

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

沖縄関係 沖縄返還交渉Ⅱ-1（対内）

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2020-05-28 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/45929

見解文書(完) 一七六

工
に
ア
シ
ス
（
務
）

nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific would have a certain psychological deterrent effect; yet the significance of these weapons seems to lie in fact in the Chinese judgment of the role these have to play in the larger context of the future Sino-American nuclear relationship including strategic weapons.

3. The question remains whether the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in post-reversion Okinawa is essential.

(1) Since it is the U.S. which actually bears the burden of militarily maintaining the equilibrium of force in the Far East, it is not intended here to make any categorical assertions on this question from the military standpoint.

(2) The Japanese position concerning nuclear weapons vis-à-vis mainland Japan and post-reversion Okinawa is that it is fundamentally a political problem involving national emotions. A special and strong feeling against nuclear weapons has existed for a long time in Japan since the end of the war and remains predominant.

(3) Therefore, a solution recognizing the stationing of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or tactical, on post-reversion Okinawa is politically unacceptable for Japan.

II
K
7
0
2

SECRET

極 秘
無 期 限
12 部 の 内
10 号

(July 16, 1969)

I. Certain premises on which the joint communique is drafted

(1) With regard to the question of U.S. military bases in Okinawa after reversion, the Japanese Government lays special emphasis on the following points:

(a) The question must be dealt with within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its existing related arrangements. Accordingly, there should be no special arrangement requiring Diet approval on the part of Japan.

(b) A confidential arrangement between the two countries would not be appropriate nor should it be required in dealing with the question.

(2) With regard to the prior consultation system as provided for in the Exchange of Notes concerning the implementation of Article VI of the Security Treaty, the considered opinion of the Japanese Government on its executive powers vis-à-vis the Diet may be summarized as follows:

(a) A situation requiring prior consultation, by its very nature, compels the Japanese Government to take a policy decision of utmost importance, which involves Japan's overriding national interest concerning the nation's own security. In the view of the Japanese Government, such a decision can be made only on the

Handwritten notes on the right margin, including the characters '極秘' and '12部の内 10号'.

basis of individual concrete cases. Thus, should the Government make external commitments in advance as to the position it might take on certain hypothetical cases of prior consultation, without considering all the relevant factors some of which are difficult to foresee or define, it would be tantamount to renouncing, as far as such hypothetical cases are concerned, the right of final judgement reserved by the Japanese Government under the terms of the Exchange of Notes. This cannot be done without a special arrangement requiring Diet approval.

(b) On the other hand, so long as the right of final judgement is reserved, it is within the normal executive powers of the Government to state its evaluation or recognition of certain situations which it envisages, without seeking Diet approval.

Replies given by the Government to the Diet on various occasions in the past in relation to the prior consultation system have always been based on the foregoing basic principles.

Paragraph 2 of the draft communique refers to the recognition of the Japanese Government of the fact that the security of countries in the Far East has a special bearing on the security of Japan and goes on to state that "in the

light of such recognition the reversion should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defence of countries in the Far East." Furthermore, the paper containing a statement on the position of the Japanese Government concerning Korea, attached to the draft communique, (hereinafter referred to as the statement on Korea) states that "(an armed attack against the Republic of Korea) would seriously affect the security of Japan" and "such recognition would form the basis on which the Government of Japan would determine its position vis-à-vis prior consultation"

The language is meant to be the clearest possible expression of the position of the Japanese Government, as an exercise of its executive powers within the constitutional limitations referred to in (a) and (b) above, in order to dispel the concern that U.S. interest in carrying out the international obligations might be adversely affected by the reversion. It is also intended to prevent any third party from mistakenly assuming that the Japanese Government wishes to impose undue restrictions through the prior consultation system on the use of bases in Japan, including Okinawa after reversion, by U.S. forces for military combat operations essential to the defense of countries in the Far East.

(3) The statement on Korea was not drafted as a part of the joint communique but was intended as a declaration by those responsible in the Government, to be addressed to the Japanese public through the Diet or any other appropriate channel. The recognition of the Japanese Government of the special significance of the security of countries in the Far East in relation to Japan's own security, stated in the draft communique, does encompass a situation in which an armed attack is launched against the Republic of Korea. Yet, separate and specific reference to Korea was considered desirable because of the need to make the position of the Japanese Government unmistakably clear to any potential aggressor against the Republic of Korea in view of the continuing tension over the area and also because of the mutual advantage in reaching a public understanding between the two countries which would effectively replace the Understanding of 1960. To incorporate the reference into the joint communique, however, would create an impression as if U.S. commitments to the defence of other countries in the Far East were less substantiated than in the case of the Republic of Korea — an impression which not only may have undesirable effects on the friendly relations of Japan and the U.S. with these countries but may invite a miscalculation of the intention

of the free world with respect to their defence.

II. On point II. A. in the U.S. paper

The term "armed attack" is used with the same meaning as in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and also in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, i.e., organized and premeditated use of force by any country, including the North Korean regime, against the Republic of Korea. Thus, the term as appears in the statement on Korea encompasses the situation envisaged in the Understanding of 1960, while such North Korean action as taken against the Pueblo and EC-121, by itself, does not fall within the definition of "an armed attack against the Republic of Korea."

However, as to the latter category of action, search and rescue operations to be undertaken from Japan by U.S. forces will not be regarded as military combat operations. Also, should the situation be considered an armed attack against the U.S. involving the common security interest of both countries, and should U.S. action be required as an exercise of the right of self-defence to meet such attack, it would be only natural for the Japanese Government to take a position consistent with the mutual interest provided that the principle of prior consultation is maintained.

III. On point II. B.

In view of what has been stated in paragraph 1, (2) (a) above, it is not within the executive powers of the Japanese Government to dispense with the prior consultation system in case of an armed attack against the Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, since the position of the Japanese Government vis-à-vis prior consultation will be based on the "recognition" stated in paragraph 3 of the draft communique, which encompasses the "basic recognition" in the statement on Korea, it should not be too difficult to anticipate the Japanese reply to be in line with the assumption of the U.S. Government.

IV. On point II. C.

The statement on Korea encompasses the situation envisaged in the Understanding of 1960, though, to be precise, the former, covering situations of lesser urgency, is wider in scope than the latter. The Japanese Government is prepared to co-operate fully with the U.S. Government on ways and means to carry out speedy prior consultation, so that the requirement to maintain the prior consultation system under all circumstances can be compatible with the need for effective military action. Thus, it is proposed that the Understanding of 1960 be treated as having been

replaced.

V. On point II. D.

(1) The premises of the language of paragraph 2 of the draft communique have already been elaborated upon in paragraph I, (2) above. It is the view of the Japanese Government that the existence of the prior consultation system as such, with its proper operation, should not constitute restriction on the use of bases in Japan by U.S. forces for military combat operations essential to the defense of countries in the Far East. It is further considered that prior consultation may be carried out in a smooth manner if preceded by close consultations under Article IV of the Security Treaty.

(2) The safety of U.S. forces stationed in the Far East, who bear the main burden of maintaining peace and security in the area, is obviously not a matter of small concern for the Japanese Government. It may be recalled, however, that Article VI of the Security Treaty defines the purpose for which military bases in Japan may be used as "contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." The Treaty is not built upon such a concept as "U.S. forces wherever stationed in the Far East"; nor has the Japanese Government given any

statement to the Diet in terms of such concept. In any case, it is legally impossible for the Government to give prior consent to any specific type of military combat operations.

VI. On point II, E.

As stated in paragraph 2 of the draft communique, the security of Taiwan is a matter of serious concern for the Government of Japan. As a matter of fact, however, an armed attack against Taiwan, which is only possible with direct confrontation between the U.S. and Communist China, is considered less likely to occur than one against the Republic of Korea.

VII. On point II, F.

The term "Far East" in the draft communique is used with the same meaning as it appears in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japanese Government, with the understanding of the U.S. Government, submitted to the Diet on February 23, 1960, the official definition of the term as used in the Treaty. According to this definition, Viet Nam is not included in the "Far East", but is considered to be covered by its "surrounding areas."

It may be recalled in this connection that the official definition clarified the term "surrounding areas" in relation to U.S. action under the Treaty in the following terms:

"The scope of U.S. action to be undertaken in case an armed attack is launched against the area (the Far East) or the security of the area is threatened by situations arising in surrounding areas, depends on the nature of the attack or the threat and will not necessarily be confined to the said area."

It may be further added that, as stated in the official definition, "if such U.S. action involves military combat operations, the use of facilities in Japan for the operations will naturally require prior consultation with the Government of Japan," while the use of the facilities for logistic activities will not be subject to prior consultation.