琉球大学学術リポジトリ

重光外務大臣訪米関係一件　重光・ダレス会談

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GENERAL STATEMENT

August 29, 1955

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1. Significance of the Geneva Conference

It is certainly gratifying that the danger of nuclear war seems to have been eliminated, at least, for the immediate future, as a result of the Four-Power Conference at Geneva. But the struggle between the free and the fettered world in the arena of diplomacy is expected to continue with undiminished intensity. We are looking anxiously forward to the outcome of the Foreign Ministers' Conference scheduled for October in accordance with the directive issued by the Geneva Conference.

The discussion at Geneva centered mainly on the European theatre. There are, however, a number of urgent problems in the Orient, particularly in the Far East, which await solution. We hope that the United States will take due cognizance of the serious concern we are feeling about the disposition of these problems.

In fact, we solicit the American authorities to enlighten us fully on the policies, current and prospective, of the United States toward the Far East, especially Communist China, in order to furnish our Government with the data of vital importance for the formulation of our own policies.

The Communists seem to regard the Geneva Conference as a triumphant vindication of their peace offensive, believing that a final victory is sure to be theirs if they adhere to their present "peaceful" policy and programs. For this purpose all Communist elements are being mobilized throughout the world. It seems that the Communist countries, which were obliged to recognize their inferiority in modern arms, are now trying to turn the tables by dint of peaceful maneuvers. This is, we believe, quite evident in the East Asiatic areas as elsewhere.

2. Communism in Japan

(a) Its rising threat.

We find it extremely difficult to deal effectively with our Communists under the Constitution promulgated under the occupation period. The abrogation of all laws relative to public peace and order has deprived us of the effective means of combatting subversive activities. The Communist elements who have subtly and secretly wormed their way into all segments of society -- political, social and cultural -- are building up a formidable strength.

By tying up covertly with the Socialist parties, the Communists have been exerting themselves with a view to preparing the ground for an eventual revolution. Seeing that the situation has turned in their favor as a result of the Communist global peace offensive, the Japan Communist Party announced recently the conversion of their underground activities into a legitimate movement. The party has now emerged into the open to wage a determined battle for political hegemony. The Communists apparently feel that the time is ripe and are sharply alert for any chance to precipitate a revolution by consolidating their position in and out of the Diet through collusion with the Socialist and other left-wing factions.

It is true that the numerical strength of the Japan Communist Party in the Diet is at present practically nil. But it commands a wide influence over the nation, and the party appears to be quite confident of its own power. We expect that the Communists will desperately oppose the constitutional revision proposed by the Government. Indeed, this is a crucial and critical issue on which a decisive battle between the leftist and constructive forces will soon be joined. On the international front,

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the major Communist object is, we presume, the same in the East as in the West, namely, to eliminate American influence. Supported by Socialists, the Communists are concentrating their efforts on fomenting anti-Americanism and eradicating gradually the influence of the United States from Japan and East Asia. This is plain from the arguments advanced by the leftist Parties in the Diet. They are thus making political capital out of our vulnerable situation.

(b) Coping with the Red peril.

The Communist Party, the Labor-Farmer Party and the Socialist Party (which holds one-third of the Diet seats) have joined forces in defeating the basic bills for national reconstruction, which include, among others, the Constitution Research Council Bill and the National Defense Council Bill. They are opposed to even the budget bill; they are opposed to all legislation designed to promote cooperation with the United States such as the bill on the agreement for the purchase of surplus farm products, not to speak of the vitally important bills relating to national defense. They attack the Government's policy of enhancing cooperation with the United States at every turn, while they support any move inspired by international Communism and advocate the alignment with Communist China. The "united front" of the leftists, as propounded by the Communist Party, is an accomplished fact where Japan's international relations are concerned. The Communist Party, in collusion with other leftist elements, is obstructing thus our efforts toward the fulfillment of the program of economic self-support and self-defense, and is vigorously intriguing in order to seize an opportunity of starting a revolution.

We cannot permit such a situation to take its own course. The

forces

forces of democracy are resolved to unite in combatting the infernal forces of Communism and push forward on the high road toward national reconstruction. They fully realize that Japan's destiny commands her to march shoulder to shoulder with the United States. This is the very reason why full cooperation with the United States is the keynote of the foreign policy of our Government. Unfortunately, however, not a few of our people are grossly misled by extremist propaganda. It is the firm determination of the Government to cure these people of their delusion and to restore them to their senses, so that a reconstructed Japan may, together with other free nations, contribute to the cause of freedom and democracy. To that end, the Government is earnestly endeavoring to consolidate constructive forces and thereby lay the foundation for our national rehabilitation. Accordingly, the revision of the Constitution, the building-up of adequate defense forces and the establishment of a self-sustaining economy are among the basic aims of our policy.

3. Our Defense Efforts

The existing system of joint defense between Japan and the United States is based on inequality owing to a mistaken interpretation of our Constitution that we are not allowed to maintain armed forces even for the purpose of self-defense. It is this interpretation, tantamount to a denial of sovereignty, which has led to the present arrangement, under which the responsibility of our defense devolves mainly on the American forces, Japan bearing a substantial part of the required expenses.

This one-sided national defense arrangement is not the fault of the United States but the result of our own inability to defend ourselves. It should be noted, however, that this system of joint defense is being

severely

severely criticized as an evidence of our vassalage to the United States by the leftists who are intent upon stirring up anti-American feeling among the unthinking populace. Our Government feels that it is imperative to remedy the anomalous situation, which is extremely detrimental to the cause of our friendly cooperation.

Being convinced that the present Constitution admits of building self-defense forces, the Government submitted to the last session of the Diet a bill on the establishment of a National Defense Council with the object of formulating a basic national defense plan. But the bill encountered stiff opposition from the leftists, led by the Socialist parties, and failed to pass. The defeat of the National Defense Council Bill together with the Constitution Research Council Bill certainly dealt a hard blow at the anti-Communist forces of the country. But immediately upon the adjournment of the Diet early in August, the Government set up within the Cabinet a committee on national defense, composed of a small number of the competent ministers of state to draw up a new national defense plan.

The general outline of the defense plan now under study is as follows: Under the existing circumstances it will be difficult for us to build a balanced combination of land, sea and air services at once. Efforts will be first concentrated on the construction of adequate land defense, which will serve as a deterrent against direct aggression. Judging from the current international situation in general, the strength of the ground forces is set at 180,000. We plan to increase the present army of 150,000 troops by 10,000 annually so that the building of fully equipped ground forces numbering 180,000 will be completed in three years. As our ground forces are so increased, they will progressively replace the American

troops.

troops. It is our calculation that the replacement may be accomplished in three years' time.

4. New Relationship between Japan and the United States

As stated above, Japanese-American cooperation is the cardinal and constant aim of our foreign policy. With the concurrence of the United States Government we intend to pursue this policy in a manner different from and more effective than heretofore. We believe we must, first and above all, see to it that our people do not fall into the Communist trap.

The principal targets of Red propaganda are, needless to say, Japanese-American joint defense and Japanese-American economic cooperation. The Communists say: Japan is a vassal state of the United States and not an independent nation; Japan is a military base of the United States against the Soviet Union and Communist China and the Japanese people are employed as mercenary soldiers; Japanese economy is subservient to American interests, and is so devoid of independence that Japan is forbidden even from trading with countries the United States does not favor. These assertions shouted even from the Diet floor are apt to win acceptance under the existing circumstances, in spite of the endeavors of the Government for popular enlightenment.

The defense arrangements which we are envisaging will inaugurate a new relationship between Japan and the United States through a radical revision of the present defense formula. We submit that such arrangements as the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement should be replaced by an alliance of equals on the basis of mutuality. The existing Treaty and Agreement should be abrogated and a new arrangement made in the form

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of a mutual defense treaty such as those the United States has concluded with the Chinese Republic, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. It will elevate our status to an equal footing with the United States in so far as national defense is concerned. It will satisfy our people and take the wind out of the sails of leftist machinations bent upon destroying American-Japanese relations. We earnestly hope that the United States Government will give speedy approval to the above proposal. The plan, if carried out, will not only dispense with the knotty negotiations which must be repeated year after year with regard to our share in the defense expenditures, but will also deprive the Socialist parties and other leftist elements of a major butt of their vicious propaganda. No small contribution will thus be made toward the promotion of closer cooperation between Japan and the United States.

5. War Criminals and Territorial Problems

There are not a few questions other than the defense problem which must be settled in the interest of closer cooperation between Japan and the United States.

The release of the so-called war criminals is a case in point. Despite the fact that ten years have elapsed since the end of the war and that we are emphasizing constantly the furtherance of co-operative relations between our two countries as the very keynote of our foreign policy, a number of war criminals are still held in prison, subjecting their families, scattered all over the country, to indescribable agonies. In the eyes of our people this situation does not stand to reason. We believe the war criminals should be given freedom forthwith for the sake of genuine and genial cooperation between our two peoples.

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With respect to the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands, it is, as is well known, the fervent desire of us all that the administrative right over them will be restored to Japan at an early date. Setting aside Iwojima where an American air base is said to exist, the return of administrative rights over the Bonins, where there are practically no military establishments, will prove an effective gesture on the part of the United States in demonstrating its good will toward Japan. At least as an immediate initial step, we hope that the United States Government will permit the former inhabitants of the Bonins to return to their home islands in accordance with our long standing request.

6. Self-sustaining Economy

It goes without saying that political independence must be coupled with economic independence. So long as the population increases yearly at the present rate of one million and the people are crowded into four narrow islands, poor in resources, our people cannot subsist without lowering the standard of living. Herein lies the major cause of social unrest. As mentioned above, economic stability is essential to combat successfully the subversive activities of the Communists and establish a truly democratic Japan. In order to stabilize our precarious national economy, we must increase production and expand foreign trade while taking every precaution against inflation. We appreciate the aid extended by the United States since the war and trust that we may count on further American assistance directly and indirectly in the economic field.

Needless to say, our people themselves are prepared to do their utmost to accomplish, by dint of hard work and austerity, the economic reconstruction of our country. For this purpose the Government is also

determined

determined upon the realization of the six-year economic plan which is now being elaborated.

For the sake of achieving a self-sustaining economy, we should particularly like to invite the attention of the United States Government to our foreign trade. Important is the problem of improving the trade balance between Japan and the United States. In this connection, we shall have to study also the great potentialities of Japanese-American cooperation with regard to the economic development of Southeast Asia.

We believe that restrictions on trade with Communist China may now be relaxed to the same degree as those on trade with the other Communist countries in general without detriment to the interests of the free world. We request, therefore, that the United States Government will take the matter up and give it favorable consideration.

The purchase of American surplus farm products is beneficial to both Japan and the United States. We would like to make the purchase again next year on appropriate terms. We also welcome American private capital such as will help promote our economic viability.

7. Conclusion

Today Japan is confronted with a grave challenge. A showdown is imminent between the leftists and the conservatives, or rather, between Communism and Democracy. Our political future, we believe, will be decided largely by the outcome of this fateful showdown, which could spell disaster to the nation.

We, who oppose Communism, are firmly determined to stabilize the political situation through consolidation of the conservative forces in

order

order to reconstruct Japan as a free democratic nation. We aspire to become, in name and in fact, a stabilizing power in East Asia, thereby contributing effectively to the peace of the Pacific. For that, we fully realize that the closest possible cooperation with the United States should ever remain the foundation of our national policies.

Let me state in conclusion that my mission in visiting the United States is to promote a more realistic understanding on the governmental level and to advance yet further the friendly and fraternal cooperation between the peoples of Japan and the United States so that my country, true to the earnest solicitude of our people for peace, may fulfill its responsibilities toward the stabilization of Asia.

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JAPANESE-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

I. Our chief purpose in the Japanese-Soviet negotiations now in progress in London is to solve the issues that have arisen as a result of the war waged against Japan by the Soviet Union, and thereby to put an end to the abnormal situation between the two countries where a state of war has continued for the past ten years since the cessation of hostilities and, if possible, to conclude a peace treaty and normalize the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The Japanese Government is thoroughly aware of the fundamental policies and aims of the Kremlin. In the current negotiations we are seeking first to let the Soviet Government take cognizance of our fundamental position and to obtain mutual confirmation of the principles of respect for territorial sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and the peaceful solution of all disputes. Setting forth the position of Japan relating to the territorial problem, the repatriation of Japanese internees, the problem of the North Pacific fisheries, the problem of trade and Japan's accession to the United Nations, we are carrying on negotiations with the greatest caution and persistence. It should be added that there is no intention on the part of the Japanese Government to modify in the slightest degree its policy of cooperation with the United States which constitutes the foundation of Japanese diplomacy.

At the very beginning of the negotiations, we handed an itemized summary of the above-mentioned aims of the Japanese Government to the Soviet side, which in turn submitted their views in the form of a draft treaty. More recently we also presented our draft of a peace treaty and

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the negotiations have now entered the stage of discussions on the basis of these two draft treaties.

[redacted]

The most difficult point at issue in the negotiations is, after all, the territorial question. On this question, we are [redacted] Although Japan renounced her territorial rights to the Kurile Islands as well as South Sakhalin under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is clear that the Soviet Union cannot invoke the said Treaty to claim territorial rights for herself to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin. [redacted]

II, The following is the gist of the stands which so far have been made known to each other by the two sides on the principal points at issue.

1. Repatriation Question.

Japanese nationals involved in the negotiations comprise 1,452

persons

persons who are alive for certain at present and 11,190 persons who should still be alive according to information obtained up to the end of 1951. The Japanese side asked that notification be made of the particulars of the person and the present state of each of those still alive, that facilities be provided for correspondence with these persons and that they promptly be sent back to Japan. As regards the dead, notification was requested of the personal particulars and circumstances of the death of each one.

The Soviet side was informed of the strong desire of the Japanese Government to have this question settled prior to entering into discussions on any questions related to the normalization of relations between the two countries. At practically every session, the Japanese side has raised this question and requested that necessary steps be taken by the Soviet side.

The reply of the Soviet side has been that the only persons still detained are 1,016 military personnel and 357 civilians, who are serving prison terms, and that steps would be taken to settle the question of their repatriation upon the signing of a peace treaty.

Later, however, at the session held on the 26th of last month, the Soviet side stated that steps had been taken through the Soviet Red Cross for the repatriation of 16 persons who had just completed their prison terms, and that a list containing the names of the 1,016 prisoners and 357 civilians who were still held in prison would be handed over to the Japanese side. The Soviet side also declared that, immediately after the signing of the proposed peace treaty, these persons would be given an amnesty by the Supreme Soviet and forthwith repatriated.

The Japanese side has continued to raise the repatriation question

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at every opportunity in subsequent sessions. Meanwhile, the Japanese Red Cross, which had contacted its Soviet counterpart on procedures for repatriation of the above-mentioned 16 persons, was notified on August 11 by the President of the Soviet Red Cross that it might be possible to ship back 10 additional persons.

2. Territorial Question

(1) [redacted]

(2) There is not a single international instrument which provides for the transfer of Japan's title to the Kuriles and/or South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. As is evident from all international precedents, changes in territorial sovereignty must be prescribed by a peace treaty, stipulating the extent of the territory to be ceded, the date on which the cession is to take place, and the disposition of other matters related to the cession. The fact that Japan renounced all right and title to the above-mentioned areas under the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not warrant in anyway the claim to those areas by the Soviet Union which is not a party to that treaty.

(3) By virtue of the Instrument of Surrender, Japan accepted the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, and, by accepting the Cairo Declaration, Japan accepted the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, but she had no knowledge whatever of the existence of the Yalta Agreement. Since Japan has accepted the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, which sets down the broad objectives of the recent war and is an expression of a fair and just policy, the final disposition of any Japanese territory should be

made

made in accordance with the principles of that Charter. We feel that in the light of these principles, [redacted]

The above is our position on the question of territory, whereas the Soviet side, citing the Instrument of Surrender, the Potsdam Proclamation, the Yalta Agreement, SCAP Directive Number 1 and SCAP Directive Number 677, dated 29 January 1946, is taking the stand that [redacted] have already been settled under war-time and post-war treaties, agreements and international arrangements.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The free navigation of merchant ships on the high seas and their innocent passage through foreign territorial waters are recognized by virtue of general international practice. [redacted]

4. Military Alliance

With regard to Article 2, Paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft, which concerns the prohibition of participation in any future coalition against the

Soviet,

Soviet, the Japanese side explained that the Security Treaty was not directed against third countries, whereupon the Soviet side stated that it was not calling for Japan's abrogation of treaties with third countries and that it had no intention whatever of demanding the cancellation of obligations assumed by Japan under treaties with third countries. The Soviet side also stated that, in view of the declaration of the Japanese Government to the effect that none of the treaties, including those of a military nature, which Japan has concluded with other countries is aimed at third countries, the Soviet side considered it possible that agreement would be reached on this question when the other provisions of the peace treaty were agreed upon.

5. Entry into the United Nations

The Japanese side expressed its desire that the question of Japan's entry be put to a separate vote, without being tied to such questions as the entry or the right of representation of other countries, and that the necessary vote in support of Japan be given by the Soviet Union.

To this, the Soviet side replied that it had exercised its veto power because of the discriminatory stand of the United States on the question of the admission of East European nations and that the Soviet draft, unlike the San Francisco Treaty, specifically provides in a separate article for the support of Japan's entry into the United Nations.

6. Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs

Attaching special importance to this question, the Japanese side declared that it was necessary to have a special stipulation on this question, for instance, a stipulation such as Article 5 of the Convention of 1925 between Japan and the USSR.

To this, the Soviet side, citing the part of the preamble of the Soviet

draft

draft, which states that the contracting parties will conform to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, expressed the view that this sufficiently covered the question.

7. Cultural Agreement

The Japanese side stated that, since both countries were members of UNESCO and the purpose of the proposed treaty was to solve questions arising from the existence of a state of war, it would not be proper to have any stipulations on this question in the peace treaty.

Against this, the Soviet side, citing the Geneva Conference, is insisting that cultural agreements are of world-wide importance and that it is necessary to conclude a cultural agreement separately from the UNESCO arrangements.

8. Fisheries and Economic Matters

At the session of July 26, the Soviet side expressed its desire to decide only the general principles related to these questions in the course of the current negotiations and to leave the details to negotiations after the conclusion of a peace treaty.

To this, the Japanese side replied that, although it shared the view that the peace treaty should provide for general principles and the details be reserved for future talks, it was necessary to discuss the principles to be set forth in the peace treaty on these questions.

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The Defense Problem

1. Japan has always endeavored to live up to the expectation of the United States, as expressed in the Preamble of the Security Treaty of 1951, by assuming increasingly the responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. More recently her efforts in this direction have been intensified following the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954. Our nation, which was totally demilitarized after the war, is thus going to have self-defense forces listed in Table I, by the end of March 1956.

2. In the face of all the post-war economic and financial difficulties, the build-up of national defense would have been impossible but for American military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and other forms of assistance provided by the United States, for which we are profoundly grateful.

3. We recognize, however, the inadequacy of the above-mentioned defense power. We are now working on a six-year plan for its augmentation, starting from the Japanese fiscal year 1955. Under this plan, the land forces will be increased so as to bring up the total to 180,000 by the end of JFY 1958; the sea forces to 34,000 men and vessels totalling 123,900 tons; and the air forces to 1,300 planes and 42,000 men by the end of JFY 1961. The details of the above increase by year are enumerated in Table II.

Needless to say, the realization of this long-range defense program will depend upon uninterrupted development of Japanese economy as well as continued assistance from the United States.

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4. We believe that this program will render it possible for the United States to withdraw gradually its armed forces from Japan, starting with land forces. If the American Government will announce its intention to do so, it will produce a salutary effect on the public psychology. It will awaken the Japanese people to full realization that the defense of their country is a responsibility of their own. It will take the edge off the arguments of the opponents of self-defense armament. It will greatly facilitate the task of the Government to push its national defense program.

It is also desired that the United States Government give consideration to a substantial reduction of the monetary defense contribution which Japan now bears under the Administrative Agreement and an eventual abolition of the monetary contribution system itself in view of the fact that the proposed six-year plan will impose a huge financial burden on the Japanese Government, and the envisaged withdrawal of United States land forces made possible thereby will reduce the yen expenditure of the United States forces required for the procurement of goods and services in Japan.

5. We feel that the time has come when it would be for the best interest of the two countries to review the situation with the object of concluding a new defense treaty which will replace the existing Security Treaty.

At the time of the signing of the Security Treaty, unarmed Japan was not in a position to stand as a partner on equal footing in a collective security system. Moreover, the then prevailing interpretation of her new Constitution, as well as her financial and economic conditions, have made it impossible for the Japanese Government to conclude a bilateral agreement of military nature on a mutual basis. Now that Japan currently possesses armed forces which exceed those of some member countries of NATO or SEATO, and which are to be expanded under the proposed six-year plan, it would seem that

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the time is ripe for the conclusion of a new defense treaty between the two countries on a mutual basis which will take the place of the present one-sided Security Treaty.

This new treaty might be patterned after those of the treaties signed by the United States with Australia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Korea, China and others, and include provisions concerning mutual defense to the effect that each Party will recognize that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories, or the areas under the administrative jurisdiction, of the other would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Table I.

Strength of the Self-Defense Forces
As of the End of March, 1956

1. Ground Self-Defense Force.

a. Number of Uniformed Personnel 150,000.

b. Organization.

2 Corps Headquarters

6 Regions (Divisions)

2 Mobile Combat Teams (Regimental Combat Team)

2. Maritime Self-Defense Force.

a. Number of Uniformed Personnel 20,388.

b. Naval Vessels

Type	Number
DD	4
DE	5
PF	18
Patrol Craft	16
SS	1
AMS	13
MSB	3
ML	1
CL	1
LSSL	50
MS	44
Old Japanese Destroyer	1
FS	2
Total	159
Total Tonnage	75,200 tons

c. Aircraft

Type	Number
P2V	24
AD (TBM)	22
P5M (PBY)	8
S55	5
PV2	17
JRB (JRF)	4
Bell	3
Total	83

3. Air

3. Air Self-Defense Force.

a. Number of Uniformed Personnel 11,500

b. Aircraft

Type	Number
F85F	54
G46	16
Total	70
T34	123
T6 (SNJ)	156
T33	68
Total	347
Grand Total	417

c. Radar

Number of personnel 2,350

Table II.

SIX-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AGENCY

Classification \ Year		1954	1955	1956	1957
Ground Self-Defense Forces	Uniformed	130,000	150,000	160,000	170,000
	Civilians	10,000	12,000	13,000	14,000
	Reserves	1,500	5,000	8,000	11,000
Maritime Self-Defense Forces	Vessels	ton 66,990	ton 75,200	ton 81,000	ton 84,650
	Aircraft (Including helicopters)	42 (9)	83 (8)	121 (9)	139 (13)
Air Self-Defense Forces	Combat Planes	16	70	166	332
	Training Planes	183	347	439	474

Remarks: This plan has been made on the assumption that the following assistance will be given by the United States of America.

1. Hard-items of the Ground Self-Defense Forces.

   (a) Initial Equipments for the increase of personnel.
   (b) Replacements (to be gradually replaced by domestic production)
   (c) Repair Parts (to be gradually replaced by domestic production)

2. Aircraft of Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, provided Japan's share of expenses in the production of F86F and T-33A will be gradually increased.

3. The carrying arms of newly-built vessels of Maritime Self-Defense Forces.

4. Ammunition for training of each Self-Defense Force.

Table II (continued)

SIX-YEAR DEFENSE PLAN PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AGENCY

Classification \ Year		1958	1959	1960	1961		
Ground Self-Defense Forces	Uniformed	180,000			180,000	Regions (Divisions)	6
						Mobile Combat Teams	4
	Civilians	15,000			15,000		
	Reserves	14,000	17,000	20,000	20,000		
Maritime Self-Defense Forces	Vessels	ton 89,750	ton 95,770	ton 108,980	ton 123,900	DD, DE etc.	ton 86,000
						Mine-Sweepers, etc.	22,000
						Submarines	3,000
						Supporting Vessels	13,000
	Aircraft (Including helicopters)	155 (17)	167 (17)	179 (17)	179 planes including 17 helicopters		
					Total of Personnel		34,000
Air Self-Defense Forces	Combat Planes	516	684	777	777	Fighter Squadrons (F86F 21) (F86D 6)	27
						Reconnaissance Squadrons	3
						Transport Squadrons	3
	Training Planes	498	516	516	516	Primary	130
						Basic	156
						Jet	230
						Radar Bases (Number of personnel)	4,600
						Anti-aircraft Artillery battalions (4) (Number of personnel)	2,400
						Total of Personnel	42,000

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SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY

- Some Factors Relating to its Establishment -

1. Trade Promotion to the U. S. Market

2. Economic Cooperation with Southeast Asia

3. China Trade

1. TRADE PROMOTION TO THE U.S. MARKET

The expansion of trade is the most important requirement for Japan to attain a self-supporting economy.

While the total value of Japan's exports to the U.S.A. has never exceeded 300 million dollars in any postwar year, her imports therefrom amount to 700 - 800 million dollars every year. Thus, the deficit of Japan's trade with the U.S.A. approximates 500 million dollars annually, which accounts for the major part of her deficit in world trade.

Japan's participation in GATT is expected to contribute to the improvement of her trade balance. The assistance rendered by the U.S.A. in obtaining Japan's accession thereto is deeply appreciated.

Notwithstanding Japan's strenuous efforts, her exports to countries other than the U.S.A. are not expected to increase sufficiently to cover the above-mentioned deficit even after Japan's accession to GATT, in view of the limited purchasing power of the Southeast Asian countries and the tight export control against Communist China. Even if Japan's exports to these areas were substantially increased, it would not solve Japan's chronic dollar shortage because of the inconvertibility of pound sterling and other currencies.

Furthermore, the dollar receipts from the "Special Procurements", which have heretofore served to offset Japan's trade deficit, are considerably decreasing.

Therefore, the improvement of Japan's trade balance through export promotion to the U. S. market is now the most urgent problem for the Japanese economy.

Japan has few major export items and her exports to the United States are composed of a wide variety of minor items. Most of these, which are

produced

produced or processed by small enterprises, have no large export market other than the U.S.A. The domestic market for such products is also often very limited. Thus, many of these industries are almost entirely dependent upon the U.S. market.

In order to promote Japan's exports to the U.S., Japan is making utmost efforts to lower the cost of production through modernization of industries and improvement in marketing methods, as well as to improve both the design and quality of export commodities. The Government is also taking every possible step in order to eliminate unnecessary friction with U.S. industries and to prevent unfair trade practices.

In the U.S.A., however, requests for curtailment of imports from Japan by means of tariff raise or import quota are often made by the industries concerned. Thanks to the fair and friendly attitude of the U.S. Government toward the problems, neither tariff increase nor import quotas have so far been put into effect. Nevertheless, such movements, calling for restrictions on imports from Japan, are always embarrassing to the Japanese industries concerned, which find it difficult to set up and carry out a long term production and export program.

Therefore, it is Japan's earnest desire that the U.S. Government will give most careful consideration not to undertake any tariff increase or quantitative import restrictions and in this way furnish Japanese products with a more stabilized U.S. market. It is also desired that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Act and such other U.S. legislation as may have effect on imports from Japan, be applied with the utmost circumspection, or be modified in such way so as not to unduly disturb Japan's normal exports.

2. ECONOMIC

2. ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

The rate of capital formation in the Southeast Asian countries is extremely low and the level of income per capita is below that in the Central and South American countries. Their exports are dependent on a few primary products and therefore their foreign exchange position has deteriorated owing to drop in prices of their major export items since the end of the Korean hostilities.

These straitened economic circumstances provide an excellent opportunity for Communist infiltration into the area, and it is evident, also, that the fast build-up of economy in the adjacent Communist China looks extremely attractive to the peoples of Southeast Asia.

In order to meet effectively the Communist threat to this area, there is an immediate need to intensify the efforts to promote the area's economic development and to raise the standard of living of its inhabitants. This is not an impossible task if the free nations, especially the U.S.A., will positively cooperate in giving economic assistance to the countries of the area.

Japan has joined the Colombo Plan in October last year with this end in view. Though short of funds, she intends to cooperate with the member countries of the Plan by offering capital goods and technical assistance and, in doing so, she hopes also to expand her trade with this area.

Now that a Presidential fund of 100 million dollars has been set up for Southeast Asia, it is hoped that plans for the economic development of this area will be put into operation as soon as possible. In this connection, Japan is in a position to furnish capital goods and technical skills necessary to establish the basic industries in the area.

The Japanese Government also desires that the U.S. Government will ...

consider

consider setting up of technical training centers in Japan out of this fund in order to facilitate technical assistance programs in this region.

As to the U.S. assistance fund of more than 1,210 million dollars allocated to Southeast Asia including Defense Support and Direct Forces Support, it is hoped that this fund will be used for off-shore purchases and for the promotion of inter-regional trade in the area.

The multilateral use of the United States assistance fund for Southeast Asia is desirable for its contribution towards promoting mutual economic relations between Japan and this area. However, it is absolutely necessary from the Japanese standpoint that such multilateral use of U.S. assistance funds does not react unfavorably on Japan's normal trade relations with this area.

3. CHINA TRADE

The Chinese Continent used to be Japan's traditional market, but the situation has changed under the Communist regime. Japan, as a member of the free nations, is now imposing strict control on trade with Communist China while Communist China has begun to depend heavily upon the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries as well as to restrict her import of consumer goods to the minimum.

If it were not for the above-mentioned international situation, such raw materials indispensable to the Japanese economy as iron ore, coking coal, soya bean, salt, etc. would have been imported chiefly from the Chinese mainland as in the prewar days in exchange for Japan's exports thereto, in which case, the present Japanese economy, which suffers from chronic dollar deficit, might have fared better.

Japan has never failed in honouring the various international commitments with regard to the export of strategic goods to the Communist countries. However, it should be stated that the discrepancy between the control against the European Soviet bloc and that against Communist China resulting from the drastic relaxation of control against the former last summer is so wide that approximately 290 items, which are now exportable to the European Soviet bloc, are still embargoed to Communist China.

In view of the geographical contiguity and close political interdependence between the two areas we firmly believe that the same level of controls should apply to Communist China if the strategic controls are to be fully effective.

That is to say, the strategic export control against Communist China would lose effectiveness if the European Soviet bloc exports to Communist China some embargo list commodities imported from the free world, or if such commodities produced inside of the said bloc become exportable to Communist China because of the free importation of the same from the free world. Therefore, the Japanese Government desires that these two areas be considered, for embargo purposes, as one and the same bloc, and that the present control against Communist China be adjusted at the earliest possible date to the same level of control as currently applied to the European Soviet bloc,

True, an increase in trade volume with the Continental China under the existing regime would not be expected great despite such relaxation of trade controls. But it should not be overlooked that even a small increase in trade could have a big significance to the Japanese economy which is extremely sensitive to the development of any overseas markets.

It is further to be noted that the relaxation to such an extent would not only meet the public opinion but also deprive certain political groups of the opportunities of taking advantage of the present stricter control on China trade as a political propaganda against U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 30, 1955

Resumption of Japanese Enterprises in the South Sea Islands formerly under Japanese Mandate.

The Japanese Government has repeatedly requested the United States Government to give favorable consideration of the earnest desire of Japanese business concerns to resume the business activities in which they were engaged before the war in the South Sea Islands then under Japanese mandate.

While there had not been favorable reactions from the United States Government on the matter, a proposal has also been made, as the first step towards the full resumption of economic activities by Japanese that the United States Government grant to Japanese fishing vessels one or two insular harbors in the South Seas as fishing bases, and the detailed estimates of the economic advantages which this proposal, when materialized, would bring about to the Japanese fishing industry have been presented to the Department of State for its information.

It is well understood that this problem presents to the United States Government certain difficulties which have to be overcome before these requests from the Japanese Government are acceded to, particularly those difficulties arising from the strategic considerations of the United States Navy in this area.

It is believed, however, that the whole program could easily be adjusted to any strategic as well as other technical requirements which this resumption of business activities would have to meet, and Japanese enterprises planning those activities are well prepared to comply with any necessary limitation or condition which may be imposed on them by the United States authorities. Moreover, should those enterprises be authorized to put

their

their plans into operation, assurance is given that they would contribute to the advancement of living standards and the overall welfare of the inhabitants of the islands, with their ample knowledge of the social and economic conditions of this area together with their broad experience in the past with the conduct of economic activities in these underdeveloped islands.

For the reasons reviewed above, it is earnestly solicited that the United States Government give sympathetic consideration to this repeated request of the Japanese Government, so that considerably more business and employment opportunities may be given to the Japanese people in their struggle for a self-sustaining economy and also the difficulties which the Japanese fishing industry has encountered in waters surrounding Japan may be reduced.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1955.

Release of war criminals

Although ten years have elapsed since the war and the maintenance of close and cordial relations between the United States and Japan constitute the cornerstone of our foreign policy, a considerable number of Japanese sentenced for the so-called war crimes are still held in confinement, and their families, deprived of the main pillar of support, are undergoing great hardships.

To our people this appears an anomalous situation. Peace of reconciliation was signed ten years ago. Yet today the deep scar of war is left unerased. Our people are urged to rearm, but an unbearable stigma that hurts the national pride still remains.

The time has come when all possible measures should be taken to consolidate the dynamic working partnership between our two peoples. Yet the fact that there are many of these so-called war criminals* still in prison, sets up a psychological barrier against public support of such measures. It provides the extremists a means of instigating anti-Americanism and the weakening of ties between the United States and Japan. In order to win popular support of the Government's policy it is essential that this dark cloud that hangs heavily over our heads be cleared away. Indeed, the importance of removing this barrier cannot be too strongly emphasized.

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* out of a total of 577, two hundred and ten or 36 per cent are under United States jurisdiction.

We, therefore, request that the United States, with full appreciation of the situation described above, take early action to release all Japanese under its jurisdiction who are still in confinement in order to facilitate the carrying out of our policy of greater cooperation with the United States.

Favorable action by the United States, it is believed, may encourage similar action by the other powers concerned. If such is so, Japanese appreciation for the American action would indeed be deep. The time seems now most opportune for the United States to demonstrate its good will and magnanimity.

CONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1955

THE RYUKYU AND BONIN ISLANDS

1. A problem of major importance is that of the restoration to Japan of the Ryukyus and Bonins and such other islands as are mentioned in Article III of the Peace Treaty. It is the ardent hope of the entire Japanese people that the United States will restore these islands to Japanese administration at an early date. This is a subject on which national feeling is very strong.

It need hardly be added that the restoration of these islands to Japanese administration would not only satisfy the long cherished desire of the inhabitants of these islands, but would also contribute to Japanese economy, especially in the field of fisheries.

The confirmation by the American Government that it is in accord with the view that the Japanese Government retains residual sovereignty over the above-mentioned islands and that the inhabitants thereof are Japanese nationals is earnestly solicited. This would remove misgivings held by the Japanese people and prevent undesirable agitation on this matter by leftist elements. It is recalled that Mr. John Foster Dulles in the capacity of the Delegate of the United States to the Peace Conference at San Francisco stated on September 5, 1951 that Japan retains residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.

2. With regard in particular to the Ryukyu Islands, it is hoped that the United States authorities will give full consideration to the interests and the welfare of the population of the islands. The Japanese Government believes that, if the acquisition of land necessary for military purposes

is

is conducted so as to give as little reason for complaint as possible to the parties affected, a more favourable atmosphere will be created not only in the islands but also in the mainland of Japan.

3. With regard to the Bonin Islands where military installations are few, the return of administrative rights is very strongly hoped for and will prove an effective gesture of good will on the part of the United States. If as an immediate initial step, measures could be taken to allow the former inhabitants of these islands to return to their original homes, a great stride forward would nevertheless be made in improving Japanese-American relations. These islanders are undergoing extreme hardship, being obliged to make their livelihood away from their home islands. For their relief the Japanese Government, together with the Municipality of Tokyo, paid some 37 million yen in Japanese fiscal year 1954. In Japanese fiscal year 1955, the Japanese Government will, in order to comply with a Diet Resolution, by itself make disbursements to the extent of 100 million yen for the relief of these people. In this connection we hope that the United States Government will give their sympathetic consideration to the claims which have been presented with regard to the losses sustained by the islanders through not having been permitted to return to the islands.

August 31, 1955

JOINT STATEMENT

Mamoru Shigemitsu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, has concluded three days of discussions with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and with other high United States officials.

The Foreign Minister was accompanied among others by Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary-General of the Japan Democratic Party; Ambassador to the United States Sadao Iguchi; Ambassador Toshikazu Kase, Japan's Permanent Observer to the United Nations; and Takizo Matsumoto, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary.

American officials who met with the Foreign Minister and members of his party included: Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr. ; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur W. Radford; Director, International Cooperation Agency, Mr. John Hollister; Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy; Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray; Ambassador to Japan John M. Allison; and Acting Assistant Secretary of State William J. Sebald.

A free and frank exchange of views from the global viewpoint was held concerning more recent international developments, notably the implications of the "Summit" Meeting at Geneva, the present United Nations discussions on disarmament, and the impending Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva. The Far Eastern situation was also discussed. Secretary Dulles explained the policy of the United States to support freedom firmly while exploring patiently every avenue which may lead to the enhancement of general peace. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu drew on his experience in the Soviet Union and China in interpreting his nation's

policies. The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister concurred in the view that while the immediate danger of major war had perhaps receded there still remain elements of uncertainty in the situation particularly in the Far East and that the continued solidarity of the free world is needed to maintain improved prospects of peace.

The Foreign Minister expressed Japan's resolve to maintain cooperation with the United States and the free world as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. In this connection the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, recognizing the desirability of closer cooperation between their countries for the purpose of securing stability and enduring peace in the Far East, agreed that consultations between their Governments should continue on various problems of mutual concern.

The basic problems of Japanese security were discussed. The Foreign Minister indicated that Japan's defense strength has now reached a considerable level and expressed the firm determination that the policy of progressive increase will be continued within the limit of Japan's capacity. He explained the plans for increasing Japan's defense capabilities recently formulated by the Japanese defense authorities. It was agreed that these plans should be studied in the course of the continuing consultations in Tokyo on United States - Japanese defense relationships and should be reviewed from time to time in the light of strategic requirements.

It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on a cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as rapidly as possible, assume primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed that when such conditions are brought about

it would be appropriate to replace the present Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality.

With the conclusion of such a treaty as an objective, it was further agreed that consultations would take place in Tokyo between Japanese and United States representatives on defense problems and that in such consultations consideration will be given to the establishment of schedules for the progressive withdrawal of United States ground forces as Japan's own defense capacity increases and taking into account the related situation in Asia.

On the problem of Japan's financial contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan, there was agreement on the desirability of establishing a general formula for progressive reduction over the next several years.

The Foreign Minister emphasized Japan's need to expand its trade with other countries particularly in Asia and expressed appreciation for the help of the United States in assisting Japan to become a full member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Secretary Dulles expressed current thinking about assistance for the economic development of the free nations ofAsia pursuant to United States legislation. It was recognized that the measures planned would facilitate Japan's efforts to improve its economic position and attain a higher standard of living. The Secretary stressed the contribution to economic development which could be made by foreign private investment both in Japan and in other countries of the area.

The Foreign Minister requested the early release of war criminals under United States jurisdiction. The Secretary of State described the complexity of the problem and indicated that the question of the release of the war criminals will be kept under continuous and urgent examination.

It was agreed that no major obstacles remain to settlement for economic assistance rendered to Japan during the occupation and that utmost efforts will be made to bring the negotiations in Tokyo on this subject between the two Governments to an early conclusion.

Throughout these talks the representatives of the United States and Japan recognized that Japan, as a major power in Asia, should play an active role in friendly cooperation with other Asian nations in contributing to stability and peace in Asia. They agreed that in view of Japan's efforts to establish internal stability, reconstruct the national economy and strengthen its defense capacity, there is a firmer basis for continuing cooperation between the United States and Japan. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles confirmed anew the determination of their Governments to expand this relationship further so that they together and with others may pursue their work for the consolidation of world peace and freedom.

極秘

一、ゼネバ会議とその後
二、日本の情勢
三、日本政府の決意
四、日米の協力
五、防衛問題
六、日米新態勢
七、戦犯問題その他
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ゼネバ会議とその後

原子爆弾をもつてする戦争がゼネバ四国会議によつて阻止せられたことは人類のために歓ぶべきことであるが、共産陣営と自由民主陣営との闘争は外交戦の形において今後も熾烈に継続される模様である。われ等はゼネバ会議の指令による来る十月の四大国の外相会議の経過を注視し、非常の関心をもつてその成果を期待するものである。

ゼネバ会議は主として欧州を中心とする談し合いであつた。東洋及び極東の問題は別に処理を要するものが多い、これ等の諸問題の処理については日本において重大なる関心を有つものであることを米国政府において特に認識せられんことを望む。

共産勢力はゼネバ会議をもつて平和攻勢の勝利なりとなし、今後もいわゆる平和政策によつて現状を維持しゆくにおいては終局の勝利は彼等の手中にありと感ずるもののようで、彼等は東西何れの地域においてもこの目的達成のために、国々の内外に亘る共産勢力を動員し活躍せしめつつある。近代武力において自己の劣勢を認めざるを得なかつた共産勢力は平和手段によつて形勢を有

利に導かんとしつつあるものと認められる。この傾向は東亜方面においても顕著なものがある。

二、日本の情勢

占領時代においていわゆる平和憲法が敷かれて治安に関する法律が悉く取り除かれ共産活動に対する国家的防禦方法が皆無となつて以来、日本は共産活動を有効に制止することが出来ぬ有様であつて、共産勢力は政府の反共的態度に拘らず政治、社会、文化の各方面に潜入し、その実勢力は決して侮り難きものがある。

彼等は陰に社会党と連繋し議会の内外に亘つて革命の素地を作ることに専念して今日に至つたのである。共産党は平和攻勢によつて四囲の情勢が有利に転回し来れることを認識してここに地下運動より合法運動に転進し表面に出で（昭和三十年六月）公然政治勢力を争わんとする有様である。彼等は社会党等左翼勢力と公然統一戦線の政策によつて提携してその勢力を伸展し議会の内外より革命の機を俟たんとするものの如くである。日本の共産勢力は議会においては数において殆んど皆無に均しきも、その実勢力に至つては侮り難く共産党自身可なりの自信を有するものと認め

られる。

今後左右両勢力闘争の場面において憲法再検討の論議が重要なる題目となるは明かにして共産勢力の主眼とする所は、相変らず米国勢力を駆逐することに集約せらるることも又明かである。反米思想を誘致し、米国勢力を漸次共産圏の周辺より駆逐し、共産陣営に対する圧力を緩和せんと策するものなることは東西その揆を一にするところである。この点は最近の国会における左翼政党の言論に見て極めて明瞭である。彼等はかようにして日本における平和攻勢に対する国内的無防備の現状を利用して有ゆる手段を有効に運用し反米感情を増進せしめ、もつて米国勢力を日本及び東亜より駆逐してその究局の目的を達せんとするもののようである。

三、日本政府の決意

ここにおいて日本国民は国家の独立を完成し、将来の国家再建に対し決意を新にせざるべからざる事態に直面するに至つているのである。

現に議会を中心とする現下の政局について見ても、共産党、労農党は勿論議会の三分の一を占むる社会党に至るまで、国家の再建に関する基本的の法案特に憲法調査会法及び国防会議法に反対して議会通過を阻止した。彼等は予算案そのものすら反対しており、また政府の提出した米国との協力関係の法案及び条約案例えば防衛関係法案は素より余剰農産物取極めの如き悉くこれに反対したのみならず機会あるごとに米国との協力政策を非難し、日ソ交渉においてはソ連の主張を支持し中共貿易促進を主張している。共産党の主張する統一戦線は既成の事実と云うべきである。共産左翼勢力はかくして日本が独立を完成して将来に向つて再建することを阻止しもつて日本赤化の運動に没頭しているのである。

日本国民は断じてこの傾向を許してはならぬ。特に反共保守勢力は以上の形勢に直面して結束を新にして国家再建の正道を前進

することを決意しているのである。反共勢力は日本再建のためには日本が現に置かれている反共民主陣営間の一員として米国と緊密なる協力の下に進む以外に途のないことを了解している。現日本政府が外交の基調を米国との協調に置いているのは正にその意味である。

日本再建の途はこの以外にないのである。然しながら不幸にして日本国民の少からざる部分が左翼運動のために甚だしく迷わされていることもまた事実である。政府としては国民を指導し迷夢を解き日本再建の途を拓き国際的に世界の民主自由思想の確立に貢献せんと堅く決意しておるのである。この決意をもつて諸般の政策を遂行するためには国内政治の背景として保守勢力の結集を必要とする次第であつて、民主党は健全なる反共保守の人士を全国的に糾合して日本再建の事業を完成せんことを期しているのである。それがため、政策的基礎事業として憲法の再検討自衛軍の建設、自立経済の達成は一日も速かにその実現を期せねばならぬと考えているのである。

四 日米の協力

日本政局の現状は以上のとおりであり、日本政府の日米協力の方針も亦以上のとおりであるが、若し日米協力の根本方針が米国政府の同様に是認するところであるにおいては、われわれはその協力方法において従来とは遙い一層有効なる方法を選び、まず共産左翼勢力の宣伝的平和攻勢に乗せられぬように努力する必要がある。

左翼勢力の最もその宣伝に利用しているのはいうまでもなく、日米共同防衛の点と日米経済関係とである。彼らは、日本は米国の隷属国であつて完全なる独立国ではない、日本は米国の対ソ戦争の軍事基地となつておつて、日本人は米国の傭兵として使役されている、日本の経済は米国経済の一部分であつて、独立性はない、日本は米国の欲せざる国とは貿易をも禁ぜられているというのである。これら左翼の主張は議会における左翼議員の言動によつても明瞭であるのみならず、今日の情勢においては宣伝としては極めて効果的であるのである。

五、防衛問題

日米間には桑港平和条約と列んで締結された安保条約及びそれに伴う行政協定等によつて共同防衛の関係が設定されている。この関係は当時の事情によつて日本が防衛力（軍隊）を有ち得ないという独立否認の誤つた憲法解釈に立脚して造られたために、全く不平等の関係に出来ている。即ち日本の防衛は米軍の負担する処となりこれに要する経費は日米折半の観念の下に日本は米軍の費用を分担することになつている。

国防問題に関する日米不平等の位置は日本の独立未完成から来る処であつて素より米国の責任ではない。然しこの点が日本の米国への隷属関係であるといつて左翼勢力の反米思想鼓吹の根源をなしているのである。日本国民が左翼の宣伝に迷わされるのも全くこの点にもとづくのである。

国防に関して日本側に独自の考え方がなければ米国としては現状を維持して安全の保障を得るの外はない。そこで防衛問題は日本が如何なる防衛計画を有するかが前提となる次第である。

現日本政府は現行憲法の下に自衛軍を建設し得るとの見解に立つ

ているので国会に法案を提出して国防会議を起し先ず基礎的な国防計画を樹立せんとしたが、社会党を先頭とする左翼勢力の阻止する所となつて遂に議会を通過するに至らなかつた。最近の第二十二国会において国防会議法案が憲法改正調査会法案とともに不成立に終つたことは反共勢力の一大打撃であつた。然し政府は国会直後直に法案成立に代る実行手段をとり少数の関係閣僚より成る国防協議会の設定を急いで直に国防計画の樹立を計つている。

この計画は日米双方の専門家の審議にかけられて成立することになつている。

日本政府の有する基礎計画は次ぎの如きものである。

現状において日本が必要なる近代的海軍及び空軍を計画することは当分困難である。日本のなし得ることは国土防衛のための地上軍備でありこれをもつて日米共同防衛の Deterrent force となさんとするものである。この地上軍は現在の国際一般情勢より判断して大体十八万の陸軍であると判定されている。日本政府は現に日本の有する十五万の地上軍に今後毎年一万の兵力を増加して三年間に十八万の完全なる装備を有つ地上軍を建設せんと企図して

いるのである。これによつて現に日本に駐屯して居る米地上軍と直に交代を始め三年後にはこれを完了し得るものと考えているので、この点に関して米国政府の了解を期待する次第である。

六、日米新態勢

以述の提案にして米国政府の納得を得ば、今日までの防衛態勢は根本的に改められなければならぬ。即ち安保条約及び行政協定の如き不平等的取り極めは双方対等同盟の関係に立つ双務防衛の観念に立つ協定に直き換えられなければならぬと思うのである。現行の条約協定を廃して米華又は米比若は米韓双互防衛条約の如き形式に改められるべきである。斯様にして始めて日本の地位は防衛に関する限り対等なる独立国として完全なものとなり、国民の納得を得て、左翼関係を封ずることが出来るのである。よつてこの点に関して米国政府の早急なる検討を経て根本的改善の実現が期待さるる次第である。もしこの期待が充たさるる場合には毎年行わるる防衛分担金に関する困難にして摩擦多き日米間の交渉をなくすることが出来るのみならず、社会党等左翼勢力の反米宣伝の重大なる材料を取り除き得る次第にて日米協力関係の緊密化に資する所が少くないと思われる。

七、戦犯問題その他

日米協力関係を緊密にするために双方の努力すべきことは防衛問題の外にも少くないと思われる。

特に一例を挙げれば戦犯釈放の問題である。終戦後十年を経てわれわれは日米協力の緊密化を国策の基調としてこれを国民に説いている際なお多数の戦犯なるものが存在し、全国に散在するその家族が日常の生活にも苦しみ抜いている状態は到底日本国民の納得し得ざる所である。日米協力を心からのものたらしめるためには最早戦犯なるものをなくして彼等に自由の生活を与うべきであると信ずるのである。

又琉球諸島及び小笠原諸島に対する施政権が近い将来わが国に返還されることが、わが国民全体の強い念願であることは御承知のとおりであるが、米軍飛行場があると伝えられる硫黄島を除き、軍事施設のほとんどない小笠原諸島に対する施政権が返還されることは、日米交渉におけるわが国の領土返還要求に強力な支援を与えることとなると考える。右が近い将来に実現困難であれば、かねて要望している小笠原諸島旧島民（約七、七〇〇名）の帰島の早期実現方更に御努力願いたい。

六 自立経済

日本が再建され自主独立を完成するためには経済上の自立を得ることが必要であることはいうまでもない。年々百数十万の人口増加率を有する敗戦後の日本が資源なき四つの島嶼に閉じ込められている以上生活水準の低下なくしては到底経済生活を行うことは出来ない。ここに重大なる社会問題が伏在する。日本国民は国家の民主的再建のためには共産破壊勢力と闘わねばならぬ。この戦は社会上の安定が保たれて始めて勝つことが出来るのである。これがためには対外的方面において移民は肝要である。又国内においてはインフレは防止せねばならぬ。生産は拡大せねばならぬ。政府予算の拡大均衡と貿易の増大均衡とは不可欠の要件である。日本は敗戦後過去において経済上米国政府の好意に負う所が極めて多くこれに対して感謝の念を有するものであるが、更に日本が自立経済を達成するためには直接間接米国の支援に俟たさるべからざるものが多い。

日本が自立経済を達成するためには先ず日本自身の努力と犠牲とが必要であることはいうまでもない。日本国民はこれがために

必要なる努力と犠牲とを惜むものではないのであつて、粒々辛苦国家の再建を成し就げんと決意している次第である。現政府もまた経済六カ年計画を樹立してその実現に精力を傾注している。

自立経済の実現のために特に米国政府の注意を喚起したきことは貿易の方面である。日米貿易のバランス改善の問題が重要である。此点に関しては日米両国の直接の貿易のみならず、亜細亜全般に関する日米経済協力の問題をも検討するの必要があると思う。

日本側の要請としては中共に対する貿易は今日は既に共産圏一般に対する貿易制限と同一程度に緩和するも民主自由陣営にとりて何等不利益ではないと信ずるもので、米国政府の考慮を促す次第である。

余剰農産物協定は確かに日米両国にとつて利益を齎らすものである。日本は次年度も適当な条件でこれを受け入れて日本再建に資したい所存である。その他民間資本の導入も日本経済にとつて極めて必要であることは申すまでもない。

九、私の使命

これを要するに、日本は今日国家として重大なる局面に遭遇している次第であつて、特に国内において共産反共産の左右勢力の対決の時期に入つていると判断せられる。その対決の勝敗の如何によつては政局の将来も危険に陥ることなきを保しない。

われわれ反共主義者は全力を挙げて保守勢力の結集を計り政局の安定を実現し民主陣営の一員としての日本を再建し亜細亜における安定勢力として太平洋方面の平和に貢献したき決意を有している。われわれは飽くまで米国との協力関係を緊密ならしめて以上の国策遂行の基調となすべきことを認識しておる次第である。

終りに私の米国訪問の使命は現政府の日本再建の責任達成のため日米両国政府の双互の理解を一層現実的ならしむるにある。更に又日本国民の平和維持に対する悲願成就のため、日米両国国民の双互の親善関係を一層増進せしむる目的を有するものであることを確言するものである。