


琉球大学学術リポジトリ

沖縄関係 沖縄返還交渉Ⅱ-1（対内）

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SECRET

(September 17, 1969)

Draft Joint Communiqué^{1/}

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his Government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and

^{1/} Underlined parts not agreed. Wording in square brackets indicates U.S. version.

security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. /The Prime Minister agreed that the United States should be in a position to discharge effectively its international obligations for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan./

3. The Prime Minister and the President specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area, and referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China, which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the

Vietnam problem. The Prime Minister and the President expressed the hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should hostilities in Vietnam unfortunately not have been concluded by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two Governments would fully consult with each other so that the U.S. efforts for the realization of peace in Vietnam /to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference/ would not be affected by reversion. The Prime Minister further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indo-China area.

4. In the light of the situation and the prospects in the Far East, the Prime Minister and the President highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and mutually affirmed the intention of the two Governments to maintain firmly the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and the common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two

Governments should maintain closer and constant contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

5. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between Japan and the United States and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed due appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The Prime Minister and the President also recognized the vital role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion set forth above, it was agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of

these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The Prime Minister and the President also agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

6. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should be compatible with /contemplates the/ effective discharge of the international obligations

assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure, without prejudice to its position with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.


9. The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two Governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Government

of Japan in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both Governments. They agreed that the Japan-United States Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The Prime Minister and the President decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission in place of the existing Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Preparatory Commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with appropriate staff, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations to the two Governments through the Japan-United States Consultative Committee.

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to

strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.



SECRET

(September 17, 1969)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United

States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan. Therefore, in view of our national interest, we would deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the U.S. of its defense obligations. However, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today.