

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 沖縄関係 沖縄返還交渉（共同声明・総理演説）

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共同声明に関する大臣説明要旨

共同声明に関する外務大臣説明要旨

昭和四十四年十一月二十一日

一 (全般)

この共同声明は、日米両国共通の関心事に関する佐藤総理とニクソン大統領の会談内容を盛つたものでありますが、なんといつても沖縄の平和的返還という、世界史上稀な出来事についての基本的合意が特筆大書されるべき点であります。しかもこの返還に当り総理も述べたごとく交渉に当つての日本側主張たるいわゆる「七二年、核抜き、本土並み」の三つの基本原則をすべて実現することができたことも、沖縄県民をはじめとする日本国民の強い支援と、日米両国間の強い友好信頼関係の賜物であるとともに、わが国外交史上画期的な意義をもっております。今回の交渉を通じて米側は、当然ながら主に沖縄基地の抑止力維持に強い関心を

示し、特に核については、ワシントンでの両首脳会談においては、  
じめて結論ができたことは御承知のとおりであります。日米双方の  
当事者は両国共通の利害をふまえつつ、夫々の国益の命ずるところに  
従い、辛棒強く一つ一つ問題解決の努力を重ね、誠意をもつて交渉し  
て参りました。その結果、時を同じうして貿易経済面において困難な懸案  
を抱えつつも、領土問題といういわば国家・民族の存立の基盤にもかか  
わる超重要事項について、日米双方の満足する成果を挙げることであり  
ます。かくて日米両国最高首脳の名において、双方の政策上の見解と方針を  
記録にとどめたこの共同声明が出来上りました。沖縄返還問題は、これ  
から交渉される返還協定によつて、わが国においては国会の承認を、  
米国においても議会の支持をえて法的に、かつ、最終的に取決められ  
ますが、この共同声明に盛り込まれた事柄は、両国最高首脳の考  
え方の一致点を示すものとして最も強い政治的、道義的な力を持つ

ものであります。

全国民の悲願の実現の軌道を敷きえたわが国と、不自然な沖縄の地位とのかかわりを断ちえた米国とは、ともにうるところ多大であり、これにより一九七〇年代に向つての日米関係は磐石の基礎の上におかれることとなりました。

## 二 (世界・アジアの平和と繁栄―第一、二項―)

第一項と第二項は、共同声明全体の基調を示したもので、総理と大統領は、自由世界第一及び第二の経済的実力を持つ国同志にふさわしく、スケール大きく、かつ、七〇年代への長期展望に立つた話し合いにより、緊密な日米関係を出発点として、特に国際緊張の緩和、世界及びアジアの経済発展、民生安定への貢献を通じ、平和と繁栄に向つて協力することを明らかにしたものであります。

## 三 (極東情勢についての意見交換―第三項―)

この項は安保条約でいうところの極東の安全。換言すれば戦争防止が、効果的な抑止力としての米軍の極東における存在によつて支えられているという現実に対する両首脳を考えを明らかにしたものであります。すなわち、総理は大統領が強調した極東の安全保障に対する米政府の基本的姿勢を支持しつつ、抑止力としての米軍の極東における存在を積極的に評価し、また効果的な抑止力の維持の必要という一般の見地から、米国が既存の防衛条約上の義務を、必ず守るといふ決意をいつても実証しうるような態勢にあることが望ましいとの考え方を示したのであります。以上はいずれも米軍の極東における存在一般の評価を述べたもので、米軍の具体的な配備ぶりとか装備ぶりについて論じたものでないことはいうまでもありません。また共同声明のあとの部分に出てくる沖繩返還の態様、あるいは事前協議制の運用の問題と直接関係がないことも同様であります。

四 (地域別の情勢の検討―第四項)

第四項は第三項を敷衍して、現に軍事的緊張または紛争が存する朝鮮、台湾及びインドシナ半島の各地域の情勢に関する両首脳の見解を記したものであります。韓国及び台湾についての総理の見解は、現在の極東情勢の下において、わが国が韓国及び台湾の安全を、日本の安全確保との関連で、一般的にどのような認識しているかを明らかにしたものであります。総理がすでに記者会見で述べたとおり、特に韓国に対する武力攻撃が万一発生すれば、これは当然わが国の安全に重大な影響を及ぼすものであります。従つて万一かかる事態が起つた際、これに対処するため、仮に米国より安保条約上の事前協議が行なわれれば、政府はこの一般的認識を判断の重要な要因として、その態度を決定することは、もとより国益上当然のことと考えられます。また、台湾地域に対する武力攻撃発生という事態は、幸いにして現在予見されませんも

の、これもわが国の安全にとって大変重要な要素であり、わが国はこのことを十分認識しておく必要があります。もとより国際緊張の緩和は日米両国の大きな目的であり、共同声明にも両首脳が中共がより協調的・建設的な対外態度をとることを期待する点で一致していることを記していることに御留意願います。

ここで一つ特に強調しておきたいことは、事前協議において政府がとるべき態度の決定は、あくまでわが国益、すなわち、日本の安全にとって必要か否かの判断に立つて行なわれることで、米國が他國と防衛条約を結んでいるがゆえに当然に行なわれるものではない、ということです。共同声明の表現もまさにかかる見地に立つているのであります。

次に、アジアにおける現下の最大の問題の一つとして両首脳が取り上げたヴィエトナム問題については、両首脳とも、沖繩返還までに戦争が終結していることを強く希望し、総理としてもイン



ドシナの安定と復興に果しうべき日本の役割りの探求に言及して  
います。日本政府としては、米国が和平実現のため真剣な努力を  
払っている以上、北越側にこれに応ずる誠意がある限り、返還時  
になつても平和が実現していかないという事態は、実際問題として  
まず起りえないものと考えます。しかしながら、現在和平交渉中  
の米国としては、特定の時点までに戦争を必ず終結させると一方  
的にコミットしうる立場になく、可能性の問題としては、平和が  
実現していない事態を排除しえない事情も当然理解されます。よ  
つて、万々一このような事態となつた場合、具体的にいかなる選  
択がありうるかは、その段階で両国政府が諸般の情勢を十分考慮  
に入れつつ協議して判断すればよい、というのが本項のこのくだ  
りの意味であります。南ヴィエトナム人民の民族自決の権利が確  
保されるような公正な和平の達成を期するという米国の基本政策  
は、わが国も従来から支持してきたところであります。このため

の米国の努力に対し沖縄返還が具体的にいかなる影響を及ぼしうるか、影響ある場合にいかなる幾多の選択がありうるかは、現在の時点では判定しうるわけには行かないので、これを将来の万一の場合の協議にゆだねたのでありまして、ここにいう「協議」とは、安保条約に基づく「事前協議」ではありません。

以上の各地域についての意見交換を通じて、いうまでもないことながら、日本側としてはいわゆる「事前協議に関する許諾の予約」を如何なる意味でも全く行なっていないという当然のことを、念のためつけ加えさせていただきます。

五 (安保条約堅持の意図表明―第五項)

この項で両首脳は、わが国はじめ極東の平和と安全の維持に大きく貢献している安保条約の堅持を、相互に表明し合つたのであります。これはもとより両国それぞれの条約の廃棄権を制限して条約の有効期間を固定するがごとき法的合意でないことは多言を要しません。また両国政府が今後とも通常の外交経路や安全保障協議委員会等を通じて従来から行なつてきた意思の疏通のための緊密な相互の接触を続けて行くことに一致しましたが、これは今までと同様、流動的な国際情勢の下にわが国の安全の確保に万全を期するためであります。

六 (沖繩返還の時期―第六項)

この共同声明の一つの大きな柱ともいうべきこの項では、両首脳は、両国政府が沖繩の返還を一九七二年中に実現するため返還協定締結交渉を直ちに開始することに合意した旨明らかになされ

ています。

なお、協定案が出来た上は、米側は、その締結に当つて、議会の何らかの支持をうる必要があるので、共同声明において、その点に言及しておられますがわが国においては国会の承認を必要とすることは申すまでもありません。なお総理が述べたように、いわゆる復帰シヨックをなくして、沖縄県民の皆様は安心して日本に帰つて頂くことを考えれば、この程度の準備期間は必要であり、この点を考慮すれば、七二年中の返還は、実質的には「即時返還」と同じであります。

なお本項での文言は、お氣付のことと思ひますが、昭和四十二年の佐藤・ジョンソン共同声明のうちの小笠原返還に関する合意の部分と全く同じ表現が使われていることに御留意願います。

同じく当然なことは、返還後わが国の領域に戻つた沖縄の局地防衛責任が日本に帰すること、政府は最然のペースで徐々にこ

れを實現して行く考えであります。現在のよ様な極東情勢の下に  
おいて、沖繩における米軍基地が重要な役割りを果していること  
は申すまでもなく、今後とも引続きその機能を有効に發揮するこ  
とはわが国の安全にとつて極めて必要であります。しかして、こ  
れらの基地は復帰後は、本土と同様に、すべて安保条約に基づく  
施設区域として地位協定に従い日米間の合意によつて使用を許さ  
れるのであります。従つて既存の米軍基地がそのまま既得権とし  
て存続するのではないことは自明の理であります。

七 (沖繩返還の態様―第七項)

この項と次の第八項は、沖繩の本土並み返還につき両首脳の見  
見が一致したことを明らかにしたもので共に、共同声明の中核的  
部分の一つであります。両首脳の話合の結果はすべて、共同声明  
にもられており、秘密の了解というようなものはありません。  
この項に明らかかなように、現行安保条約及び関連取決めはそ

のままなんの特別取決めなしに沖縄に適用されるという、わが国の基本的立場を米国が受入れたことがはつきりしました。かくして返還後の沖縄に事前協議制が全面的に適用されますので、いわゆる「自由使用」「自由発進」などは全くなくなります。ここにいう「関連取決め」とは安保条約とともに国会の承認をえている条約第六条の実施に関する交換公文、すなわち事前協議の取決めとか、吉田・アチソン交換公文等に関する交換公文、相互防衛援助協定に関する交換公文及び地位協定をさすのであります。これに関連して、総理は極東諸国の安全は日本の重大な関心事であるとの日本政府の認識を明らかにした上、かかる認識に照らせば、本土並みの態様による沖縄の返還は、米国が極東諸国の防衛のためを負っている国際義務の効果的遂行の妨げとなるようなものではない旨の見解を表明し、大統領が同意見の旨述べております。このことは当然ながら個々の具体的事態につき事前協議の際の許

諾をあらかじめ予約したり保証したことでございませぬ。

なお、地位協定の適用により、沖縄の米軍は本土と全く同様の立場におかれることとなります。従つて沖縄の基地問題及びいわゆる「入籍問題」ははじめて本土と同じ立場に立つて処理されることとなり、沖縄県民の権利が十二分に守られることとなります。また、基地の整理統合についても、地位協定により本土同様に合理的に対処しうることとなります。

以上を通じて、沖縄の返還は本土並みであり、沖縄が本土と差別されないことが明らかであります。

#### 八 (核問題―第八項)

この項も共同声明の柱の一つであつて、総理がわが国の非核三原則に基づく政策を詳しく述べ、これに対し大統領は深い理解を示し、この日本政府の政策に反しないように沖縄の返還を実施する旨を確約しております。すなわち、沖縄の核抜き返還が明らか

にされたものであります。すなわち、米國政府の最高責任者である大統領の「確約」であるからには、返還時における核兵器の撤去についてこれ以上の明確な保証はないのであります。従つて返還後の沖繩にひそかに核兵器を存置しておくというふうな、いわゆる「核隠し」などは到底問題となりえないことは、私から事新しく申上げるまでもありません。なお、事前協議制度のもとでは、核兵器の日本（本土及び返還後の沖繩）への導入は法的に禁止されるということではなく、ただ日本政府は現在その政策たる非核三原則により、これを断るといふ方針をとつています。従つて事前協議の対象となるべき性質の問題であることは変らず、米國政府の立場としてこれを確認したのが、「事前協議制度に関する米國政府の立場を害することなく」との表現であつて、これによつてわが方が「有事持込み」を認めるといふ保証を与えたものではありません。



九 (財政經濟問題―第九項)

この項は、沖縄の返還に伴い現地米国资産の対日移転、通貨の交換、現地米国企業の事業活動の取扱等に関するものであります。その詳細はまだ明らかではありませんが、返還協定交渉の一環として日米間で具体的に話し合われることとなる旨を述べています。なお、私としては、現在沖縄で正当に従事している米国の企業等について、復帰に際し衡平に取扱うことが必要であると考えており、そのような考え方は米国にも十分伝えてあります。

六 (復帰準備—第十項)

戦後四半世紀にわたつて法律、政治、経済、社会等あらゆる分野で日本本土と異なつた諸制度のもとにおかれてきた沖縄の復帰に當つて、県民の生活に無用の摩擦と混乱を起さないことは最も大切であります。このためすでに政府は格差是正を含む一体化政策によつて多くの措置をとつてきましたが、いよいよ復帰が実現するこの段階においては、一層周到、かつ、十分にその準備を進め、万全を期すとともに、沖縄県民の民生福祉の一層の増進にとむべきであることは当然であります。他方、復帰実現の日までは米国は依然として沖縄の施政の責任を負つております。このため両首脳は復帰準備に當つて、日米両国が緊密に協議し協力することに一致し、東京の既存の日米協議委員会がその全般的責任を負うとともに、現地において新に準備委員会を設置することに意見が一致しました。この委員会は従来の日米琉諮問委員

会と異なり、日米両政府の現地での最高級代表者たる大使級の代表及び高等弁務官をもつて構成され、かつ、全く対等に協議、調整することとなりますが、沖縄県民の意思が十分に反映されるため、琉球政府行政主席が顧問として参加する道が開けております。政府はこの委員会がなるべく早く発足して活動できるように、その権限等の具体的事項を含め、必要な国内及び外交上の手続をとるつもりであります。準備作業は沖縄県の再建、その他中央、地方行政の整備、基地問題、いわゆる人権問題等の解決を可能にする地位協定の適用、法律・経済・財政その他あらゆる制度の本土との整一化等々万般にわたつての準備を含みます。政府は、この間施政権者たる米國と十分に意思を疏通しつつ、政府の現地の出先が琉球政府、その他沖縄県民側と協力して、総理のいう「豊かな沖縄県造り」の基礎として行けるようにする所存であります。

なお国政参加については、すでに昨年日米間で原則的合意に達

しており、この共同声明に特に言及されておりませんが、復帰までの大事な時期に当って、一日も早く実現されるべきことはいうまでもなく、私としても、このため国内措置が速かにとられることを希望しております。

十一、（沖繩返還の意義―第十一項―）

第十一項は、沖繩返還の意義をうたつたものでありまして、特に説明を要しないと思ひます。

十二、（経済―第十二項―）

この項では、日米間の大きな問題となつてゐる貿易及び資本の自由化についての両首脳の見え方が記されてゐます。この点を少しく補足して申し上げますと、つぎのようになります。

まず、日米貿易は、昨年は海洋をはさんだ二国間貿易としては史上最大の七〇億ドルに達し、資本と技術の交流も増大しておりますが、このような日米経済関係の成長と緊密化が前提となつております。

また、米國と日本は国民総生産において自由世界の一位と二位を占めてゐることに象徴されますように、兩國は世界經濟において重要な地位を占めており、このことから國際貿易通貨体制の強化に關する双方の責任が確認されたわけであります。

これに關連して米國のインフレ抑制の決意が再確認されました。また米國の自由貿易堅持の姿勢が再確認されたことは喜ばしいことであります。すなわち、戦後の自由、かつ、開放された國際經濟体制を創設し、この体制を維持、強化して行く上で常に原動力となつてきた米國が自由貿易政策を今後とも維持することを明らかにしたことは、世界經濟の発展にとつても、わが國經濟の拡大にとつてもきわめて重要なことであります。

わが國は従来から貿易及び資本の自由化を推進してきておりますが、國際社会の一員としての責任を果すとの観点からも、今後ともこの努力を続けて行くとの決意を表明致しました。貿

易の自由化については、去る十月の關係閣僚協議会の決定を再確認し、さらに、貿易の自由化を促進するとの見地から、今後とも自由化計画の検討を続けてゆく旨明らかになりました。

以上のことは、日本政府が従来とつてきた政策の基本方針に  
そうものでありまして、沖縄返還と経済問題とを取引したとい  
うことではないことは言うまでもありません。

十三 (援助問題—第十三項)

この項で、両首脳は、開発途上国の経済開発は、先進国と開発途上国との共同の努力により進められるべきものであつて、いわゆる南北問題の解決なしには国際平和と安定はありえない、日米両国ともこういう共通の認識に立つて、開発援助に取り組もうという事で、まず意見が一致しました。

さらにアジアに対して、わが国経済の成長に依じ、経済援助の量を拡大し、その内容を改善して行く意向であることは政府としてすでに繰返し述べているところでありますが、総理はこのようになわが国の意向を大統領に対してあらためて表明したわけでありませう。

他方、大統領は、米国としてもこれまでアジアに対しては積極的に援助を行なつてきたが、今後もこれを続けて行く考えであることを確認し、今後とも両国がアジアの経済開発をできるだけ助

けて行くことになりました。

特に、ヴェトナム戦争後においてヴェトナムその他の東南アジアの地域の復興開発をはかることが極めて必要であることを認め、日本としても、これに対しての協力を惜しまないことを明らかにしました。

#### 十四 (宇宙協力―第十四項)

総理は目下行なわれているアポロ十二号の壮舉につきお祝いと成功への期待を述べるとともに、科学の新しい分野であると同時に国際協力の重要な新分野となりつつある平和目的のための宇宙開発について、国際協力の推進は世界平和の推進につながるものであるとの共通の認識に基づき、大統領と意見の一致をみたのであります。

日米宇宙協力協定は、直接的にはわが国の宇宙開発計画の実施を容易にすることを目的にしますが、これにとどまらず、このよ



うな積極的な面における日米間の協力が行なわれることにより、日米友好関係を一層増進することに意義があります。

十五 (軍縮―第十五項)

「軍備管理」とは、軍備の質、量、開発、展開、使用などを含む軍備政策になんらかの規制を行なうことであり、核実験の停止とか核兵器の海底設置禁止がこの中に入り、「軍拡競争の抑制」とは軍拡のスピードを相互に落とそうというもので、米ソのヘルシンキ交渉はこれに入ります。わが国としても、この交渉の成功を強く望んでいます。単なる軍備制限では満足できず、全面完全軍縮を目標として、効果的な軍縮措置（たとえば化学細菌兵器の禁止、核兵器の制限）を進めることに強い関心を持っている旨総理が述べたのであります。

ok

STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER

KIICHI AICHI

ON THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

November 21, 1969

1. (General)

The Joint Communique before us contains the substance of the exchange of views between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon on matters of mutual interest to Japan and the United States. Particularly noteworthy is that a basic agreement <sup>has been</sup> ~~was~~ reached between the two leaders on the reversion of Okinawa in a peaceful manner, an event which has few precedences in world history. I should like to draw your attention further to the fact that, as the Prime Minister stated, the agreement on the reversion was reached in a form which carries all of the three principles our Government insisted upon during our negotiations, namely the principles of "reversion during 1972, removal of nuclear weapons, and the same status as mainland Japan." This accomplishment, which has an epoch-making significance in the diplomatic history of Japan, was made possible only with the strong support given by the people of Okinawa and the entire nation as well as by the relationship of friendship and mutual trust between Japan and the United States.

共同声明に關する大臣説明要旨  
 後記  
 (赤谷實) 氏  
 積込書記官  
 未使用

During the negotiations, the United States has shown a strong interest, particularly in the maintenance of the deterrence capabilities of the bases on Okinawa. You are all well aware that it was only at the meeting between the two leaders here in Washington that the question of nuclear weapons was finally resolved.

Those who were engaged in the negotiations have pursued sincere and patient efforts to resolve one question after another on the basis of mutual interest of the two countries as well as their respective national interest. It is as a consequence of such efforts that, despite the difficult issues pending between the two countries in the trade and economic fields, the two countries were able to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement on a territorial question that is of vital importance to the very basis of national existence.

Such is the general background of the present Joint Communique which records the views and policies of Japan and the United States in the name of their Prime Minister and President. The contents of the Joint Communique are explained below in detail, but its major part can be summarized as specific elaboration of the three basic principles I referred to above.

The Joint Communique does not of course constitute an international agreement legally binding on the two countries.

In order to finalize the agreement reached here in a legal form, specific arrangements on the reversion of Okinawa should be negotiated between the two countries and submitted to the approval of the Diet. The Joint Communique, however, has the strongest political and moral force as an expression of the meeting of minds between the two leaders. What is contained in it cannot be changed easily by either of the parties in a unilateral manner.

The Communique is of great value to both Japan and the United States, as it now enables Japan to realize the earnest desire of the entire nation whereas it frees the United States from its unnatural involvement in the status of Okinawa. A firm foundation of the relationship between the two countries in the 1970's is now laid. I cannot over-emphasize the significance of the Joint Communique which is of common merit to both Japan and the United States.

2. (Peace and Prosperity in Asia and the World - Paragraphs  
1 and 2)

These two paragraphs set the keynote of the Joint Communiqué as a whole. The Prime Minister and the President conducted an exchange of views on a lofty plain and on a long-term perspective looking well into the 1970's, as befitting the leaders of the two countries which would rank first and second in the free world in terms of their economic capabilities. They made it clear that, on the basis of close relationship between the two countries, Japan and the United States would cooperate with each other in the search for peace and prosperity through their contributions, particularly to the relaxation of international tensions as well as the economic development and stability of Asia and the world.

3. (Exchange of Views on the Situation in the Far East -  
Paragraph 2)

This paragraph expresses the views of the two leaders on the realities in the Far East where the actual fact is that what the Japan - U.S. Security Treaty defines as ~~peace and~~ security in the Far East, in other words the prevention of war in that area, relies on the existence of United States forces in that area as an effective deterrent.

The Prime Minister supported the basic position of the United States concerning the security in the Far East as stressed by the President, and recognized positively the value of the existence of United States forces in the Far East as a deterrent. He further expressed the view that, in terms of the general need to maintain an effective deterrent, it is desirable that the United States would be in a position to implement at any time its determination to honor fully the obligations it assumes under the existing defense treaties.

Needless to say, these views of the Prime Minister are confined to the general appraisal of the existence of United States forces in the Far East, and are not related to the specific manner of their deployment or extent of their equipment. They are also not related in any direct sense to the question of the

operation of the system of prior consultations or that of the status of bases on Okinawa after reversion, both of which are dealt with in other parts of the Communique.

4. (Examination of the Situations in Different Areas -  
Paragraph 4)

This paragraph, in further elaboration of the previous paragraph, expresses the views of the two leaders on the situations in Korea, Taiwan and the Indo-China peninsula where military tension or conflict actually exists.

The statements of the Prime Minister on Korea and Taiwan are reflections of how, under the present situation in the Far East, he views in a general sense the security of Korea and Taiwan in relation to Japan's own security. As the Prime Minister himself stated at the press conference, if an armed attack were to occur against the Republic of Korea, it would certainly affect the security of Japan seriously. Therefore, should an occasion arise for prior consultation, it would certainly serve Japan's own national interest for the Government to decide its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition. I am glad to say that an armed attack in the Taiwan area cannot be foreseen today. But, we will need to recognize fully the fact that it is another important factor affecting the security of Japan. I should of course like to draw your attention to the facts that the relaxation of international tensions is a major objective for both Japan and the United States, and that the Joint Communiqué itself records the agreement of the two leaders in their hope



that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations.

I should particularly like to emphasize in this regard that the position of the Government in any prior consultation would be determined solely on the basis of its judgement on our national interests, namely the needs for the attainment of the security of Japan. The decision is not something which would be made automatically because of the obligations assumed by the United States in its defense treaties with other countries. The expressions used in the Joint Communiqué are based on none other than such a position of the Government.

As regards the problem of Vietnam which the two leaders took up as one of the greatest problems in Asia today, the two leaders expressed their strong hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before the reversion of Okinawa, and the Prime Minister referred to the exploration of the role Japan could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in Indo-China.

In view of the serious efforts being made by the United States to bring about peace, the Japanese Government is of the view that it would hardly be possible for peace in this area not to be brought about by the time of reversion, if the North Vietnamese side responds to the efforts of the United States in earnest. We do understand, however, that the United States,

being currently engaged in negotiations for peace, is not in a position to commit itself unilaterally on a specific date for the termination of the war. The United States would not be in a position to exclude completely the possibility that peace would not be realized by that time. This part of the paragraph, therefore, is meant to say that, in case such a situation should arise, the two Governments would consult with each other and decide what specific policy alternatives are possible, <sup>to cope with such a situation</sup> taking fully into consideration the various factors prevailing at that time.

Japan has supported the basic policy of the United States to bring about a just peace so as to assure the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination. It is not possible at present to ascertain how such efforts on the part of the United States would be affected by the reversion of Okinawa or to determine what policy alternatives exist in case where such efforts are affected by reversion. The provision in this paragraph <sup>therefore</sup> calls for consultation for any future eventuality. It is evident that the "consultations" envisaged here are not of course "prior consultations" on the basis of the Security Treaty.

I should like to add, just as a reminder, that throughout the foregoing exchange of views on different areas, the Japanese side has never made in any sense a so-called "prior commitment to give an affirmative reply in the event of prior consultation."

5. (Affirmation of the Intention to Firmly Maintain the Security Treaty - Paragraph 5)

The two leaders affirmed in this paragraph their intention firmly to maintain the Security Treaty which is now making a significant contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East including Japan. It goes without saying that such mutual affirmation does not imply a legal agreement to fix the term of effectiveness of the Treaty by restricting the respective right of the two countries to terminate the Treaty.

There was also an agreement to continue to maintain as in the past close contact with each other for deepening mutual understanding through normal diplomatic channels or other appropriate forums such as the Security Consultative Committee.

This is to continue to ensure the security of Japan under the international situation which is in a state of flux.

6. (Timing of the Reversion of Okinawa - Paragraph 6)

This paragraph contains one of the most important elements of the Joint Communiqué. It expresses the agreement reached between the two leaders to accomplish, as the policy of the two Governments, the reversion of Okinawa during 1972 and to enter immediately into negotiation regarding specific arrangements for that purpose, namely an agreement on the return of the administrative right over Okinawa to Japan.

The paragraph also expresses the fact that such an agreement requires the approval of the Diet. Although the expression "with the necessary legislative support" is used because no decision has been reached on the United States side as to whether the agreement requires the consent of the Senate, there is no question that the approval of the Diet is <sup>meant here</sup> ~~required~~ in the case of Japan.

At any rate, as the President with whom the highest responsibility of the United States Government rests clearly indicated a specific timing of the reversion at the talks with the Prime Minister himself, it could not be changed due to any particular circumstance on the part of the United States.

As the Prime Minister stated, the reversion during the year of 1972 is in effect the same as "immediate reversion", because a period of <sup>some</sup> ~~this~~ length for preparation is required considering the need to absorb the "reversion shock" and to give

reassurance to the people of Okinawa on smooth transfer of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan.

Although you must have noticed it, I should like to remind you that the wording used in this paragraph is exactly the same as the part on the agreement on the reversion of the Bonin Islands found in the Joint Communique of 1967 between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson.

It is a matter of course that, following reversion, the local defense of Okinawa, which will then become again a part of Japan, will become our responsibility. The Government intends to assume such responsibility gradually at our optimum pace.

It is quite important for the security of Japan that the bases of the United States forces on Okinawa, which are now playing an important role under the present situation in the Far East, will continue to discharge their functions effectively even after reversion. Accordingly, the use of all these bases after reversion will be permitted in the same manner as with the mainland as facilities and areas under the Security Treaty by agreement between Japan and the United States in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement. It is self-evident, therefore, that the existing United States bases would not continue to be maintained as vested rights.

7. (Status of the Bases on Okinawa after Reversion - Paragraph 7)

This is another paragraph of a central importance where the two leaders reached agreement on the reversion of Okinawa with "exactly the same status as mainland Japan". It clearly shows that the United States has accepted the basic position of Japan to apply to Okinawa the present Security Treaty and its related arrangements without modification and without any other special agreement. It follows that the prior consultation system will be fully applied to Okinawa after reversion, and consequently the so-called "free use of the bases" or "free combat operations from Okinawa" will not take place. ~~As I will explain later, Okinawa will be also free of nuclear weapons.~~

The "related arrangements" referred to above are the following agreements approved by the Diet together with the Security Treaty; the Exchange of Notes concerning the implementation of Article 6 of the Treaty, which is an agreement on prior consultation; the Exchange of Notes concerning Yoshida-Acheson Exchange of Notes, etc.; the Exchange of Notes concerning the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement; and the Status of Forces Agreement.

The Prime Minister then affirmed the recognition of his government that the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. In the light of such

recognition, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner set forth above will not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East. The Prime Minister and the President shared this basic viewpoint.

Needless to say, this does not imply a prior commitment or assurance of affirmative responses at prior consultations on specific individual situations, as is fully understood by the United States side.

As a consequence of the application of the Status of Forces Agreement, the United States forces in Okinawa will come to have exactly the same status as those in mainland Japan. The problems related to the bases in Okinawa including the so-called "human rights problems" will come to be dealt with on the same basis with mainland Japan, fully protecting the rights of the people of Okinawa. The problem of rearrangement and convergence of the bases will also be handled in the same orderly manner as in mainland Japan in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement.

It must be crystal clear from the foregoing that Okinawa will come to have the same status as mainland Japan after reversion and there will be no discrimination between them.

8. (Nuclear Problem - paragraph 8)

This too is one of the core paragraphs of the Joint Communiqué.

The Prime Minister has set forth therein the policy of our government based on the "three non-nuclear principles" and the President has assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the United States Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with such policy of the Japanese Government. As a result, it has been made clear that Okinawa will be returned without nuclear weapons. In effect, since it is an assurance given by the President with whom the highest responsibility of the U.S. Government rests, there could be no clearer guarantee with respect to the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa at the time of reversion. It would not be necessary for me to explain to you, therefore, that it would be inconceivable that the so-called "under-cover" nuclear weapons could be covertly retained on Okinawa after its reversion.

Furthermore, under the prior consultation system the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan (mainland and Okinawa after reversion) is not prohibited in a legal sense



but that the current policy of the Japanese Government based on the three non-nuclear principles is to refuse the introduction of nuclear weapons. It is essentially a matter that would be subject to the prior consultation procedure and the expression "without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system" constitutes affirmation of its position by the United States Government. Consequently, I need hardly add that by that expression Japan has not given the assurance that it would permit the "introduction of nuclear weapons in times of emergency".

9. (Financial and Economic Problems - Paragraph 9)

This paragraph relates to such matters as transfer of local United States assets to Japan, conversion of currency and activities of local United States business interests following the reversion of Okinawa. While the paragraph does not go into details on this matter, it states that specific discussions between Japan and the United States will be initiated as part of the consultations regarding specific arrangements for the reversion of Okinawa.

For my part I consider that it would be necessary to give equitable treatment to U.S. business interests currently engaged in illegitimate activities in Okinawa at the time of reversion.

10. (Preparations for Revision - Paragraph 10)

In connection with reversion of Okinawa, which has been placed over a quarter century after the war under various systems different from that of the Japanese mainland in all sorts of fields such as the legal, political, economic and social, it is most important that unnecessary friction and confusion in the livelihood of the inhabitants of Okinawa should be prevented. For this purpose, our government has already taken numerous measures through the policy of "Ittaika" including the elimination of differences between Okinawa and the mainland. As the time for reversion approaches, it goes without saying that even more careful and adequate preparations should be made to ensure that the welfare of the inhabitants of Okinawa will be further promoted. On the other hand, until the date of the reversion, the United States will continue to assume responsibility for the administration over Okinawa. Accordingly, both leaders have agreed relative to the preparations for reversion that Japan and the United States should consult and cooperate closely. They further agreed that the United States - Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake overall responsibility for this preparatory work and that a Preparatory Commission will be newly established in Okinawa. This Commission, unlike the existing Japan - U.S. - Ryukyu Advisory Committee, will be

composed of the highest ranking representatives of both the Governments of Japan and the United States, who, in our case, will be a representative of ambassadorial rank and in the case of <sup>the</sup> United States the High Commissioner ~~of~~ <sup>for</sup> the Ryukyu Islands. These representatives will consult and coordinate locally on measures relating to such preparation on a completely equal footing. Moreover, in order to reflect the will of ~~the~~ inhabitants of Okinawa, the way has been left open for the Chief Executive of the Government of <sup>the</sup> Ryukyu Islands to participate as adviser to the Commission. In order to establish this Commission as soon as possible and to enable it to begin its work, the Government intends to take the necessary domestic as well as diplomatic procedures, including specific matters such as its terms of reference. The preparatory work will cover a wide range of measures including the re-establishment of Okinawa Prefecture, improvement in central and local administration, the application of the Status of Forces Agreement which will permit the solution of problems related to bases and human rights, and the alignment of the legal, economic, financial and other systems with those applicable on the mainland. Our Government intends during this preparatory period, to maintain close communication with the United States as the administering power and to cause its local representatives to cooperate with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and

other representatives of the inhabitants of Okinawa in creating the basis for the building of an "affluent Okinawa Prefecture" as mentioned by the Prime Minister. With respect to the question of the participation of the people of Okinawa in the Diet, agreement in principle was already reached between Japan and the United States last year. While there is no specific mention of it in the present joint communique, I need hardly add that in the important period before reversion, it should be realized at an earliest possible date. For my part, I trust that domestic procedures will be taken promptly to this end.

11. (Significance of the Return of Okinawa - Paragraph 11)

(No particular explanation necessary)

12. (Economic - Paragraph 12)

The views of the two leaders on the major issues between our Government and the United States, namely the question of liberalization of trade and the export of textiles to the United States are set forth in this paragraph. I would like to explain in some detail on this matter including its background.

- (1) Japan - U.S. trade amounted to 7 billion dollars last year, which is the highest recorded figure for a bilateral trans-oceanic trade. The exchanges of capital and technology have also increased. The leaders noted the marked growth in the economic relations between the two countries and that such relations were becoming increasingly close.
- (2) Both the United States and Japan occupy leading positions in the world economy as indicated by the fact that they are respectively the first and second ranking in their gross national product in the free world. In this connection, the two leaders acknowledged that the leading positions which their countries occupied in the world economy imposed responsibilities upon their respective countries for the maintenance and strengthening of the international trading and monetary system.

(As a great economic power, we must discharge our responsibility.)

- (3) The determination of the United States to bring inflation under control was reaffirmed. The fact that this point has been emphasized in connection with the strengthening of the international trading and monetary system, is noteworthy.
- (4) I welcome the fact that the posture of the United States to defend the principle of free trade has been reaffirmed. This means indeed that the great American market has been secured. Its significance, however, does not rest there. In other words, the fact that the United States, which has created a free and open international economic system in the postwar period and which has always been the motivating force in maintaining and strengthening the system, has made known its intention to continue to maintain a free trade policy, is a matter of far-reaching importance not only to the development of the world economy but also to the expansion of our own economy.
- (5) Our government has been promoting the liberalization of trade and capital transactions. Its intention to continue its efforts along these lines from the viewpoint of assuming its responsibility as a member of the



international community was given expression. With respect to the reduction of trade restrictions, the decision taken by the Cabinet Ministers concerned last October was reaffirmed.

- (6) The textile problem has continued to be a major issue between Japan and the United States since the visit to Japan of Mr. Stans, the Secretary of Commerce, in May of this year. Hope was expressed that the preliminary discussions between Japan and the United States which are now being conducted at Geneva, would contribute to the furtherance of understanding between our two countries and that it would lead to a solution of difficulties in economic relationship between the two countries.

13. (Aid - Paragraph 13)

In this paragraph the two leaders agreed that economic development in the developing countries should be promoted through the joint efforts of the developed as well as the developing countries, and that the solution of the so-called North-South problem was essential to the development of international peace and stability. It was further agreed that both Japan and the United States would deal with the question of developmental aid on the basis of such common recognition.

Our Government has repeatedly stated its intention to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia commensurate with the economic growth of our country. In this paragraph, the Prime Minister reiterated to the President such an intention on the part of our Government.

The President, for his part, confirmed that the United States Government would continue to make active contribution to the economic development of Asia. Thus our two countries will continue to assist in the economic development in Asia to the best of their abilities.

14. (Space Cooperation - Paragraph 14)

The Prime Minister congratulated the President on the successful moon landing of Apollo 12, and expressed his hope for its safe return back to earth. He agreed with the President on the common recognition that with respect to the exploration of space for peaceful purposes, which is not only a new field in science but is fast becoming an important new field of international cooperation, the promotion of international cooperation could be identified with the promotion of world peace.

While the Agreement on Space Cooperation between Japan and the United States, aims primarily at facilitating the implementation of our space exploration program, it is of significance in that it further promotes the friendly relations between Japan and the United States through our mutual cooperation in such a positive field.

15. (Disarmament - Paragraph 15)

Arms control means to apply certain controls in arms policies, including the quality, quantity, development, deployment and use of arms. It also covers such matters as suspension of nuclear testing and the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed, and the "curbing of arms race" is to achieve a mutual reduction of the speed of armaments. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and Soviet Union at Helsinki would come under this category. In this paragraph, the Prime Minister stated that we would strongly hope for the success of these talks but that, however, we would not be satisfied merely with arms limitations and that we had a strong interest in realizing effective disarmament measures (for example, prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the reduction of nuclear weapons) with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament.

16. (Conclusion)

In the present talks, the two leaders engaged in a frank exchange of views based on mutual friendship and trust, and after the fullest consultation succeeded in bringing forth results satisfactory to both sides.

As one who has been charged with the task of assisting the Prime Minister in these negotiations, I am convinced that the results that have been achieved at this time are the greatest and the best that could be expected under the current international situation.

The return of administrative rights over Okinawa has settled the last remaining problem left in the wake of war to our respective countries.

I would like to state, however, that the results of the present talks do not rest there. The solution of the Okinawa problem has brought forth a new relationship between Japan and the United States. Our two countries have established a solid foundation upon which we will cooperate and assume a positive role in the international scene.

As we face the 70's, our two countries have reached a point where we will not merely be dealing with bilateral problems between ourselves, but bring a positive contribution

to international cooperation and development in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the entire world. It is my belief that we in Japan must renew our resolve to plot the course of our nation upon a vision that would be worthy of this new era. The significance of the present joint communique should be evaluated highly as a historic document which marks the advent of a new era in Japan - U.S. relationship.