀行借款等を含む）で十分である、(4) 援助の継続期間については、ソ連プロツクが自由世界の破壊を求めると限り継続の他なし、などの諸点を答申している。

(二) ジョーンストン報告

対外援助担当の米大統領特別顧問ジョーンストンは三月七日国際開発計画に関する大統領顧問団の団長として、大統領に報告し、後進国の長期援助に重点をおいた国際開発基金の設置を次のように勧告した。

(1) 恒久的な国際開発基金を設ける。基金は開設の当初において最低三年間の財政援助計画を行うに十分な金額をあたえるよう議会の承認を求めらる。

(2) 基金は輸出入銀行あるいは世界銀行と同様、開発が十分行われていない後進国に借款ないし贈与を与える。とくに基金は、中東を含むアフリカ、アジア、中南米各国における開発計画に必要な技術援助と資金を供与することを目的とする。

(3) 基金は原則として世界銀行より有利な利率で貸付を行うものとし、また特定の場合には、その国の通貨で支払うことも可

能とする。

このジョーンストン報告もとくに日本に言及してはいないが、昨年二月ジョーンストンが米大統領の国際開発顧問団長として来日したさい、東京会館における歓迎会での演説で、次のように述べたことは、外交辞令的強調に対する割引を考慮しても、今回のジョーンストン構想におけるわが国の役割に対する米側の評価を示唆するものであろう。

「既存のあらゆるアジアに対する共同開発計画には、一つの非常に重要な要素が欠けている。それは日本である。アジアの唯一の技術指導者である日本が、この絶対に重要な地域が将来の向上発展を目指して前進するとうとき、その先頭に立たないなどということは考えられない。」

もつともこのジョーンストン構想は、前述の通り新たに経済開発のための特別国連基金といつたような機関を創設することに反

対しているフェアレス報告と対立する恐れがある。

(三) ボツクス委員会報告

民主党のボツクス議員を委員長とする米下院の貿易分科委員会は、昨年わが国を現地視察した後さる三月十四日その結果につき中間報告を発表したが、本報告は、日本の経済を強化し、ひいては自由世界を防衛する米国の同盟国としての義務を果す日本の能力を増大する上において貿易の拡大が演じる役割の重要性を強調したのち、次のようにのべている。

日本は世界の工業国のうちでもとくに外国貿易に依存している。現在その関心は、米国、中共、東南アジアとの貿易拡大に集中している。中共貿易の拡大は大きな関心のマトとなり、重要な政治問題となつてゐるが、その見込みは余りなさそうである。これに対し東南アジアおよびその他の自由アジア地域は、日本にとつて自然な補足的市場を提供している。東南アジア諸国が

經濟開發を進めるに従い、これら諸国はますます多くの資本財と
輕工業品の輸入を必要とするようになり、これら商品は食糧およ
び原料と交換で日本から買うことができる。

ポツクス委員会は、この中間報告につき公聴会を開いた後、さら
に最終報告を出す予定である。

(四) ハンナ報告

米上院外交委員会は三月十七日、日本、韓国、台湾、フィリピン四国に対する外交政策、援助政策の再検討ならびに調査報告を目的としたハンナ報告を発表した。これは、上院が世界を十地域に分けて米国各界の有識者に現地調査を委嘱したもので、この東亜四国はハンナ・ミシガン大学総長らが担当、昨年暮各
国を歴訪してまとめあげたものである。

本報告は日本に関して次のように勧告している。

- (1) 米国にとつて不可欠の要件は、(一)日本が軍事的に安全であること、(二)日本経済が強力であること、(三)日本政府が安定を維持すること、(四)日本が自力で国内治安を守り得ることの
の 嚮 轍 である。

だが極東全般の防衛計画の一部として日本が自衛力を増強することは望ましくても、強力かつ、侵略的な軍事力をつくりあげることとは問題外であることを注意したい。(注)

日米安保条約前文には、「……日本国が、攻撃的な脅威となり又は国連憲章の目的及び原則に従つて平和と安全を増進すること以外に用いられべき軍備をもつことを常に避けつつ……」との文句あり。

(2) 対日関係で最も深刻なのは、沖縄問題である。昨年プレス報告が不用意に発表されたことは、反米活動を助長する以外の効果は生まなかつた。沖縄問題ではまず米国人、フィリピン人、沖縄人三者間の給与差別を是正せねばならぬ。沖縄政策がこれまで軍当局にすべての決定を托されていたが、いまや民間人の判断がより重要な時期がきている。

(注) 土地問題解決の具体策はのべず

(3) 貿易がある限り日本は、「極東の英国」として米国最大の友として存在しうる。米国は日本の貿易振興のためあらゆる努力を払うべきである。だからといって米国や西欧の市

場が無制限に開放されることを意味しない。むしろ米国の側で国内の弱体産業、例えば繊維や陶磁器などが、日本製品から被つてゐる重圧を、産業全体に分割負担させるための方式を見出すべきであり、そのためには現在よりもつと根本的かつ寛大な考え方をもちつとが必要である。日本に對しては他國に對するような直接援助問題は重要ではない。(4) 現在の年額三百万ドルの經濟援助は、生産性向上計画に使用され、良好な結果を得てゐる。

ニ 米官辺筋の意見

最近の米官辺筋の対日言明で特に注目をひいたものはないが、行われた若干の言明は主として、わが國の對外貿易問題とくに中共貿易問題に對する米側の関心を示してゐる。一月中旬ロバートソン國務次官補はU・S ニュース・アンド・ワールド・リポート誌との会見で、中共貿易はたとえ制限を全廢しても、日本の貿易誌

総額の七ないし八%以上にはのぼらないであろうから、日本の経済問題は中共貿易によつて解決するものではないとした後、中共貿易に反対する政治的理由につき次のように言明した。

「中共はいまなお敵意ある態度を示しており、侵略的で、たえず軍事力の増強につとめている。全アジア共産化の目標を放棄した証拠はどこにもない。もしかれらが侵略に出てくれば、軍事力の負担は大部分米国にかかってくる。とすればわれわれが日本その他中共から侵略をうける危険性のある国々に対して、中共が軍事力増強のために必要とする物資を輸出しないよう協力を求めることは、正当なことだといえるだろう。」

また二月十二日アイゼンハワー大統領は、貿易教書を議会に提出したが、同教書は、日本のガソリン加入は日本に対し貿易の村会を拡大することにより、日本の中共依存度増大の危険を減ずるばかりでなく、日本に役立つ自由世界の市場を拡大するものだと、その意義を強調するところがあつた。

三、米紙論調

最近日米関係に関する米紙の論調で特に目立つたものはないが、石橋内閣から岸内閣へと相つぐ政変にさいし米重要紙が行つた論評を通じて一般に感じられるものは、米世論が日本の保守政権の継続を望み、それを前提としたわが政界の安定に関心をもつているとうことである。なかには「米国は日本国内の反米動向を検討するため近く新大使を派遣するが、新大使が大きな成功を収める公算は少ない。米国の対日政策は占領終了以来ドルと慈善と多大の忍耐の政策であつたが、今や強硬政策をとるべき時期に來たのかもしれない」(十二月二十七日アメリカカン・ジャナル紙、INSストイン極東部長)といつた見解を示したものもあるが、一般には石橋内閣の誕生にさいしてもまた岸内閣への更迭にさいしても、日本の対米政策には変化はないとし、「岸氏はしつかりした反共主義者で西方とくに米国の心からの友人である。あらゆる徴候からみて日本は新首

相の指導の下に繁栄し、世界にその影響力をつよめてゆくことにならるゝ。二月二十六日ニューヨーク、ヘラルド、トリビュンとか、「こうした秩序正しい選手交代（石橋内閣から岸内閣への更迭）の結果、日本の内外政策の前途には希望が生れた」といった好意的論評を示した。

こういう態度は、日米両国関係強化のため両国間の諸問題が互譲により解決すること望む態度につながっている。二月二十七日ワシントン。ポスト紙が次のよきに論じたのは、その代表的なものである。

「ワシントンでは、少なくとも現在の情勢では、日本は再軍備の速度をあげるべきだと考えられているが、岸氏にはこれがわかっているようだし、大体において同一意見のようである。中共貿易に対する西方側の禁輸措置については、これを一方的に破棄しようなどとはしないであろう。然し岸氏は、日本の利害関係を棄_てい目でみた場合、ゆくゆくは極東で政治解決をはかる必要がある

日本の再軍備はそれを困難にするかもしれない、通商上の障害を恒久化する、そうした解決が不可能になる、ということも心得ているわけである。

米政府としてもまた、日本人戦犯問題、核兵器実験、沖縄問題などで、日本側からこれまでより強い圧力をうけることは、覚悟しておいてよかろう。幸い岸氏が首相になつた結果、お互いの立場から、これらの問題にまじめな再検討を加えることが、いよいよ差迫つてきたばかりでなく、これによつて、両国関係強化という成果のあがる可能性も大きくなつてきたのである。というのは、これまでの日本の政治家は、一見わけのわからない態度をとつたり、他人ごとのような態度をみせたりすることが、その特色となつていて、過去においてはこれがときには、両国関係をこじらせた場合もあつたが、岸氏にはそういうところが全くないからである。米国は、相手の戦略的、経済的利害に対して、両国が互いに合理的にこれを尊重する建前で、岸氏と話合ふことができる

はずである。』

さらに三月十七日のニューヨーク。タイムスが掲載したトランブル記者の東京特電が、岸首相の訪米を報じたなかで、「日米は相互依存の關係にあり、両国間の軍事的取決めは決して一方的に日本のみを利用するものではなく、日本が西欧の集團防安保体制から離れれば、アリュイシヤンからニュージーランドに至る防衛線は崩れることになろう。日本はワシントン会談で一九四一年以来最強の立場にあるように思われる」とのべたことも、この点に關連して注目される。

最近における米国の対日政策(二)

一 中共貿易に対する米国の態度

(一) 中共に対する米国世論の緩和を思わせる徴候が最近次の通り相ついで現われている。

- 1、フオード会社のヘンリー・フオード二世はさる一月米商業会議所連盟総会で二つの中共承認を唱えるところに、中共貿易平常化の要を説き、その主張を政界要路者に伝えた。
- 2、グリーン上院外交委員長はさる二月十八日のラジオ放送の記者会見で、「私は遅かれ早かれ中共を承認すべきだと考える。われわれは中共政府の形態を好まないが、中共は大国であり、組織されている。私は米国がなぜ、一方で他の共産主義を承認しながら中共承認を控えているかわからない」とのべた。

3、これに対しダレスは翌十九日の記者会見で、これを反駁するような言明を行つたが、「外交的承認の検討を始めることは時期尚早である」とのべて、将来における検討を示唆した。

4、ギヤラップ調査は最近、米中外相会谈への賛成は五四%と発表。

5、モレ仏首相は二月下旬アイゼンハウアーとの米仏首脳会谈直後、中共の国連加盟を支持すると言明。

6、本国との打合せを終えて台北に帰任したばかりのランヤン米大使は三月一日米人記者との会見で、「中共の国連加入が実現すれば不幸なことではあるが、国府にとつて必ずしも悲惨なことではない」と語る。

7、米大統領特別補佐官ケストーンボームは最近極東旅行の帰途三月七日ホルルで、「米国は適切な条件で中共の承認と国連加盟を認めることを明らかにする方がよい。適切な条件というのはソ連、中共が個人の自由について新たな態

度をとることである、またかれらが世界平和と完全な自由に貢献することを証拠立てて欲しい」と語る。(三月十三日にも同じ言明を繰返す)

8. コロンビア、アムハースト両大学教授ヘンリー・スチールは最近、「中共禁輸は中共そのものより米国およびその友邦の利益をより多く阻害している」と演説。

(二) ロバートソン國務次官補の反対

このような情勢に対して従来の対中共強硬論が沈黙しているわけではない。強硬論急先鋒の一人ロバートソン國務次官補は二月六日イリノイ州ブルミントンの商業会議所における演説で(1)中共不承認はイデオロギーや経済制度を嫌うためではない。また朝鮮戦争に対する感情上の反動からでもない。(2)基本原因は三つある、即ち(a)米国並びに自由世界の集団安保の利益を害する。つまり中共承認は国府解消を意味し、共産侵略に対する米国のあらゆる立場を失わさせる。台湾がもし共産側の手に落

ちれば、日本、フィリピン、東南アジア全域は重大な脅威をうける。(b)アジア諸国は米国の保護をあきらめ、中共との妥協をはかり始める。(c)一千二百万の華僑が自動的に中共側に赴く。(3)中共は非合法政権であるから、これを承認する法的根拠もない。

因みに、ダレスは前述の記者会見で、同日中共承認を検討することについて反対する理由として次の七点をあげたが、ロバートソンがあげた反対理由と本質的な相違があるのが注目される。(1)中共は朝鮮で国連および米国と戦い、米国に十五万の死傷者を出させた。(2)中共は休戦後六カ月で実現するものとみられた朝鮮問題の政治的解決を阻止した。(3)中共はチベットを奪取した。(4)中共はインドシナ戦争を助長した。(5)中共は台湾に武力侵略の脅威を与えている。(6)中共は伝道師八人を含む十人の米市民を過酷な状態で監禁している。(7)中共は米国および国連の諸原則に対しあらゆる機会に反対宣伝を行つてゐる。

(三) S E A T O 理事会におけるダレス言明

三月十二日ダレスは S E A T O 理事会での演説で、中共不承認、国連加盟反対の強い発言を行つたのに対し、英国代表は直ちに、右は会議の意見を代表する物でなく、またその討議を要求するものでないと了解する旨を述べたといわれる。一説によると、ダレスはこの理事会に中共貿易に関する硬軟三つの色分けをもつ原稿を持参したが、加盟国のうちフィリピンを除き英、仏、豪、ニュージーランド、パキスタン、タイのいずれもが中共貿易を望んでいるばかりでなく、国府により封鎖されているアモイ港を解放すべきだと主張していることを知り演説原稿中最も強硬な反中共的草稿を読みあげざるをえなかつたものだともいう。

十九日か一方、ダレスの S E A T O における演説が、前記二月十九日の記者会見における説明に比し、かなり大巾に硬化して、この記者会見には、その三月五日に周恩来が中共政治協商会議における外交報告で、米国に先手を打つが如く「二つの中国」方式を断固拒否するとともに、激しく米国を攻撃したことがその大きな原因ではないかとみられる。

(四) パーミュニダ会議の結果

最終コミュニケには中共貿易問題は全然言及されなかつたがロイターが現地から米権威筋の言明として伝えるところによれば、アイゼンハワーはココムの特認条項を一層利用しなさいとのマクミランの発言を同情的に受入れ、昨年一月イデン訪米の際公約したココムリスト再検討問題に言及、米国は中共貿易問題の検討を続けるのに反対ではないとのべたといわれる。しかしアイゼンハワーはなんの公約も行わず、またこの検討は、米国が中国共産主義を将来の道として受入れることを示唆しないようなやゝ方でのみ続けらるものであることを指摘したといふ。

一方ロンドン。タイムズの現地特派員の報道も、ほぼこれと同趣旨を伝えるとともに、英側はソ連リストと中共リストとの差が修正されるのにある程度期待をよせていると報じた。

二、東南アジア経済援助

上院対外援助特別委員会は三月二十四日、ラトガズ大学のウェブスター・ジョーンズ総長の報告を発表した。これは、同総長が同委員会の委嘱により、最近アフガニスタン、パキスタン、インド、セイロンの各国を回り相互安全保障計画の実体を調査したもので本報告は、共産主義の脅威に対抗する上から南アジアに対する経済援助継続の必要を強調するとともに、これら諸国に対する援助は十年から五十年にわたる長期計画とし、かつ一国以上の諸国を益するよう地域的な計画をたてることを勧告している。

5月11日 第7回 事務局 定例会 議事録 提出 2009

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May 11, 1957

1. Despite the large number of significant developments in the Communist Orbit since the death of Stalin, the threat posed to the survival of the free world by the Communist conspiracy remains in our view basically undiminished. The Communist leaders continue to be completely hostile to the peoples and institutions of the free world. They retain the objective of waging a continuing campaign, in one guise or another, to undermine and ultimately destroy all rival power. They continue to command a military capability of truly formidable proportions and are unstinting in their efforts to augment it at the maximum rate possible. They retain in the world Communist apparatus a pliable instrument of subversion. They continue to enjoy the advantage inherent in a policy which seeks to exploit and magnify the world's ills rather than to overcome them.

2. Nevertheless it is apparent that erosive forces are operating within the Communist world. These offer a solid basis for hope that if the free world preserves its strength, unity and resolution, the time may come when the Communist threat will be reduced to acceptable proportions, if not dissolved.

(a) Significant stresses and strains exist in the Soviet economy and these seem likely to increase. Difficulties are being encountered in agriculture, in the control and management of the increasingly ~~tant~~ economic machine, in meeting the mounting manpower requirements, in expanding the supply of materials required to attain production goals, and in effecting physical investment in accordance to plan. For several years, various indices have indicated a growing economic imbalance and a slowing down of the rate

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of economic growth. Add the economic problems of the satellites, and the prospect of growing economic pressure on the Kremlin appears real. The benefits of the "decentralization" program currently being publicized are questionable. There is an inherent contradiction between real decentralization and a planned economic system like that of the USSR.

It seems unlikely that in practice decentralization will be carried far. Whatever is done in the way of decentralization may well add to the confusion and difficulties, at least for the next two to three years. It should be emphasized that in general what is anticipated is not a breakdown or severe crisis of the Soviet economy, but increasing problems for the Soviet leaders in the allocation of resources, the necessity of repeated modification of established goals, and a decline in the rate of economic expansion to a level more comparable to that of free countries.

(b) The ideological base on which the whole Communist system rests has been severely shaken. The Kremlin has tried desperately to reverse the trend toward ideological disintegration, but the damage done to the Communist mythology remains essentially unrepaired and probably unrepairable. The principle of the infallibility of leadership, the most important ingredient of the mythology, has been dealt a shattering blow. A complicating factor is that within party ranks the impression appears to exist of a division within the leadership between "stalinists" and "anti-stalinists." The result is uncertainty as to who really is in a position to speak ex cathedra. The party system now lacks what was most important for its monolithic character under Lenin and Stalin: the fixed principle that there is a final voice of authority

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from which there can be no appeal. Many "revisionist" concepts have been put forward in party circles, and literary and artistic elements are insisting upon and enjoying a certain amount of freedom from the ideological strait-jacket. Cynicism, both within and outside party ranks, appears to be on the increase and some observers see a strong trend toward a "nihilist" point of view.

(c) Popular attitudes within the USSR also appear to present a problem. We have no evidence that anything approaching an uprising is in the offing or is at all possible. There is, however, widespread evidence of growing dissatisfaction among intellectuals. It appears also that the masses are less responsive to Kremlin demands for continuing forced-draft efforts with minimal material returns. Moreover, the effectiveness of "terror" to drive the people forward has diminished. The most we can reasonably expect from this situation is a greater "dragging of feet," but coupled with other difficulties this could be quite important.

(d) The leadership situation may also constitute a weakness. While direct evidence is lacking, there is a possibility of conflicts over policies. Moreover, while the leadership has shown a greater flexibility than did Stalin and perhaps a better grasp of objective realities, it has on several occasions given evidence of confusion and uncertainty. It has produced something of a record in false starts, sudden reversals in important and costly programs, incidents of bad judgment in domestic, party and foreign affairs.

(a) The European satellites continue to present problems of serious proportions. Moscow has strengthened its physical control over all

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except Poland, and another Hungary appears unlikely. What has been done, however, has not touched the basic problems that led to last year's crisis. The people remain bitterly hostile; economic conditions are if anything further deteriorating; intellectual fermentation continues widespread. In brief, all the old sores are festering.

It seems certain that Moscow will have to pay an increasingly greater price -- in the psychological as well as the physical sense -- for the privilege of ruling the satellites.

(f) Poland offers a special problem. The Gomulka regime appears to enjoy a significant degree of independence in domestic affairs. It is following a program markedly different from the USSR and the other satellites. If it should be able to continue on its present course, it could hardly fail to prove a cancerous body in the Soviet-satellite structure. Yet for Moscow forcefully to reverse the situation in Poland would involve great costs and risks. Thus Moscow faces a real dilemma.

(g) The attraction of "Titoism" as an alternative course still appears to be strong. Although Moscow is energetically attempting to withdraw the respectability granted Tito's "heresies" in 1955 and 1956, it appears to be finding it difficult to do so effectively. The "Yugoslav way" seems to affect the thinking and, in thinly disguised form, many writings throughout the Orbit.

(h) While the evidence is less firm than in other areas, there are some indications of mounting economic difficulties in Communist China. Should these continue and grow, they might add significantly to Moscow's

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own troubles.

3. We feel that the above problems and difficulties add up to a potentially serious situation for Moscow. However, we consider it necessary to stress that nothing in the present situation justifies the assumption that the Communist power structure is in jeopardy, or that a factor is operating that will compel a change in heart of the Communist leaders or force them in the near term to abandon any of their objectives. What is at work is a group of erosive rather than explosive forces.

These may, over a period of time, produce a significant evolutionary change. Meanwhile, the Soviet-Communist power is and will remain a hard reality. In this connection special attention should be paid to the following points:

(a) The Kremlin, although doubtless hurting, shows no intention of unilaterally reducing its efforts in the armaments field. Its concentration on the technological race remains feverish and highly productive.

(b) Moscow gives every indication that it is integrating nuclear weapons into all branches of its military forces and that it is getting into a position where large-scale armed operations would be likely to involve nuclear operations.

(c) The present Soviet rulers have demonstrated a willingness to be as ruthless as Stalin when it comes to matters that directly or indirectly threaten their hold on power.

(d) The Communist apparatus outside the Bloc remains an effective and dangerous instrument of Soviet policy. While de-Stalinization and Hungary

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produced an important impact on fellow travellers and a limited number of the rank and file membership, hard core Communists in the free world obviously remain completely loyal to Moscow.

④ With respect to intentions, the pressures now operating within the Bloc have clearly not produced a modification of basic objectives. Beyond this, the following generalizations can be made about Communist intentions:

(a) Basic to all Soviet actions and policies is the preservation of the security of the regime and of the territory of the USSR. Second only to this is the concern to preserve Soviet control over the satellites and to maintain Sino-Soviet solidarity. It seems almost certain, therefore, that the Kremlin in pursuing its long-term goals will avoid actions that would clearly jeopardize either the USSR or the Orbit.

(b) Subject to the limitations imposed by this consideration, Moscow's basic aims are, in the sequence given:

- ①
- (I) the elimination of United States influence and bases in Eurasia, the neutralization of United States allies, and the isolation of the United States;
 - (II) the expansion of Bloc influence and power throughout Eurasia;
 - (III) the elimination of the United States as a rival power center; and
 - (IV) the ultimate spread of Communist power throughout the world.

② (c) Chinese Communist aims appear to be identical to those of the USSR except more influenced by regional considerations. Thus Peiping gives first priority to the Taiwan problem, Japan, and the continued United States

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influence in Korea and Southeast Asia.

(d) In view of security considerations, it appears that short of gaining a decisive technological advantage neither the USSR nor Communist China will deliberately resort to general war. The danger of general war would become great, however, if the free world relaxed its defense efforts. Under existing conditions, a general war might occur in consequence of Soviet miscalculation of United States intentions or in consequence of a series of actions and counter-actions not intended to produce general war. Moreover in a totalitarian system the possibility of a "madman decision" can never be completely ruled out.

(e) There can be no assurances that the Communists will not again resort to local aggression. For the time being, concern that local aggression might precipitate general war may be an effective deterrent. As however their nuclear capability increased, the Communists may calculate that free world fear of a nuclear holocaust would rule out anything worse than counteraction on a local level and perhaps not that. The principal danger spots are the Taiwan Straits, Indochina, and Korea, but other areas cannot be ruled out.

(f) Currently the Communists are concentrating on their long-standing aim to drive the United States out of Europe and Asia and break up its alliances. They are actively using the "carrot and stick" tactic, coupling "atomic blackmail" in their notes and propaganda with conciliatory overtures and gestures. In connection with the latter, they are especially seeking to regain pre-Hungary respectability.

(g) Communist activity in the economic and technical assistance sphere is directly tied in with the campaign to isolate the United States and

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to fragment its alliances. The Communists can not be said to have transformed the struggle into one of economic competition. They still adhere to the "two world markets" concept. Their trade and assistance maneuvers are all directly related to specific political ends. The Communists clearly do not expect to attain "victory" in any area through economic means but to prepare the ground for the use of other means.

(h) In the Middle East, the Communists are seeking on the one hand to keep the situation inflamed and on the other to get big-power acknowledgment of a special Soviet interest in the area. They have also sought to use Middle East developments to divert attention from their military crushing of Hungary.

(i) In respect of major issues in dispute, the Communists are holding fast to their long-standing position on all with the possible exception of disarmament. The logic of the situation, including the terrible danger of a continued nuclear race and the increasing high cost of modern armaments, as well as the greatly increased expression of interest in disarmament, suggest that Moscow may be willing to make some concessions to get a partial agreement on disarmament. So far, however, Soviet proposals retain provisions that make them obviously unacceptable to the free world. It is entirely possible, therefore, that their objective in the disarmament field remains simply that of inhibiting the free world from developing its nuclear capability and from retaining the will to employ it if necessary. A significant recent development is the public reversal by Zhukov of the long-standing Soviet contention that in a new war the use of nuclear weapons might be eschewed as were chemical and bacteriological weapons in the last war. Zhukov says the

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situation is basically different.

Q. In view of the situation within the Communist Bloc and the nature of current Communist policies, the requirements of the United States and free world policy appear to be clear:

(a) Within our own ranks we must:

(1) Avoid courses of action that would increase the danger of general war.

(II) Maintain the military capability both to retaliate massively in case of Communist attack and to resist effectively any local aggression; for this latter not only must the United States maintain mobile forces and the overseas bases necessary for their deployment, but effective local forces must be provided. (Failure of the free world to maintain a capability against local aggression would involve the gravest risks since it would leave the free world with no other defense against such aggression that the precipitation of a general nuclear war).

(III) Existing free world alliances must be preserved and strengthened.

(IV) Economic and technical assistance programs must be continued and strengthened to the end that maximum viability will be achieved throughout the free world. Communist efforts in this sphere must be watched and where necessary countered, but a shift of effort simply to reacting to Communist maneuvers should be avoided.

(V) Emphasis on economic and technical assistance must not be at the expense of other defense measures, since the Communists clearly are not relying principally on this line of attack; they have the capability and the will to use other types of weapons.

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(VI) Maximum cooperation should be sought among the free countries in the economic, ideological, and political spheres; energetic efforts should be made to resolve or neutralize differences that exist or may arise.

(VII) Full support should continue to be given to the United Nations and efforts made to strengthen its capability to prevent or defeat aggression.

(b) With respect to policies vis-a-vis the Communists, the principle of the free world should be to maintain policies and postures that will maximize the erosive effects of forces and pressures operating within the Bloc power structure. To this end:

(I) Further extensions of Communist power must be prevented.

(II) No concessions should be granted the Communists in return for paper agreements or declarations.

(III) The USSR should not be conceded the revived respectability that it is now seeking.

(IV) Any arms agreement, partial or total, should be accompanied by concrete arrangements that will guarantee adherence.

(V) Maximum efforts must be made to achieve world understanding of the true nature of Communism and its purposes and to marshal world opinion against the methods and practices of the Communist leaders.

(VI) Maximum efforts should be made to influence the thinking and attitudes of the peoples held in bondage by the Communists.

(VII) Cultural contracts between free and Communist-dominated peoples should be promoted but only in ways and to a degree such that advantages will redound to the free world and not to the Communists.

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(c) Special attention should be concentrated on the problems raised for the Communists in consequence of their forceful rule over the satellite peoples. Under present circumstances, actions and policies that might precipitate popular uprisings on Hungarian model should be avoided. Further uprisings clearly would be militarily suppressed by the USSR. While this would increase the costs of empire for Moscow, it would entail a terrible human sacrifice and would involve risks of general war particularly if Poland or East Germany were affected. The free countries should, however, continue to refuse to accept the permanence of enslavement of once-free states by the Communists and should refuse to enter into any arrangement with Moscow or Peiping that would in any way legitimize Communist rule over those states. To the extent possible without precipitating Soviet military action against them, the Poles should be encouraged and supported in their efforts toward greater independence. Similar policies should be adopted for other Communist regimes that resort to a more independent course, but only after a capability and intention along this line have been demonstrated.

(d) Moscow and Peiping are bound firmly together by ideological, military and economic ties. The overriding emphasis placed by Peiping on Communist Bloc solidarity at the time of the Hungarian crisis strikingly demonstrated the Chinese Communist leaders' commitment to the goals of world Communism. It would be unrealistic to expect any action by the free world to induce a split between Peiping and Moscow. Only extreme disillusionment with the USSR and discouragement regarding the future of world Communism could lead to such a development. Every indication today suggests that the Chinese

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Communist leaders regard their future as inseparable intertwined with that of the USSR and that they have supreme confidence in the final victory of Communism. Under such circumstances, the free world must persist in the policy of strengthening the free countries of the Far East militarily, to deter overt aggression, and politically and economically, to prevent Peiping from increasing its influence and that of local Communist parties by non-military means. It is essential to maintain the position of the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan and in international affairs as a vital element in combatting Chinese Communist efforts to increase their power and influence. A "Two-China United Nations" solution to the problem of a divided China has been rejected with equal vehemence by both Peiping and Taipei and any attempt by outside powers to impose such a solution could only result in destroying the position of the Government of the Republic of China and contributing substantially to the growth of Communist influence in Asia. In Asia, as in the rest of the world, United States policy is to strengthen free world countries, to prevent general war, and to exert such pressures on the Communist world as will contribute to evolutionary changes favorable to free world.

(e) Free world policy as a whole should rest upon the premise that at some point the combination of free world strength and erosive forces within the Communist world will lead to changes either in the Communist power structure or in Communist policies and attitudes that would reduce the threat to the free world. We should therefore explore every indication of Communist willingness to adjust, in part or in whole, to the requirements of a peaceful and stable world order. Where solid ground is found in the form of concrete deeds and actions, the free world should stand ready to enter into appropriate

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agreements and arrangements. Where, however, deeds and actions are not firmly put on the line, concessions and deceptive declarations must be avoided. Any other course would invite disintegration of the whole free world program to attain peace without war.

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1957年⁴月25日 第51回 外・マッカーサー元帥府南会談
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Japan-US Exploratory Talks

Japanese Paper No.8 (Agenda 6)

Review of the World Situation

The Government of the United States no doubt has much information on recent world trends, especially on the trends in various European countries. I would like to hear in detail the views of the United States Government on this subject. However, I should like at this time, to state my views on the direction in which the world is likely to move in the future, and also my opinion, from the point of view of an Asian, on how the free nations should cope with such a trend.

I. The world, generally speaking, seems to have entered into an era of unstable peace, which is likely to continue for some time to come. The Communists will never give up their final goal of world communization, but it is unlikely that they will risk a world war for that end. The rapid development of arms capable of immediate and widespread destruction of life has turned war into something too fearful even to think about. The weaknesses inherent in the economic and social systems of the Soviet Union can not be overlooked. These strains existing

within the Communist orbit have become evident in Poland and Hungary. Furthermore there is no doubt that the solidarity of the free nations under the leadership of the United States has contributed to bringing about a change in Soviet strategy.

The danger of an outbreak of local war in the Far East has also diminished. Needless to say, this is due greatly to the fact that the United Nations and the United States promptly took effective measures when the Korean war broke out. It now seems possible to say that Communist China no longer entertains the intention of taking Formosa by force. In Viet Nam, the previously fluid situation has been greatly stabilized with the drawing of the international line.

Furthermore it is often said that Japan is the principal objective in Asia of the Soviet Union and Communist China. But the means for their attaining this objective will be indirect aggression.

We cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union maintains considerable military forces in the Far East, and that Communist China is building up its military strength. It is difficult to deny that this constitutes a potential threat to Japan. It may also be true that the Communists are increasing their military strength in

both North Korea and Vietminh in violation of the armistice agreements. However, it does not necessarily follow that they are about to undertake military aggression in these areas as a part of their program to communize the Far East. Meanwhile, both the Nationalist Government of China and the Government of South Korea are advocating military action against their communist opponents, making it seem as if they desire the outbreak of a third world war. We must take note that this is a peculiar phase of the East-West conflict that does not exist in any other part of the world.

II. Based upon the views just stated on the world situation, I should like to make a few suggestions concerning the direction which future policy toward the Communist countries should take.

(1) Promotion of Economic Cooperation

There are three aspects to the measures which should be taken by the free nations against the Communist bloc. The first is to deter large-scale aggression from the Communist countries, that is to say, to prevent the occurrence of a third world war. In this respect, we must rely upon the United States maintaining

retaliatory power. The second is to prevent local aggression and to be prepared to cope with any such aggression. The third is to defend ourselves against communist infiltration, that is, indirect aggression. The fundamental measure to be taken for this purpose is to provide economic assistance to those countries lacking in economic stability, thereby enhancing the power to resist communism and establishing a basis for the development of democracy in those countries.

All of these three requirements are indispensable for safe-guarding against communist aggression. The question lies in striking the proper balance between them. Any attempt to set up a watertight defense line around the entire Communist bloc is impracticable and a waste of effort. Deployment of armed forces capable of dealing with local wars is necessary to those areas deemed vulnerable, but, as to other areas, it would appear to be sufficient if it is made clear to the Communists in one way or another that any armed attack against these areas by communist countries will lead to a war with the United States. This would be more economical and politically sound than to station armed forces in such areas. From this standpoint it is considered appropriate that, in the Far East, the United

States is placing emphasis on such countries as South Korea and Formosa, which are deemed vulnerable to local war.

Efforts in the military field will serve to prevent a "cold war" from turning into a "hot war", but will not play positive role in winning the "cold war". Efforts which will serve the purpose of winning the "cold war" are those which take place in economic fields. Nevertheless, military efforts should not be neglected. Therefore, due consideration should be given to the maintaining of an appropriate balance between military and economic efforts. In my opinion, much greater stress than before should be placed on economic efforts in the future policy toward the Communist bloc.

If I were to be permitted, as a friend of the United States, to express my views on the United States foreign assistance program, I would like to suggest first that economic assistance be increased so as to make it more equal and proportionate to military assistance.

Secondly, I would like to suggest that the United States declare the principle that it is prepared to extend assistance to all countries deemed to have no aggressive intentions. Needless to say, economic assistance should only be extended after a careful study is made of the specific circumstances of each case. But,

it is believed that an open door policy in economic assistance would in the long run be the best policy.

(2) Prohibition of Nuclear Bomb Tests

We have called for the early and effective prohibition of nuclear tests, and we are determined to continue to exert our efforts for this purpose. However, we do not mean that the manufacture and possession of nuclear arms should be prohibited immediately. We are fully aware of the fact that the possession of a large stockpile of nuclear arms by the United States has been serving to check the outbreak of a global war. In view of the present technical progress of the United States over the Soviet Union, we do not believe that prohibition, today, of nuclear tests, would result in an advantage to the Soviet Union and a disadvantage to the United States.

Perhaps the United States feels that, even if an agreement on prohibition is reached, there would be no guarantee of compliance by the Soviet Union, and there would be no way of detecting the tests conducted within the Soviet Union. Such an apprehension could be eliminated by working out an effective system of detection as well as the means of attaining compliance with the agreement.

I sincerely hope the United States Government will take the lead in making a concrete proposal in this line.

In this connection, I hope the observations recently submitted to the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee by the Japanese Government will also be taken into consideration (see attached paper). The Soviet Union may not agree to such a proposal, but in that event, it will at least have the effect of demonstrating to the world that the Soviets lacked in sincerity from the outset.

(3) Proposal for Plebiscite in Divided Countries

One of the principal factors preventing stabilization of the international situation today is the fact that four countries are each divided into two parts. With respect to Germany and Korea, the Free World has been proposing the holding of elections to unify each country, but the Communists have so far rejected and will continue to reject such proposals. On the other hand, it is feared that if the same method of election is adopted in China and Viet Nam, the result would be unfavorable to the Free World, because of the balance of population between the divided parts is unfavorable.

In view of these circumstances, I should like to suggest a plan which, I believe, can be applied uniformly to all of the four countries. That is, the Free World should propose that a plebiscite be held in each of the divided areas for the purpose of ascertaining whether

the people in each area desire to remain under the Government of the area or whether they desire to be placed under the Government in the other area. Such a plebiscite should be carried out under the supervision of the United Nations, and the Governments concerned should agree beforehand to respect the view of the majority as shown by the voting.

This would be a challenge which the Communists probably will not accept. But such a proposal will have the favorable effect of a peace offensive on the part of the Free World. If the plan is rejected by the Communists, a plebiscite might still be held in the free areas. In any event, such a plebiscite will not have results unfavorable to the Free World. It might also pave the way to the realization of the "two Chinas" which I mentioned previously.

I believe that, if through such a plebiscite the present status of Formosa is endorsed by the majority of its people, it will contribute to a better understanding of United States policy by the peoples of Asia.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The Japanese Government, as clearly stated in the letter of Mr. Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, dated 18 March 1957, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (United Nations document DG/109 dated 25 March 1957), strongly hopes that an agreement of the prohibition of nuclear test explosions will be promptly reached among the powers concerned.

From the above point of view, and in order to do away with the current situation in which nuclear test explosions are carried out in an uncontrolled manner, and frequently without prior warning, the Japanese Government suggests the following with the object of prohibiting nuclear test explosions through practicable and effective measures :

- A. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, or a Nuclear Test Explosion Control Committee which may be newly established, (hereinafter to be called "the Committee") shall, first of all, study whether it is possible to detect all nuclear test explosions, and should it reach the conclusion that such detection is possible, all nuclear

/test

test explosions shall be prohibited in accordance with the recommendation of the General Assembly or the Security Council; if "the Committee" should reach the conclusion that such detection is impossible by means of existing detection systems and methods, a new international detection machinery shall be set up by "the Committee", methods of detection shall be improved and strengthened, and steps shall be taken to make such detection possible.

B. Until such time as the international detection machinery is completed and methods of detection progress to the stage where all nuclear test explosions can be detected, all members of the United Nations shall register in advance all nuclear test explosions with the United Nations in order to restrict such test to a minimum. The details of the registration are given in the Annex.

C. (1) When a nuclear test explosion is registered, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall immediately so inform all members of the United Nations and "the Committee".

- (ii) "The Committee" shall immediately study the effects of the proposed test upon man and his environment, and other effects.
- (iii) "The Committee" shall report to the Secretary-General of the results of the study, and when it deems that the planned test will adversely affect man and his environment, etc. outside the territory of the country planning the test, and that suspension of the test is advisable, it shall so report to the General Assembly or to the Security Council.
- (iv) The country concerned shall, in the event that the General Assembly or the Security Council, based upon the report of "the Committee", recommend the suspension of the planned test, comply with the said recommendation.

The Japanese Government considers it appropriate that the international agreement regarding the above suggested system and its operation should be attained in the form of a General Assembly resolution, based upon recommendation of the Disarmament Commission; that if a new "Committee" is to be

/formed,

formed, it should be formed within the framework of the United Nations, composed of the same members as that of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

A N N E X

Details of Registration System and its Operation

(1) Time of registration

Any country, which intends to carry out a nuclear test explosion, shall register the said test with the United Nations at least five months prior to the planned test.

(2) Object of registration

Nuclear test explosions to be registered with the United Nations shall include all nuclear test explosions irrespective of their size or type ; provided that those test explosions, which the General Assembly or the Security Council considers as having no effect on man and his environment, etc. on the basis of recommendations made by "the Committee", may be excluded.

(3) Data to be informed at time of registration

At the time of registration of nuclear test explosions, each country shall supply data, as detailed as possible, concerning the planned test, which shall include the following minimum data:

- a) Location, date, time and period of test.
- b) Type of nuclear explosion (fission, fusion or fission-fusion, etc.) and total energy.
- c) Place of explosion : on the ground, in water or in the air; in case in the air, the altitude of explosion.

/ d)

- d) Meteorological and oceanographical conditions.
- e) Amount of radioactive fall-out to be produced by the explosion.
- f) (Other relevant data to be itemised by agreement).

Attached Paper

The Japanese Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's Note of the 1st April, 1957, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations regarding the decision of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the 28th March, 1957, which invited certain countries to communicate their observations on their proposals which were referred to the Sub-Committee by the General Assembly on the 14th February, 1957.

Under instructions from his Government and in compliance with the above Note, the Japanese Ambassador has further the honour to submit herewith the official text of the "Observation of the Japanese Government", together with its Annex, for the consideration of the Sub-Committee.

London :
9th April, 1957

No.63/IC1

Tokyo, March 18, 1957.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith enclosed the text of the resolution on prohibition of atom and hydrogen bombs, adopted by the House of Councillors on 15 March 1957.

At the same time, I further have the honour to invite Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the House of Councillors adopted following resolutions in 1954 and 1956;

"The House of Councillors

Resolves to request the United Nations to take immediately appropriate measures in order to realize the establishment of effective international control of atomic energy, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the prevention of damages by experiments of atomic weapons, and to achieve the peaceful utilization of atomic energy for the promotion of human welfare."

(adopted on April 5, 1954.)

His Excellency
Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
New York, N.Y.,
U. S. A.

"This House had adopted the "Resolution concerning the International Control of Atomic Energy and Prohibition of Atomic Weapons." Recently, the problem of atomic weapons has come to be one of the most important international issues, and many countries, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, appear to be taxing their minds on how to handle this problem. Subsequent to the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States of America at Bikini two years ago, powerful nuclear tests have recently been held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, it is reported that tests on a greater scale are to be conducted this spring by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

We earnestly desire the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and hydrogen bombs which could bring ruin upon mankind. Pending the establishment of effective measures among the nations, we desire that the United Nations and the countries concerned promptly take measures for the prohibition of the nuclear explosion tests.

The foregoing is hereby resolved."

(adopted on February 9, 1956.)

Since I wish to emphasize the strong hope of the Government of Japan that the most serious consideration be given by all Member States of the United Nations to the realization of the fervent desire of the Japanese people as repeatedly expressed in these resolutions, I shall be grateful if you would be good enough to circulate copies of this letter and the enclosed resolution to the Members of the United Nations as a United Nations' document.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Nobusuke Kishi

Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan.

(Translation)

Resolution of the House of Councillors on
Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bombs (March 15, 1957)

It is resolved that:

This House adopted sometime ago a "Resolution on International Control of Atomic Energy and on Prohibition of Atomic Weapons" and a "Resolution on Prohibition of Atom and Hydrogen Bomb Tests" requesting the United Nations and the Powers concerned to take appropriate measures. It is to be deeply regretted, however, that no steps have yet been taken for international control of atomic energy but atom and hydrogen bomb tests continue to be conducted either with or without previous notice and that the United Kingdom Government is now preparing to carry out new tests around Christmas Island notwithstanding the repeated protests from the Japanese Government.

This House hereby urges again that United Nations and the Powers concerned to take speedily effective and appropriate measures for limiting the use of atomic energy exclusively to peaceful purposes and for the total prohibition of production, use and testing of atom and hydrogen bombs; and, in view of the reasonable fear that if things are left as they are today the amount of fall-out from nuclear explosions may increase to the point of irremediably affecting human life, calls for

solemn

solemn reflection on the part of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America and requests those Powers to suspend all atom and hydrogen bomb tests now under contemplation, regardless of whether they are to be held with previous notice or not.

世界情勢に関する米政府の見解に対する意見

(昭三三・六・六)

一、ソ連、の意図は、自由諸国の中立化、すなわち米国の孤立化に存するといふ米政府の判断は、日本政府と見解を一にするものである。また共産諸国に内在する各種の弱点にかんがみ、自由陣営がその力と団結と決意を維持すれば、共産勢力の脅威が完全に解消しないまでも、自由諸国にとつて受入れうる程度に軽減されるべきことが期待しうるとの結論に対しても、原則的に同意見である。

二、問題は、この様な力と団結と決意を維持する為に、如何なる措置をとるべきかと云うことである。領土問題を含む安全保障体制の問題は、日米間の団結を如何にして維持するかの問題に關係するものである。米政府の見解によれば、既存の自由世界の同盟關係は維持され、強化されるべきであると述べられている。私は、

極秘

このことは同盟の精神が維持され、強化されるべきであるということであり、必ずしも現在の条約の諸規定がそのまま維持されなければならぬとの意味ではないと諒解している。

三、 米国政府は、自由陣営が軍事力を強化する必要があることを強調している。そのためにこそ、日本は国力の許す範囲で自己の防衛力を増強することを決意し、かつそのための具体的計畫の策定に積極的に努力している。

四、 自由陣営の維持すべき力は、単なる軍事力だけではなく、総合的な国力、特に経済力の充実が重視されるべきであることは、米政府の見解が自由諸国に対する経済的並びに技術的援助が継続され、かつ強化されるべきことを指摘していることによつて明らかであると考ええる。岸総理が東南アジアの経済開発についての日米

協力の必要性を強調し、これについての若干の提案を行つたのも、正にかかる目的に合致するものである。また米国政府の経済援助は軍事力増強を犠牲にしてなさるべきではないとの見解に対しては、岸総理がさきに軍事援助と経済援助はバランスを保つことが問題であると述べたことと一致している。

五 米国政府は、自由諸国間に存在し、または生起すべき問題を解決するために、精力的な努力が傾けられなければならないことを指摘しているが、今回の会議により、日米間に存在し、また今後発生すべきあらゆる問題を円満に解決するための共通の地盤が見出されることが、強く期待される。

六 国連が侵略を阻止し、または抑圧する能力を強めるために全面的な支持が与えられるべきであるとの米国政府の見解には、全く

同意見であり、安保条約に国連との関係を明らかにする規定を設けることを提案したのも、この目的に添うものであると確信する。

七 米国政府の見解は、いわゆる二つの中国の存在を認めることは、台湾政府の地位を破壊し、中共のアジアにおける影響力を増大せしめるというにあるが、日本政府は必ずしもそうなるとは考えない。米国政府も同意されるであろうごとく、中共政府が内部的に崩壊することは期待しえないところである。他方台湾政府が中共側のいわゆる平和的解放政策に呑まれてしまう危険はこれを看過することはできない。従つて二つの中国という解決方法をとることが、台湾を自由陣営の側に確保するための効果的な方法であると考え、その方向に努力することを示唆しているのである。

八 結論として、共産側には、米国政府の観察通り政治的、経済的

にも幾多の弱点が内在していることは見逃しえない事実であると同時に、自由陣営の側における現在の体制がすべて完璧であるとの前提に立つて、共産側に対する政策を遂行することは必ずしも妥当とはいえないであろう。

日米関係についても、今後是正すべき幾多の問題を包蔵している。米国政府の観察によつても、共産側は世界に存在する病的現象を自己に有利に利用する政策の利益を引続き享有するであろうことを指摘している。日米両国の急務は、このような共産側に利用されるごとき状態をまず是正することである。用さなければならぬ。米
国政府のいうごとく、共産側に圧力を加えて、自由陣営に有利な
る共産国の政策転換を企図することは、基本的には正しいのであるが、相手方に対する攻勢に急なる余り、自己の足下を誤るよう

なことがあつてはならない。このことは台湾の現状についてもいえることであろうと考える。但し、共産側には米国側の見解のとおり、共産主義に内在する腐蝕的要素に起因するいわば矯正しえざる弱点が存在するに對して、自由陣営側はいかなる弱点を有しようとも、それらは自己の意思と努力により必ず救済しうるという点に根本的な相違が存している。